Judicial Accountability & Reforms in India

Key Concepts

Judicial accountability refers to the mechanisms through which the judiciary — as an institution and individual judges — are held responsible for their decisions and conduct. In India, the tension between judicial independence (necessary for impartiality) and judicial accountability (necessary for democracy) is a persistent constitutional challenge. Unlike the executive and legislature, the judiciary is largely self-regulating — a feature that generates both legitimacy and concern.

Constitutional Framework for Judicial Appointments

Original Design (Articles 124 & 217)

The Constitution provides that Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President "after consultation with" the Chief Justice of India and other judges deemed fit. High Court judges are appointed after consultation with the CJI, the Governor, and the relevant High Court's Chief Justice.

The word "consultation" was initially interpreted as advisory — the President (acting on cabinet advice) was not bound by the CJI's recommendation.

The Three Judges Cases — Evolution of the Collegium

The Collegium System — with no statutory basis, born entirely from judicial interpretation — became the de facto appointment mechanism for all Supreme Court and High Court judges.

Criticism of the Collegium

• Opacity: No written criteria, no public reasoning for recommendations or rejections
• Lack of diversity: Historically underrepresents women, Scheduled Castes, and regional backgrounds
• No accountability: Collegium recommendations cannot be challenged in court by third parties
• Reiteration power: Government can return a name once; if re-recommended, appointment is mandatory — but timeline is not enforced

The NJAC Episode (2014–2015)

National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014

Parliament enacted the 99th Constitutional Amendment (2014) creating the NJAC — a six-member body comprising:

1. Chief Justice of India (Chairperson)
2. Two senior-most Supreme Court judges
3. Union Law Minister
4. Two "eminent persons" nominated by a committee of CJI, PM, and Leader of Opposition

Veto clause: Any two members could block a recommendation.

Supreme Court's Verdict

In Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (2015), a Constitution Bench (4:1 majority) struck down the NJAC Act as unconstitutional, holding that:

• Judicial independence is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution
• Executive representation on the appointments body violated independence
• The "eminent persons" clause created scope for political influence
• The veto clause could be misused

Justice Chelameswar (the lone dissenter) argued that the complete exclusion of the executive from appointments was itself an extreme position.

Significance: The collegium system was restored. The government accepted the judgment but has since repeatedly stressed the need for a "Memorandum of Procedure" governing collegium recommendations — negotiations remain inconclusive.

Conduct Standards for Judges

Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997)

Adopted by the Full Court of the Supreme Court in May 1997, this is the primary internal code of conduct for judges. It is not legally enforceable as a statute — it is a self-imposed standard. Key provisions:

Gap: The Restatement has no enforcement mechanism — a judge who violates it faces no formal sanction short of impeachment.

Removing a Judge — The Impeachment Process

Constitutional Provision (Article 124(4), 218)

A Supreme Court or High Court judge can be removed only by an order of the President, after an address by both Houses of Parliament supported by a special majority (majority of total membership + 2/3 of members present and voting), on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.

Judges Enquiry Act, 1968

• Either House Speaker/Chairman can refer a removal motion to a three-member committee (1 SC judge, 1 HC Chief Justice, 1 distinguished jurist)
• Committee investigates and submits findings
• If committee finds misbehaviour, Parliament votes

The Only Attempted Impeachment

Justice V. Ramaswami (1993): Misused official funds and court resources as HC Chief Justice. A committee found him guilty. The impeachment motion was moved in Lok Sabha — but failed because the ruling Congress party abstained, denying the required majority. He completed his tenure. This episode exposed the political nature of the impeachment process — a judge can be found guilty of misbehaviour by a judicial committee and still retain office through political arithmetic.

RTI and the Judiciary

The Supreme Court Collegium's resistance to RTI disclosure was a major accountability controversy. In CPIO, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019), the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench held:

• The office of the Chief Justice of India is a "public authority" under the RTI Act 2005
• Personal information of judges (assets, property declarations) is exempt from disclosure under privacy provisions
• Collective collegium deliberations — the names considered, reasons for recommendation or rejection — are not routinely disclosable

Current position: Judges voluntarily file asset declarations with the Chief Justice, but there is no mandatory public disclosure. The Supreme Court publishes collegium resolutions on its website since 2017 — a significant transparency step.

