Introduction

The Supreme Court of India has, through landmark judgments delivered over seven decades, shaped the living character of the Constitution. From defining the limits of parliamentary power to expanding the scope of fundamental rights, these verdicts form the backbone of Indian constitutional jurisprudence. A thorough understanding of these cases is indispensable for UPSC aspirants — they appear across Prelims, Mains GS-II, and Essay papers.

This chapter covers the most significant constitutional judgments in chronological order, organized thematically around the amendment power debate, fundamental rights expansion, federalism, social justice, and individual liberty.


Part I — The Amendment Power Debate

1. Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1951)

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1951 SC 458
Date5 October 1951
BenchFive-judge Bench
Key IssueCan Parliament amend Fundamental Rights under Article 368?

The petitioner, a zamindar from Bihar, challenged the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which curtailed the right to property under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31. The Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment, ruling that the word "law" in Article 13(2) refers to ordinary legislative law and does not include constitutional amendments made under Article 368. Therefore, Parliament possessed unlimited power to amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights.

Significance: Established the principle that constitutional amendments are exercises of constituent power, distinct from ordinary legislative power, and are therefore immune from the restrictions of Article 13.


2. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1967 SC 1643
Date27 February 1967
BenchEleven-judge Bench
Key IssueAre Fundamental Rights beyond the amending power of Parliament?

The Golaknath family from Jalandhar, Punjab, held over 500 acres of farmland. Under the Punjab Security and Land Tenures Act, 1953, the state declared most of their land "surplus." They challenged this law as violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 19(1)(g).

By a narrow 6:5 majority, the Supreme Court reversed Shankari Prasad and held that a constitutional amendment under Article 368 is "law" within the meaning of Article 13. Consequently, Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights. The Court applied the doctrine of "prospective overruling" — meaning the decision would apply only to future amendments, not to amendments already enacted.

Significance: This judgment directly led to the 24th Amendment Act, 1971, which expressly declared that Parliament has the power to amend any provision of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, and that Article 13 does not apply to amendments under Article 368.


3. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) — The Basic Structure Doctrine

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1973 SC 1461
Date24 April 1973
BenchThirteen-judge Bench (largest in Indian judicial history)
Key IssueIs there any implied limitation on Parliament's amending power?

Sri Kesavananda Bharati, head of the Edneer Mutt in Kerala, challenged the constitutional validity of the 24th, 25th, and 29th Amendments, which had been enacted to override the Golaknath decision and curtail judicial review of land reform legislation.

The thirteen-judge Bench comprised Chief Justice S.M. Sikri, and Justices J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg, S.N. Dwivedi, A.K. Mukherjea, and Y.V. Chandrachud.

By a historic 7:6 majority, the Court held that:

  • Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution under Article 368, including Fundamental Rights (overruling Golaknath).
  • However, Parliament cannot alter the "basic structure" or "basic features" of the Constitution.
  • Judicial review is itself part of the basic structure.

Elements of Basic Structure identified (across various judgments):

  • Supremacy of the Constitution
  • Republican and democratic form of government
  • Secular character of the Constitution
  • Separation of powers among legislature, executive, and judiciary
  • Federal character of the Constitution
  • Unity and sovereignty of India
  • Individual freedom and dignity
  • Principle of equality
  • Judicial review (Articles 32 and 226)
  • Rule of law
  • Harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
  • Free and fair elections
  • Limited power of Parliament to amend the Constitution
  • Effective access to justice
  • Parliamentary system of government

Significance: The Basic Structure Doctrine is the single most important constitutional principle in India. It places an ultimate check on parliamentary power — even a constitutional amendment can be struck down if it violates the basic structure. No subsequent judgment has overruled this doctrine.


4. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1980 SC 1789
Date31 July 1980
BenchFive-judge Bench; authored by CJ Y.V. Chandrachud
Key IssueCan Parliament's amending power be made unlimited and immune from judicial review?

During the Emergency, the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 made two critical changes: (a) Section 4 amended Article 31C to give Directive Principles primacy over all Fundamental Rights (not just Articles 14 and 19); (b) Section 55 inserted clauses (4) and (5) in Article 368, declaring that no constitutional amendment could be questioned in any court on any ground.

