BharatNotes
Anti-Defection Law
/ˌæntɪ dɪˈfɛkʃən lɔː/The constitutional provision contained in the Tenth Schedule — added by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985 — that provides for disqualification of elected members of Parliament and State Legislatures on the ground of defection from the party on whose ticket they were elected. A member is disqualified if they voluntarily give up party membership, vote or abstain contrary to party direction without prior permission (and the party does not condone it within 15 days), or if an independently elected member joins any political party after the election. The only surviving exception is merger — when at least 2/3rds of members of a legislature party agree to merge with another party (the original split exception requiring only 1/3rd was deleted by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003). The 91st Amendment also barred defecting members from holding ministerial office until re-election and capped the Council of Ministers at 15% of the House's total strength.
Context & Background
The law was enacted to combat the "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram" phenomenon of the 1960s-70s. The Speaker/Chairman of the House is the final deciding authority on disqualification, acting as a tribunal. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the 10th Schedule's validity but struck down Paragraph 7 (which barred judicial review) as unconstitutional — holding that the Speaker's decision is subject to judicial review under Articles 32, 136, and 226. The SC in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) recommended Speakers decide within 3 months. Critics argue the law kills intra-party dissent, and the Dinesh Goswami Committee recommended limiting it to confidence/no-confidence motions only. The Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) recommended transferring the deciding power from the Speaker to the President/Governor acting on the Election Commission's advice.
UPSC Exam Relevance
GS2 Polity — Prelims: 52nd Amendment (1985), 10th Schedule, 91st Amendment (2003) deleted split provision (para 3), merger requires 2/3rds (para 4), Speaker decides, Kihoto Hollohan (1992) struck down para 7, Council of Ministers capped at 15%; Mains: should the deciding authority be the Speaker or an independent body, impact on inner-party democracy, misuse of merger exception, Dinesh Goswami and Law Commission recommendations, tension between party discipline and individual conscience.
