Overview
Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly known as Naxalism, is India's oldest and most persistent internal security threat. It traces its origin to the 1967 peasant uprising in Naxalbari, West Bengal, and is rooted in the ideology of armed revolution to overthrow the state and establish a communist society. The CPI(Maoist) is the principal LWE outfit operating in India today.
The Government of India has described LWE as the "single biggest internal security challenge" — though the movement has been significantly weakened by a sustained two-pronged strategy combining security operations and development intervention.
Historical Evolution
| Year | Event |
|---|---|
| 1967 | Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal — led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal; peasants armed with bows and spears seized land and grain from landlords |
| 1969 | Charu Majumdar and others founded the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) — CPI(ML) — announced at a public rally in Calcutta on Lenin's birthday |
| 1970s | Movement spread to Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and other states; Charu Majumdar died in police custody (1972) |
| 1970s-80s | CPI(ML) splintered into multiple factions — People's War Group (PWG), Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), CPI(ML) Liberation, and others |
| 1990s | PWG and MCC fought for supremacy in undivided Bihar; hundreds of cadres killed in internecine conflict |
| 2004 | PWG + MCC merged on 21 September 2004 to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist) — currently the most powerful LWE group; Muppala Lakshmana Rao alias "Ganapathi" became General Secretary |
| 2004-2010 | Peak of Maoist violence — Red Corridor stretched from Nepal border to Karnataka; 1,005 deaths in LWE violence in 2010 (highest) |
| 2010-present | Sustained government operations progressively shrunk Maoist footprint |
Causes of LWE
Understanding the root causes is essential for any UPSC answer on LWE — the examiner expects you to identify it as fundamentally a socio-economic problem.
Structural Causes
- Land alienation — tribals dispossessed of traditional land by non-tribal settlers, mining companies, and development projects
- Forest rights denial — despite the Forest Rights Act (2006), implementation remains poor; tribals denied access to forest produce and homestead land
- Governance deficit — absence of basic state machinery (police stations, courts, revenue offices) in remote tribal areas
- Exploitation — by moneylenders, contractors, and intermediaries; feudal social structures persist
- Displacement — large-scale displacement for mining and industrial projects without adequate rehabilitation
Governance Failures
- Inadequate implementation of PESA Act (1996) — Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act meant to give tribal self-governance; poorly implemented
- Forest Rights Act (2006) — land titles for forest-dwelling tribals still pending in many areas
- Lack of basic infrastructure — no roads, health centres, schools, or mobile connectivity in interior areas
- Corrupt and absent bureaucracy — government schemes do not reach the last mile
Affected Areas — Current Status (2025-26)
| Parameter | Status |
|---|---|
| LWE-affected districts | Reduced from 126 (2010) → 90 (2018) → 70 (2021) → 38 (2024) → 18 (April 2025) → 11 (October 2025) |
| Most affected districts | Only 3 — Bijapur, Sukma, Narayanpur (all in Chhattisgarh) |
| LWE violence deaths | Down from 1,005 (2010) to 95 (2025) — a 91% decline |
| States delisted | Andhra Pradesh, Telangana removed from LWE-affected list |
| Government target | Eliminate Naxalism by March 2026 |
11 LWE-Affected Districts (October 2025)
| State | Districts |
|---|---|
| Chhattisgarh | Bijapur, Sukma, Narayanpur, Dantewada, Gariyaband, Kanker, Mohalla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki |
| Jharkhand | West Singhbhum |
| Madhya Pradesh | Balaghat |
| Maharashtra | Gadchiroli |
| Odisha | Kandhamal |
Government Strategy — Two-Pronged Approach
The National Policy and Action Plan to address LWE (approved 2015) envisages a multi-pronged strategy — security measures + development interventions + ensuring rights and entitlements of local communities.