By a 4:1 majority (Justice P.N. Bhagwati dissenting), the Court struck down both provisions as violating the basic structure of the Constitution.

Key observations:

  • The Constitution is founded on a balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles — giving absolute primacy to either would destroy the basic structure.
  • If Parliament's amending power is made unlimited, the Constitution ceases to be supreme; Parliament becomes supreme — which is antithetical to a written constitution.
  • Judicial review of constitutional amendments is part of the basic structure and cannot be taken away.

Significance: Reinforced and strengthened the Basic Structure Doctrine by establishing that the limited nature of the amending power is itself a basic feature.


Part II — Fundamental Rights Expansion

5. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) — Due Process and the Golden Triangle

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1978 SC 597
Date25 January 1978
BenchSeven-judge Bench
Key IssueWhat is the scope of "procedure established by law" under Article 21?

Maneka Gandhi's passport was impounded on 2 July 1977 by the Regional Passport Officer under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967, on grounds of "public interest." No reasons were provided despite her request.

The Supreme Court transformed the interpretation of Article 21, holding that:

  • The "procedure established by law" must be just, fair, and reasonable — not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.
  • Articles 14, 19, and 21 are not mutually exclusive but form an interconnected "golden triangle" — any law depriving personal liberty must satisfy all three.
  • The Court effectively read the American "due process" standard into Article 21 without formally amending the text.
  • Overruled the narrow reading of Article 21 in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), which had treated Fundamental Rights as watertight compartments.

Significance: Maneka Gandhi is the single most important judgment for expanding the scope of Article 21. Every subsequent expansion of the right to life — right to livelihood, right to education, right to health, right to shelter, right to a clean environment, right to privacy — traces its origin to this verdict.


6. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) — The Habeas Corpus Case

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1976 SC 1207
Date28 April 1976
BenchFive-judge Bench
Key IssueCan courts entertain habeas corpus petitions during a National Emergency when Article 21 is suspended?

During the Emergency (1975-77), several political detainees challenged their detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA). The question was whether the right to move courts under Article 21 could be suspended during an Emergency.

By a 4:1 majority, the Court ruled in favor of the government, holding that no person has any locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ to challenge the legality of a detention order during an Emergency when Article 21 has been suspended.

Justice H.R. Khanna's lone dissent — He held that the right to life and personal liberty exists independent of Article 21 and cannot be taken away even during an Emergency. His dissent cost him the Chief Justiceship — Justice M.H. Beg was appointed instead, superseding Khanna.

Overruling in 2017: In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the nine-judge Bench unanimously held that ADM Jabalpur was "seriously flawed" and expressly overruled it. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud observed that Justice Khanna's dissent represented the correct constitutional position.

Significance: ADM Jabalpur is widely regarded as the darkest hour of the Indian judiciary. Its overruling in 2017 restored the principle that fundamental rights, especially the right to life, are non-derogable even during emergencies.


7. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) — Right to Privacy

DetailInformation
Citation(2017) 10 SCC 1
Date24 August 2017
BenchNine-judge Bench
Key IssueIs the right to privacy a fundamental right under the Constitution?

The case arose from challenges to the Aadhaar scheme. The government argued that no fundamental right to privacy existed, relying on M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954, eight-judge Bench) and Kharak Singh v. State of UP (1962, six-judge Bench).

The nine-judge Bench comprised Chief Justice J.S. Khehar, and Justices J. Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde, R.K. Agrawal, Rohinton F. Nariman, A.M. Sapre, D.Y. Chandrachud, S.K. Kaul, and S. Abdul Nazeer.

The Bench unanimously held that:

  • The right to privacy is a constitutionally protected fundamental right, intrinsic to life and personal liberty under Article 21, and as part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III.
  • M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh were overruled to the extent they held otherwise.
  • ADM Jabalpur was expressly overruled.
  • Privacy includes informational privacy, decisional autonomy, and bodily integrity.
  • The right is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions based on a three-part test: legality, legitimate aim, and proportionality.

Significance: One of the most consequential judgments in Indian constitutional history. It laid the groundwork for subsequent decisions on Aadhaar (2018), Section 377 (Navtej Johar, 2018), adultery (Joseph Shine, 2018), and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.


