Secularism

Why this chapter matters for UPSC: Secularism is one of the most contested concepts in Indian political life and a perennial UPSC Mains topic. The Preamble's "secular" commitment, Art. 25–28 (religious freedom), debates about Uniform Civil Code (Art. 44), the Shah Bano controversy, Bommai judgment, triple talaq, and temple entry issues all require a clear understanding of what Indian secularism actually means — and how it differs from the Western model. Rajeev Bhargava's concept of "principled equidistance" is directly cited by courts and is high-yield for GS4.

Contemporary hook: In 2019, the Supreme Court in Kantaru Rajeevaru v Indian Young Lawyers Association (Sabarimala review) referred questions about essential religious practices and the limits of state intervention in religion to a larger bench — demonstrating that the secularism debate remains alive and unresolved in Indian constitutional law.

PART 1 — Quick Reference Tables

Western vs Indian Secularism

Constitutional Provisions on Secularism

Key Secularism Cases

PART 2 — Detailed Notes

1. What is Secularism?

Secularism is the principle that the state should be neutral in matters of religion — neither favouring nor discriminating against any religious community or practice.

But this simple definition conceals deep complexity. There are at least three senses of secularism relevant to UPSC:

Separation: Church (or any religious institution) and state should be strictly separated. The state has no business in religious affairs; religion has no role in state affairs. The French laïcité model is the extreme version: no religious symbols in state schools, no state aid to religious institutions, no religious test for public office.

Neutrality: The state should be neutral between religions — treating all equally, neither promoting nor disfavouring any. The American model approaches this: Congress shall make no law "respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" (First Amendment).

Equal treatment / positive accommodation: The state may engage with religion, but must treat all religions equally. It may assist all religions financially (as the Indian state funds Hindu temples, Muslim waqfs, Christian institutions, Sikh gurudwaras) but cannot give disproportionate support to one. It may intervene in religions to reform oppressive practices (untouchability, child marriage, sati) — but only for genuine welfare purposes, applied consistently.

India follows the third model — which Rajeev Bhargava has called "principled equidistance."

2. Rajeev Bhargava's Principled Equidistance

Rajeev Bhargava, a leading Indian political philosopher, has argued that India's secularism is not a failed copy of Western secularism but a distinct and in some ways superior model.

The core idea: The Indian state maintains "principled equidistance" from all religions — it neither walls itself off from religion nor favours any particular religion. It engages with religion when necessary for two purposes:

1. Preventing inter-religious domination — ensuring no religious community uses state power to oppress another
2. Preventing intra-religious domination — allowing the state to reform oppressive practices within religions (e.g., temple entry, abolition of untouchability, sati prohibition, triple talaq abolition)

Why it is "principled": The state's engagement with religion is not based on political expediency or majoritarian preference but on consistent principles of freedom, equality, and anti-domination.

Why India needed this model: Western secularism emerged in a Christian context to solve the Christian church-state problem. India has no single dominant church; it has a deeply pluralist, multi-religious society where religion pervades all aspects of life — including civil law, festivals, social institutions. A strict separation model would be both culturally alien and practically unworkable. India needed a model that could manage religious pluralism while also reforming religiously-sanctioned injustice.

3. Art. 25–28: The Constitutional Architecture of Indian Secularism

Art. 25 — Freedom of conscience and religion: Every person has the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion. This is subject to:

• Public order, morality, and health
• Other Fundamental Rights (Art. 14 — equality; Art. 17 — untouchability; Art. 21 — dignity)
• The state's power to regulate secular activities associated with religion (temple management)
• The state's power to reform religion for social welfare (temple entry, untouchability abolition)

Art. 26 — Religious denomination rights: Every religious denomination has the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage its own affairs in religious matters, and own and administer property. The key limitation: these rights are subject to public order, morality, and health — but the state cannot interfere in genuinely religious matters.

Art. 27 — No forced religious taxation: Citizens cannot be compelled to pay taxes for the promotion of a religion. This prevents the state from financing religious propagation but does not prohibit the state from providing services to religious institutions (schools, hospitals) that serve the public.

Art. 28 — Secular state education: No religious instruction in wholly state-maintained institutions. In aided institutions, no compulsion to attend religious instruction. This ensures state schools do not proselytise.

4. The Shah Bano Case and Its Aftermath

Background: Shah Bano, a 73-year-old Muslim woman, was divorced by her husband Mohammad Ahmed Khan in 1978 after 43 years of marriage. He refused maintenance beyond the iddat period (approximately 3 months) as provided in Muslim personal law. She approached courts under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (a secular law providing maintenance for wives).

Supreme Court judgment (1985): A five-judge constitutional bench ruled in Shah Bano's favour. Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud held that Sec. 125 CrPC applies to all women regardless of religion; Muslim personal law's maintenance provision was inadequate; the Court observed that a Uniform Civil Code (Art. 44) was needed.