A. Security Response
SAMADHAN Doctrine (2017)
Announced by Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh on 8 May 2017, this is the overarching strategy of the Ministry of Home Affairs to combat LWE:
| Letter | Full Form | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| S | Smart Leadership | Strengthening political and administrative will |
| A | Aggressive Strategy | Intensifying counter-insurgency operations |
| M | Motivation and Training | Enhancing skills and morale of security forces |
| A | Actionable Intelligence | Strengthening intelligence networks |
| D | Dashboard-based KPIs/KRAs | Data-driven monitoring to measure progress |
| H | Harnessing Technology | Advanced surveillance, drones, satellite imagery |
| A | Action Plan for Each Theatre | Area-specific, tailored strategies |
| N | No Access to Financing | Cutting off Maoist funding sources |
Key Operations
- Operation Kagaar (January 2024 onwards) — meaning "Final Mission"; launched by the Union Government integrating security action, surveillance technology, and development outreach; deployed 7 lakh security forces, hundreds of drones, and helicopters across Chhattisgarh's Bastar region; over 300 Maoists killed by early 2025; top leadership eliminated
- Operation Green Hunt (2009-10) — earlier large-scale offensive in Maoist-affected forests
- Operation Black Forest (April 2025) — coordinated operation on Chhattisgarh-Telangana border; 31 Maoists killed including top commanders
Security Infrastructure
- CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) — specialised CRPF unit for anti-Naxal operations
- CRPF as the lead central force in LWE areas
- Fortified police stations — 612+ being built in areas reclaimed from Maoists
- Road construction under PMGSY — ending isolation of interior areas; critical for last-mile connectivity
- Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) across Bastar for sustained presence
B. Development Response
| Programme | Details |
|---|---|
| Aspirational Districts Programme | NITI Aayog initiative; targets LWE-affected districts for accelerated development across health, education, agriculture, infrastructure |
| Special Central Assistance (SCA) | Central funding to 30 most affected districts for public infrastructure, livelihood, skill development |
| Road Requirement Plan (RRP-II) | Road connectivity in LWE areas — roads are the single most effective counter-Naxal intervention |
| Civic Action Programme | Security forces conduct medical camps, school construction, sports events to win hearts and minds |
| Skill Development | Livelihood Colleges in LWE districts |
| Surrender/Rehabilitation Policy | Cash incentives, vocational training, monthly stipend for surrendered Maoist cadres |
Exam Tip: In Mains answers on LWE, always present BOTH security AND development dimensions. A security-only answer will score poorly. The examiner expects you to argue that LWE is fundamentally a socio-economic problem that requires governance solutions, with security operations creating the enabling environment. Cite SAMADHAN + Aspirational Districts together.
Northeast Insurgency
Northeast insurgency is distinct from LWE — it is ethnic/identity-based, not ideological. While Naxalism seeks to overthrow the Indian state through communist revolution, NE insurgent groups seek autonomy, separate statehood, or sovereignty based on ethnic identity.
Major Insurgent Groups
| Group | State | Demand |
|---|---|---|
| ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) | Assam | Sovereign Assam (now split into pro-talks and anti-talks factions) |
| NSCN-IM (National Socialist Council of Nagalim — Isak-Muivah) | Nagaland | Greater Nagalim — unification of all Naga-inhabited areas, separate flag and constitution |
| NSCN-K (Khaplang faction) | Nagaland/Myanmar border | Naga sovereignty |
| NLFT (National Liberation Front of Tripura) | Tripura | Restoration of tribal rights (signed accord 2019) |
| HNLC (Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council) | Meghalaya | Tribal homeland |
Causes of NE Insurgency
- Ethnic identity and perceived alienation from mainland India
- Immigration from Bangladesh — especially demographic changes in Assam (key driver of ULFA and AASU movements)
- Underdevelopment and geographic isolation — poor connectivity, economic backwardness
- Historical factors — delayed integration into Indian Union; broken promises made during independence
- Inter-tribal rivalries — competition for land and political power between communities
Peace Accords
| Accord | Year | Key Features | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shillong Accord | 1975 | Agreement with a section of Naga insurgents to lay down arms | Partial success; rejected by hardliners, leading to formation of NSCN |
| Mizo Accord | 1986 | Tripartite agreement (GoI + Mizoram + MNF); Laldenga became CM; MNF entered democratic politics; Mizoram granted full statehood | Most successful peace accord in India — no insurgency since |
| NLFT Tripura Accord | 2019 | NLFT cadres laid down arms | Successful |
| Bodo Accord | 2020 | Tripartite accord with ABSU and all NDFB factions; BTAD renamed to Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR); 60 assembly seats; Rs 1,500 crore development package | Implementation underway |
| Bru-Reang Agreement | 2020 | Resettlement of displaced Bru tribals in Tripura with financial package | Implementation underway |
| Karbi Anglong Agreement | 2021 | Five insurgent groups of Karbi Anglong laid down arms | Implementation underway |
| Naga Peace Talks | 2015 onwards | Framework Agreement signed with NSCN-IM in August 2015; GoI acknowledged "unique history and culture" of Nagas | Unresolved — stuck on NSCN-IM demand for separate flag and constitution; GoI rejects this citing "one nation, one flag, one constitution" |
Remember: The Mizo Accord (1986) is considered India's most successful peace process — Laldenga became CM, MNF entered democratic politics, and Mizoram has had no insurgency since. Cite this as a model answer whenever asked about conflict resolution in NE India.
Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act — AFSPA
Background
- Enacted 1958 — originally to deal with the Naga uprising in the then composite state of Assam
- Extended to J&K in 1990 (under a separate Act — Armed Forces (J&K) Special Powers Act, 1990)
- Gives armed forces power to search, arrest, and use force (including shoot to kill) in areas declared as "disturbed areas"
Key Provision
Key distinction: AFSPA can only be imposed in areas declared "disturbed" — the Central Government or the Governor of the State can make this declaration under Section 3 of the Act. The declaration must be reviewed periodically. It is NOT a permanent law — it operates only where and when "disturbed area" status is declared.
Controversies and Criticism
- Irom Sharmila's 16-year fast (2000-2016) — Manipur activist demanding AFSPA repeal; longest hunger strike in history
- Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) case — Manipur families challenged fake encounters
- Supreme Court ruling in EEVFAM v. Union of India — held that even in disturbed areas, the armed forces cannot use "excessive or retaliatory force"
- Allegations of human rights violations — custodial killings, enforced disappearances, torture
Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005)
- Set up by Central Government in November 2004, headed by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy
- Report submitted June 2005
- Called AFSPA "a symbol of oppression, an object of hate, and an instrument of discrimination and high-handedness"
- Recommended repeal of AFSPA — stated that negative impacts outweigh gains
- Government rejected the recommendation — Defence Minister argued armed forces cannot function in disturbed areas without such powers
AFSPA Withdrawals
| State | Status |
|---|---|
| Tripura | Completely withdrawn (2015) |
| Meghalaya | Completely withdrawn (2018) |
| Assam | Withdrawn from all except 4 districts (phased from 2022) |
| Nagaland | Partially withdrawn — still applicable in 8 districts and 21 police station areas in 5 other districts |
| Manipur | Partially withdrawn from 19 police station areas in 7 districts (from 2022) |
| J&K | Remains in force in parts |
Important for UPSC
Prelims Focus
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Naxalbari uprising | 1967, West Bengal |
| CPI(ML) formation | 1969 — founded by Charu Majumdar |
| CPI(Maoist) formed | 2004 — merger of PWG + MCC |
| SAMADHAN doctrine | 2017, Ministry of Home Affairs |
| AFSPA enacted | 1958 (NE); separate Act for J&K in 1990 |
| Jeevan Reddy Committee | 2005 — recommended repeal of AFSPA |
| Mizo Accord | 1986 — most successful peace accord |
| Bodo Accord | 2020 — BTR (Bodoland Territorial Region) |
| Naga Framework Agreement | 2015 — with NSCN-IM; unresolved |
| LWE-affected districts | Reduced from 126 (2010) → 11 (October 2025) |
Mains GS-3 Dimensions
- Is AFSPA a necessary evil or a human rights violation? — balanced answer needed; cite Jeevan Reddy Committee + SC judgment in EEVFAM case + operational necessity argument
- Development vs security approach to LWE — which should take primacy? Argue that both are complementary; security creates the enabling environment, development addresses root causes
- Lessons from Mizo peace process for Naga peace talks — democratic integration, addressing genuine grievances, political accommodation
- Why has Naga peace remained unresolved despite the 2015 framework agreement? — flag and constitution demand vs GoI's "one nation" position; inter-tribal differences; impact on neighbouring states (Manipur, Assam)
Interview Angles
- Would you repeal AFSPA? — balanced view; operational necessity vs democratic accountability; suggest time-bound review mechanism
- How would you resolve the Naga political issue? — draw from Mizo model; creative federalism; address concerns of non-Naga tribes in Manipur and Assam
Current Affairs Connect
| Topic | Link |
|---|---|
| Operation Kagaar successes (2024-25) | Ujiyari.com — LWE Updates |
| AFSPA withdrawals in NE (2022 onwards) | Ujiyari.com — AFSPA |
| Naga Peace Talks status | Ujiyari.com — NE Insurgency |
| Bodo Accord implementation | Ujiyari.com — Peace Accords |
| LWE districts reduced to 11 (2025) | Ujiyari.com — Internal Security |
Vocabulary
Naxalism
- Pronunciation: /ˈnæksəlɪzəm/
- Definition: A communist insurgent ideology in India, rooted in Maoist principles of armed peasant revolution against the state to overthrow existing socio-economic structures and establish a classless society.
- Origin: Named after Naxalbari, a village in Darjeeling district, West Bengal, where a peasant uprising in 1967 led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal gave birth to the movement; formed from the place name Naxalbari + the English suffix -ism.
Maoist
- Pronunciation: /ˈmaʊɪst/
- Definition: A follower of the political and military ideology of Mao Zedong, which advocates armed revolution led by the peasantry to overthrow capitalist and feudal systems through protracted guerrilla warfare.