Part III — Social Justice and Equality

8. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) — The Mandal Case

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1993 SC 477
Date16 November 1992
BenchNine-judge Bench
Key IssueValidity of 27% reservation for OBCs; ceiling on reservations; creamy layer

Following Prime Minister V.P. Singh's 1990 announcement implementing the Mandal Commission's recommendation of 27% reservation for OBCs in central government jobs, widespread protests erupted. Indra Sawhney and others challenged the government notification.

Key holdings:

  • 50% ceiling: Total reservations (SC + ST + OBC) must not exceed 50% under ordinary circumstances. Extraordinary situations in remote and far-flung areas may warrant exceptions.
  • Creamy layer exclusion: The economically and socially advanced sections within OBCs (the "creamy layer") must be excluded from reservation benefits. This concept applies to OBCs but not to SCs and STs.
  • No reservations in promotions: Article 16(4) permits reservations only at the point of entry (initial appointment), not in promotions. (This holding was later modified by the 77th, 81st, 82nd, and 85th Amendment Acts.)
  • Backwardness criteria: Caste can be a starting point but not the sole criterion for determining backwardness; social, educational, and economic factors must also be considered.
  • No reservation in certain posts: Reservations should not apply to technical, superspeciality, and research positions where merit is paramount.

Significance: The Mandal judgment remains the foundational ruling on reservation policy in India. The 50% ceiling and creamy layer concept are still cited in every subsequent reservation-related case.


9. Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan (1997) — Sexual Harassment Guidelines

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1997 SC 3011
Date13 August 1997
BenchThree-judge Bench (CJ J.S. Verma, Justices Sujata V. Manohar and B.N. Kirpal)
Key IssueWhat legal protections exist for women against sexual harassment at the workplace?

The case was triggered by the gang rape of Bhanwari Devi, a social worker (saathin) in Rajasthan, who was targeted for trying to prevent a child marriage. When the Rajasthan High Court acquitted the accused, women's groups including Vishakha filed a PIL.

In the absence of any legislative framework, the Supreme Court invoked Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21, read with CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), to lay down the Vishakha Guidelines:

  • Defined sexual harassment to include unwelcome physical contact, demand for sexual favours, sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography, and any unwelcome physical, verbal, or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature.
  • Made it mandatory for every employer to establish a Complaints Committee headed by a woman.
  • Required employers to take preventive steps and awareness measures.

These guidelines were binding law until replaced by the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (PoSH Act).

Significance: Demonstrated the Supreme Court's power to fill legislative vacuums through judicial creativity. Also a key example of the domestic application of international conventions (CEDAW) by Indian courts.


Part IV — Federalism and Governance

10. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — President's Rule and Federalism

DetailInformation
CitationAIR 1994 SC 1918; (1994) 3 SCC 1
Date11 March 1994
BenchNine-judge Bench
Key IssueCan the proclamation under Article 356 (President's Rule) be subjected to judicial review?

The case originated when the Janata Dal government in Karnataka under S.R. Bommai was dismissed in 1989 after defections, without a floor test. Several other state governments had also been dismissed on similar grounds.

Key holdings:

  • Judicial review of Article 356: Proclamations under Article 356 are subject to judicial review. The President's satisfaction must be based on relevant material and not on extraneous or irrelevant grounds.
  • Floor test is mandatory: The Governor cannot subjectively assess whether a government has lost majority. The only valid method of determining majority is through a floor test in the Legislative Assembly.
  • Secularism is basic structure: The Court held that secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution and that any state government acting against secular principles may be dismissed under Article 356.
  • Dissolved assemblies can be revived: If the imposition of President's Rule is held unconstitutional, the dissolved state assembly can be restored.
  • Parliamentary approval is a check: The proclamation must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within two months, and Parliament can refuse to approve it.

Significance: S.R. Bommai effectively curbed the political misuse of Article 356, which had been invoked over 100 times before 1994, often for partisan purposes. After this judgment, the frequency of Article 356 imposition decreased significantly.


11. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) — The NJAC Case (Fourth Judges Case)

DetailInformation
Citation(2016) 5 SCC 1
Date16 October 2015
BenchFive-judge Bench
Key IssueValidity of the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act

The Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014, replaced the collegium system of judicial appointments with a six-member NJAC comprising the CJI, two senior-most SC judges, the Law Minister, and two eminent persons nominated by a committee of the PM, CJI, and Leader of Opposition.

By a 4:1 majority (Justice J. Chelameswar dissenting), the Court struck down both the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act as unconstitutional, holding that they violated the basic structure of the Constitution by compromising judicial independence.

Key observations:

  • Independence of the judiciary is a basic feature of the Constitution.
  • The inclusion of the executive in judicial appointments would undermine the principle of separation of powers.
  • However, the Court acknowledged the need for reforms in the collegium system and directed that a new Memorandum of Procedure be framed to improve transparency.

Significance: Reaffirmed the primacy of the judiciary in judicial appointments while also acknowledging that the collegium system needs reform — a debate that continues.


Part V — Individual Liberty and Social Change

12. TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) — Minority Education Rights

DetailInformation
Citation(2002) 8 SCC 481
Date31 October 2002
BenchEleven-judge Bench
Key IssueScope of minority rights to establish and administer educational institutions under Article 30

Key holdings:

  • The right under Article 30(1) is not absolute but subject to reasonable regulations by the State.
  • Minority status is to be determined at the state level, not the national level.
  • Unaided minority institutions have autonomy in admissions and fee structure, provided the process is transparent, fair, and merit-based.
  • Aided minority institutions are subject to Article 29(2) — they cannot completely deny admission to non-minority students but may give reasonable preference to minority students.
  • Both aided and unaided institutions are subject to regulatory measures to ensure educational standards.

Significance: Provided the definitive framework for balancing minority educational rights with regulatory oversight, shaping subsequent legislation including the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (and the exemption of minority institutions from its ambit).


13. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) — Decriminalization of Section 377

DetailInformation
Citation(2018) 10 SCC 1
Date6 September 2018
BenchFive-judge Bench (CJ Dipak Misra, Justices R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra)
Key IssueConstitutionality of Section 377 IPC insofar as it criminalized consensual sexual acts between adults

The petitioners — dancer Navtej Singh Johar, journalist Sunil Mehra, chef Ritu Dalmia, hoteliers Aman Nath and Keshav Suri, and businesswoman Ayesha Kapur — argued that Section 377 violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21.

The Court unanimously read down Section 377 to exclude consensual sexual acts between adults from its ambit, holding the provision unconstitutional to that extent. This overruled Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2013), which had restored the criminalization of homosexuality.

Key observations:

  • CJ Misra: "Criminalising carnal intercourse is irrational, arbitrary and manifestly unconstitutional."
  • Justice Chandrachud: Sexual orientation is an intrinsic element of personal liberty, dignity, and privacy.
  • Justice Malhotra: "History owes an apology to the members of this community and their families."
  • The non-consensual aspects of Section 377 (minors, non-consensual acts, bestiality) remain in force.

Significance: A watershed moment for LGBTQ+ rights in India. Built upon the Puttaswamy right to privacy framework to recognize sexual orientation as a constitutionally protected facet of identity.


14. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) — The Sabarimala Case

DetailInformation
Citation(2019) 11 SCC 1
Date28 September 2018
BenchFive-judge Bench
Key IssueConstitutionality of the customary ban on women aged 10-50 entering the Sabarimala temple

By a 4:1 majority (Justice Indu Malhotra dissenting), the Court struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which permitted the exclusion of women based on custom.

Key holdings:

  • The exclusion of menstruating women cannot be an "essential religious practice" of Hinduism.
  • Constitutional morality must prevail over popular morality or traditional custom.
  • Devotion cannot be subjected to gender discrimination.
  • Justice Malhotra (dissent): Courts should not interfere with the essential religious practices of a denomination; issues of deep religious sentiment should be left to the religious community.

Note: In November 2019, a five-judge Bench referred several questions arising from the Sabarimala case — including the scope of "essential religious practice" — to a larger Bench. The matter remains pending.


15. Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) — Adultery Decriminalized

DetailInformation
Citation(2019) 3 SCC 39
Date27 September 2018
BenchFive-judge Bench (CJ Dipak Misra, Justices R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra)
Key IssueConstitutionality of Section 497 IPC (adultery) and Section 198(2) CrPC

Joseph Shine, a non-resident Keralite, challenged Section 497 IPC, which criminalized adultery but punished only the man — the married woman was treated as a victim, not an offender.