Political fallout: The judgment triggered a major political controversy. Muslim religious leaders and organisations protested that it violated Muslim personal law and Art. 25 religious freedom. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's government, under political pressure, passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 — which excluded Muslim women from Sec. 125 CrPC and limited maintenance to the iddat period plus the return of mehr.

Long-term reversal: In Danial Latifi v Union of India (2001), the Supreme Court upheld the 1986 Act but interpreted it broadly — holding that a husband's obligation to provide for his wife extends beyond the iddat period. In Shamim Ara v State of UP (2002), the Court declared triple talaq without any notice or reason to be void.

Triple Talaq (2017–2019): In Shayara Bano v Union of India (2017), a five-judge bench struck down instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) as unconstitutional — with a 3-2 majority finding it violates Art. 14. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019 then criminalised instant triple talaq, making it a cognisable offence.

5. S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994)

The Bommai judgment is the most important Supreme Court ruling on secularism and federalism.

Facts: In 1989, the BJP-led government in Karnataka (S.R. Bommai was CM) was dismissed under Art. 356 for alleged loss of majority. Bommai challenged the dismissal. The case consolidated similar challenges from other states where governments had been dismissed.

Holdings on secularism:

1. Secularism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution — it cannot be destroyed even by constitutional amendment
2. A party or government that does not respect the principle of secularism cannot rely on the constitutional protection of democratic governance
3. Art. 356 cannot be used to dismiss a state government merely because it is headed by a party with a religious orientation — but actively using government to promote one religion at the expense of others would be grounds for dismissal
4. The Court, however, cannot review the President's satisfaction leading to the proclamation — only the result can be reviewed by Parliament (within two months)

Significance: Bommai established secularism as constitutionally mandatory and non-negotiable — it placed limits on religious majoritarianism and gave courts jurisdiction to protect secular governance.

6. Uniform Civil Code — The Art. 44 Debate

Art. 44 DPSP: "The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India."

Current position: India has personal laws — separate laws for marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption — for different religious communities: Hindu Personal Law, Muslim Personal Law, Christian Marriage Act, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act. Goa applies a uniform civil code (the Portuguese Civil Code, retained after 1961 annexation).

Arguments for UCC:

• Art. 44 (constitutional mandate, even if non-justiciable)
• Gender justice — Muslim and Christian personal laws have historically disadvantaged women (maintenance, divorce, inheritance)
• National integration — a common law for all citizens regardless of religion
• Rawlsian equality — all citizens should have the same basic legal protections

Arguments against UCC (or for caution):

• Minority rights — Art. 25–26 protect religious practices, which include personal laws
• Cultural diversity — India's strength is pluralism; imposing uniformity may destroy it
• Practical difficulty — Hindu personal law itself is not uniform (regional variations)
• Political motivation — fear that UCC is being pushed to target Muslim personal law specifically
• Community readiness — gradual reform within communities is more sustainable

Supreme Court on UCC: Multiple judgments have called for a UCC (Shah Bano 1985; Sarla Mudgal 1995; Lily Thomas 2000; John Vallamattom 2003) but none has ordered Parliament to enact it — correctly recognising it as a legislative, not judicial, matter.

PART 3 — Frameworks and Analysis

Framework: Evaluating State Action Under Indian Secularism

For any state action involving religion (Mains answers):

Exam Strategy

Prelims Traps

Mains Answer Framework: Secularism Questions

For "Compare Western and Indian models of secularism":

1. Western model — separation (Jefferson's wall, French laïcité)
2. Indian model — principled equidistance (Bhargava)
3. Constitutional provisions Art. 25–28; Preamble (secular since 1976)
4. Indian state's engagement with religion — temple entry, triple talaq
5. Shah Bano, Bommai — landmark cases
6. UCC debate — Art. 44 DPSP
7. Contemporary challenges — religious majoritarianism
8. Conclusion — why India's model is appropriate for a pluralist society

Previous Year Questions

Prelims 2019: With reference to the Constitution of India, which of the following is a feature of Indian secularism that distinguishes it from the Western model? (a) State must remain completely separated from religion (b) The state may intervene in religious matters to prevent oppression and promote social reform (c) Religion is excluded from the public sphere (d) Only majority religion receives state protection Answer: (b)

Mains GS4 2022: "Indian secularism is not about the separation of religion from the state but about the principled equidistance of the state from all religions." Discuss. (150 words)

Mains GS2 2017: Examine the significance of the S.R. Bommai judgment in establishing secularism as part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. (250 words)

Mains GS2 2020: Critically analyse the debate on the Uniform Civil Code with reference to constitutional provisions, judicial observations, and minority rights. (250 words)