- Origin: From the proper name Mao (Mao Zedong, 1893-1976, Chinese communist leader) + the suffix -ist; earliest known English use dates to 1949.
Cadre
- Pronunciation: /ˈkɑːdreɪ/ (US) or /ˈkɑːdə/ (UK)
- Definition: A small, trained core group of personnel who form the nucleus of a larger organisation, particularly a political or military movement.
- Origin: Borrowed from French cadre ("frame"), from Italian quadro ("framed painting, square"), from Latin quadrum ("a square"), ultimately from quattuor ("four"); entered English in the late 18th century.
Key Terms
SAMADHAN Doctrine
- Pronunciation: /səˈmɑːdʱɑːn ˈdɒktrɪn/
- Definition: The Ministry of Home Affairs' comprehensive counter-Left Wing Extremism strategy announced in 2017, providing a unified short-term to long-term framework where each letter stands for a pillar: S — Smart Leadership (coordinated vision and strategy), A — Aggressive Strategy (proactive operations, not reactive), M — Motivation and Training (enhancing morale and skills of security forces), A — Actionable Intelligence (local networks, surrendered cadre inputs, inter-agency sharing), D — Dashboard-based KPIs and KRAs (performance measurement), H — Harnessing Technology (UAVs, satellite monitoring, communication trackers), A — Action Plan for Each Theatre (state-specific short/medium/long-term plans), and N — No Access to Financing (choking fund flows through PMLA and financial intelligence).
- Context: Announced by Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh at the Review Meeting of LWE-affected States on 8 May 2017. Samadhan is a Hindi word (from Sanskrit samaadhaanam) meaning "solution" or "resolution." The doctrine serves as the overarching strategic framework under which operational campaigns like Operation Kagaar (2024-25), CRPF deployments, and inter-state coordination are conducted. Its effectiveness is reflected in the dramatic decline of LWE-affected districts from 126 (2010) to under 12 by 2025, with over 5,000 Maoists neutralised since 2000 and more than 10,000 surrendering between 2015 and 2025. The doctrine integrates with the development prong — the Aspirational Districts Programme, PMGSY road connectivity, and Left Wing Extremism Division's special schemes.
- UPSC Relevance: GS3 Internal Security — Prelims tests the acronym expansion (all 8 pillars) and year (2017). Mains asks candidates to "Evaluate the government's counter-LWE strategy" and "Is the decline of LWE sustainable?" — SAMADHAN provides a ready-made eight-pillar framework for structured answers. Always pair SAMADHAN (security pillar) with the Aspirational Districts Programme and PMGSY connectivity (development pillar) to demonstrate the two-pronged approach that examiners expect.
Red Corridor
- Pronunciation: /rɛd ˈkɒrɪdɔːr/
- Definition: A contiguous belt of forested, mineral-rich, and predominantly tribal districts across eastern, central, and southern India — spanning states such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana — that have experienced significant Naxalite-Maoist insurgent presence, armed violence, and parallel governance structures. The corridor is characterised by dense forest cover, rich mineral deposits (iron ore, bauxite, coal), high tribal population concentrations, and historically poor governance and infrastructure.
- Context: The term emerged in Indian security discourse in the early 2000s to describe the geographic spread of Left Wing Extremism; red refers to the communist colour symbolising revolution, and corridor denotes the elongated, belt-like shape of the affected region that at its peak stretched from the Nepal border in the north to the southern tip of Andhra Pradesh. The corridor has shrunk dramatically: from nearly 180 districts in the late 2000s to 126 districts formally classified as LWE-affected in 2010, then to just 11 districts by October 2025, and further to approximately 7 districts by early 2026. The remaining core areas are concentrated in Chhattisgarh (Bijapur, Sukma, Dantewada, Narayanpur, Kanker), Jharkhand (West Singhbhum), and Odisha (Kandhamal). Home Minister Amit Shah set a deadline of 31 March 2026 for complete eradication of armed Naxalism.
- UPSC Relevance: GS3 Internal Security — Prelims tests the states covered by the Red Corridor and the declining district count (from ~180 at peak to 126 in 2010 to under 12 by 2025). Mains uses the Red Corridor concept to frame the geographic and socio-economic dimensions of LWE — always highlight that the corridor's shrinkage reflects the combined impact of security operations (SAMADHAN, Operation Kagaar) and development interventions (Aspirational Districts, road and mobile connectivity, banking access). The correlation between mineral wealth, tribal displacement, and Maoist recruitment is a premium analytical point.
Sources: MHA — LWE Division, PIB, PRS India, NDMA
BharatNotes