The Court unanimously struck down Section 497 as unconstitutional, violating Articles 14, 15, and 21.

Key observations:

  • Section 497 was based on outdated patriarchal notions treating women as the property of their husbands.
  • The provision denied women sexual autonomy and agency.
  • Adultery may remain a ground for divorce under civil law but cannot be a criminal offence.
  • Justice Chandrachud: "The husband is not the master of the wife."

Significance: Decriminalized a 158-year-old colonial-era law and reinforced the constitutional principles of gender equality and individual autonomy.


16. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) — Electoral Bonds

DetailInformation
Citation2024 INSC 113
Date15 February 2024
BenchFive-judge Bench (CJ D.Y. Chandrachud, Justices Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra)
Key IssueConstitutionality of the Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018

The Court unanimously struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme as unconstitutional, holding that it violated the voters' fundamental right to information under Article 19(1)(a).

Key holdings:

  • The right to information about political funding is a constitutionally protected right of voters.
  • Anonymous electoral bonds infringed on the voters' right to know who funds which political party.
  • The Court also struck down related amendments to Section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013 (which had removed the cap on corporate donations), the Income Tax Act, and the Representation of the People Act.
  • SBI was directed to submit all details of electoral bonds purchased from 12 April 2019 to the Election Commission, which published the full data on 21 March 2024.

Significance: One of the most consequential judgments on electoral transparency. Reasserted voters' right to information as a pre-decisional right essential to democratic participation.


Consolidated Table of Landmark Judgments

S.No.Case NameYearBench SizeKey Principle
1Shankari Prasad v. Union of India19515 judgesParliament can amend FRs under Article 368
2Golaknath v. State of Punjab196711 judgesParliament cannot amend FRs; prospective overruling
3Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala197313 judgesBasic Structure Doctrine; amendment power is limited
4Minerva Mills v. Union of India19805 judgesBalance between FRs and DPSPs is basic structure
5ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla19765 judgesFRs suspended during Emergency (overruled in 2017)
6Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India19787 judgesDue process; golden triangle of Articles 14, 19, 21
7Indra Sawhney v. Union of India19929 judges50% ceiling on reservations; creamy layer for OBCs
8S.R. Bommai v. Union of India19949 judgesJudicial review of Article 356; floor test mandatory
9Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan19973 judgesSexual harassment guidelines at workplace
10TMA Pai v. State of Karnataka200211 judgesMinority education rights under Article 30
11K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India20179 judgesRight to privacy is a fundamental right
12Navtej Johar v. Union of India20185 judgesSection 377 read down; LGBTQ+ rights
13Sabarimala (IYLA v. State of Kerala)20185 judgesWomen's right to worship; constitutional morality
14Joseph Shine v. Union of India20185 judgesSection 497 (adultery) struck down
15NJAC Case (SCAORA v. UOI)20155 judges99th Amendment struck down; collegium restored
16ADR v. Union of India20245 judgesElectoral Bond Scheme unconstitutional

Recent Developments (2024–2026)

Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (15 February 2024) — Electoral Bonds Unconstitutional

A five-judge Constitution Bench (Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justices Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra) unanimously struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018. The Court held the scheme violated Article 19(1)(a) (right to information), as voters have a fundamental right to know the source of political party funding. The Court also struck down amendments to the Representation of People Act, the Companies Act, and the Income Tax Act that had enabled the scheme. SBI was directed to submit bond purchase data to the Election Commission, which published it in March 2024.

This judgment, listed as Case No. 16 in the consolidated table, joins the Basic Structure cases and NJAC judgment as landmark constitutional law decisions.

UPSC angle: Prelims — 15 February 2024; five-judge bench; unanimous; Article 19(1)(a); Electoral Bond Scheme struck down. Mains — place the Electoral Bonds judgment in the lineage of SC jurisprudence on right to information and democratic rights.