Key Reform Proposals

In-House Inquiry Procedure (1999)

Below the impeachment threshold, the Supreme Court has an internal procedure for receiving complaints against judges. The CJI refers allegations to a committee of fellow judges. Findings are confidential — no public disclosure. Outcomes have included voluntary resignations (in a few cases) and transfers. Critics argue this procedure lacks transparency and public accountability.

Contempt of Court — The Accountability Paradox

India's Contempt of Courts Act 1971 empowers courts to punish individuals (including journalists and lawyers) for "scandalising the court" — a category with no parallel in most common law countries. The paradox: the same institution that faces accountability questions can use contempt powers against those raising them.

Key criticism: Courts have used scandalising contempt against legitimate criticism. The Law Commission and senior advocates have repeatedly recommended scrapping this category.

Prashant Bhushan contempt case (2020): The Supreme Court found senior advocate Prashant Bhushan guilty of contempt for tweets criticising the Chief Justice and the judiciary. He was fined Re. 1. The case reignited debate about whether contempt law is a legitimate accountability tool or a chilling instrument.

Recent Developments (2024–2026)

Chief Justice Transitions

• Justice D.Y. Chandrachud served as CJI (November 2022 – November 2024); his tenure was notable for large Constitution Bench sittings, including the Article 370 judgment (2023) and the Electoral Bonds judgment (2024).
• Justice Sanjiv Khanna was sworn in as the 51st Chief Justice of India on 11 November 2024; retired on 13 May 2025 (tenure: ~6 months — among the shorter CJI tenures, again highlighting the structural issue of short tenures under the seniority convention).
• Justice B.R. Gavai was sworn in as 52nd CJI on 14 May 2025 — the first Buddhist and second Dalit CJI (after Justice K.G. Balakrishnan who served 2007–2010). He retired on 23 November 2025 after a tenure of about 6 months.
• Justice Sanjiv Khanna resigned the presidency of the Supreme Court Bar Association after his elevation — not related to the CJI role.

Collegium Transparency (2024–26)

• Under CJI Chandrachud, the Collegium began publishing reasons for recommendations and for reiterations, substantially improving transparency compared to the pre-2017 era.
• However, the practice remains non-statutory and discretionary — there is no legal obligation to publish collegium reasons, and the format varies.
• The government continued to sit on several collegium recommendations without formally returning them or issuing appointments — a practice the Supreme Court criticised in multiple hearings.

Electoral Bonds Judgment (2024)

In Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (February 2024), a Constitution Bench unanimously struck down the Electoral Bonds Scheme, holding it violated the right to information about political funding. CJI Chandrachud led the bench. This judgment is relevant to judicial accountability discussions because it demonstrated the Court's willingness to check executive overreach in electoral finance.

High Court Diversity

• As of 2026, no woman has served as Chief Justice of India — India's highest judicial office. Several women have served as Chief Justices of High Courts (Justice Indira Banerjee — Madras HC; Justice Hima Kohli — Telangana HC before SC elevation).
• The proportion of women judges in High Courts remains around 13–14% (2025 data), well below the 33% representation recommended by various judicial reform committees.

Contempt Law — Ongoing Relevance

The Prashant Bhushan contempt precedent (2020) continues to cast a shadow over judicial criticism. Civil society organisations and the Bar Council have repeatedly called for legislative reform of Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act (scandalising the court). As of 2026, no amendment has been made.

Current Affairs Connect

• Collegium reiteration delays: The government's practice of sitting on collegium recommendations for extended periods without formally returning them is an ongoing governance dispute
• NJAC 2.0 debate: Calls for revisiting judicial appointments reform continue, with the government stating the collegium lacks transparency
• Diversity in judiciary: Justice B.R. Gavai (May–Nov 2025) — first Buddhist and second Dalit CJI; first woman CJI milestone still pending
• Judges' asset disclosure: Demands for mandatory, public disclosure of judges' assets remain unmet
• Short CJI tenures: The seniority convention produces many CJIs with tenures under a year — Law Commission has repeatedly recommended a minimum 2-year tenure

PYQ Relevance

Mains GS2 (previous year questions, representative):

• "Discuss the controversy over the appointment of judges to the higher judiciary in India. What reforms are needed?" (2017-type)
• "The independence of the judiciary is non-negotiable, but unaccountable power is incompatible with a democracy. Analyse." (essay/opinion type)
• "What is the collegium system? What are its merits and demerits?" (short answer type)

Prelims:

• Which article provides for removal of SC judges? — Article 124(4)
• NJAC was struck down in which case? — SCAORA v. UoI, 2015
• The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life was adopted in — 1997