BharatNotes What is Anti-Defection (Tenth Schedule)?
The Anti-Defection Law refers to the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985. It disqualifies a member of Parliament or a State Legislature from continuing as a member if they "defect" from the party on whose ticket they were elected. The aim, as stated in the amendment, was to curb "the evil of political defections" motivated by the lure of office that endangered democratic stability after the 1967 ("Aaya Ram Gaya Ram") era.
The Schedule operates under Articles 102(2) and 191(2), and the 52nd Amendment correspondingly amended Articles 101, 102, 190 and 191.
Grounds for Disqualification
A legislator is disqualified if:
| Category | Disqualifying act |
|---|---|
| Member of a political party | Voluntarily gives up party membership, OR votes/abstains contrary to the party whip without prior permission (and it is not condoned within 15 days) |
| Independent member | Joins any political party after election |
| Nominated member | Joins any political party after six months from taking their seat |
"Voluntarily giving up membership" has been interpreted by courts to extend beyond formal resignation to conduct showing one has left the party.
The Merger Exception and the 91st Amendment
Originally, the Tenth Schedule exempted a "split" if one-third of a legislature party broke away. This loophole was widely misused, and the Constitution (91st Amendment) Act, 2003 deleted the split provision. The only surviving exception is a merger, which is valid only when at least two-thirds of a legislature party's members agree to merge with another party.
The 91st Amendment also barred a disqualified defector from holding any ministerial or remunerative political post for the rest of the term (until re-elected), and capped the Council of Ministers at 15% of the House strength (with a floor of 12 at the State level), via new Articles 75(1A) and 164(1A).
Deciding Authority and Judicial Review
Disqualification petitions are decided by the Speaker/Chairman of the House. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court struck down Paragraph 7 (which had barred judicial review) for want of state ratification, holding that the Presiding Officer acts as a tribunal whose decisions are subject to judicial review. In Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Assembly (2020), the Court held that, absent exceptional circumstances, petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months, and recommended Parliament consider replacing the Speaker with an independent tribunal headed by a retired judge.
UPSC Angle
Aspirants should distinguish clearly between the 52nd Amendment (1985) — which created the law — and the 91st Amendment (2003) — which removed the split defence and added ministerial caps. Remember the two-thirds merger threshold, the 15-day condonation window for whip violations, and that the Speaker's decision is reviewable but courts ordinarily do not intervene before a decision is made. The recurring criticism — Speaker's partisanship, suppression of intra-party dissent, and delay — forms the backbone of analytical Mains answers.