Property Owners' Association v. State of Maharashtra (2024) — Article 39(b) and Private Property

A nine-judge Constitution Bench ruled on the scope of Article 39(b) — DPSP directing distribution of "material resources of the community." Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud authored the majority opinion on behalf of seven judges, overruling Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer's broad 1977 interpretation and holding that not every private resource constitutes a "material resource of the community." Justice B.V. Nagarathna partially concurred with a separate opinion; Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia dissented, arguing that Parliament retains the prerogative to determine distribution of material resources.

The Court upheld Article 31C in its original form — protecting only laws implementing Articles 39(b) and 39(c) from challenges under Articles 14 and 19.

UPSC angle: Prelims — nine-judge bench; 8:1; 2024; Article 39(b); overruled State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977). Mains — connect to the FR–DPSP tension in the context of property rights and welfare state obligations.

Mineral Area Development Authority v. M/S Steel Authority of India (25 July 2024) — States' Mineral Tax Power

A nine-judge Constitution Bench (8:1 majority) held that states have the power to levy tax on mines and mineral-bearing land under Entry 50 of State List VII. Royalty under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 is not a tax — overruling India Cements v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989). The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud; Justice B.V. Nagarathna dissented.

UPSC angle: Prelims — MADA v. SAIL (25 July 2024); nine-judge bench; 8:1; royalty ≠ tax; states can levy mineral tax. Mains — analyse the fiscal federalism implications; which states benefit and how does this interact with the 15th/16th Finance Commission frameworks?

Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024) — Bribery and Parliamentary Privilege

A seven-judge Constitution Bench unanimously held that legislators are not protected by parliamentary privilege (Article 105/194) when they accept bribes to vote in Parliament. The Court overruled P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998, five-judge bench, 3:2), which had controversially protected bribed legislators. The ruling marks a significant anti-corruption expansion of constitutional jurisprudence.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Sita Soren (2024); seven-judge bench; bribery not protected by privilege; overruled PV Narasimha Rao (1998). Mains — analyse how the Sita Soren judgment reshapes the relationship between parliamentary privilege, constitutional morality, and the anti-corruption framework.

Tribunal Reforms Act Struck Down — Five-Judge Bench (November 2025)

In a five-judge Constitution Bench judgment led by CJI B.R. Gavai (November 19, 2025), the Supreme Court struck down the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021. The Court held that the Act substantially reproduced the unconstitutional provisions of the Tribunal Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021, which had already been struck down in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021). The judgment reaffirmed the principle that Parliament cannot re-enact by statute the same provisions a court has already declared unconstitutional — to do so would amount to a nullification of a judicial verdict by ordinary legislative act, violating the separation of powers.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Tribunal Reforms Act 2021 struck down November 2025; five-judge bench led by CJI Gavai; overruled as re-enactment of struck-down ordinance. Mains — does the SC's ruling on the Tribunal Reforms Act strengthen or weaken the judicial review power over Parliament's corrective legislation?

In Re: Governor/President Assent on Bills (November 2025) — Scope of Articles 200 and 201

A five-judge Constitution Bench addressed the contentious issue of Governors and the President withholding or reserving State Bills under Articles 200 and 201. The Court held that judicially fixed deadlines cannot be imposed on the Governor or President to act on pending Bills, as this would violate the separation of powers and encroach upon executive prerogatives. The Court set aside High Court-mandated timelines.

However, the Court did not grant Governors an unlimited pocket-veto power — it emphasised that indefinite inaction amounts to a constitutional failure and may be challenged under Article 32/226. This judgment arose from several states (notably Tamil Nadu and Kerala) complaining that Governors had sat on Bills for months or years without acting.

UPSC angle: Prelims — In Re: Assent/Withholding of Bills (November 2025); five-judge bench; fixed timelines for Governor/President cannot be judicially prescribed; Articles 200 and 201. Mains — how does the SC's ruling balance Governor's constitutional discretion with the State Legislature's democratic mandate? Is the position of Governor in India constitutionally sound?

Waqf Amendment Act 2025 — Supreme Court Partial Stay (September 2025)

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 was challenged before the Supreme Court in multiple petitions (leading petition: Asaduddin Owaisi v. Union of India). On 15 September 2025, a three-judge bench delivered an interim order declining to stay the Act as a whole, but staying two specific provisions:

  1. Section 3(r) — the five-year Islam-practice requirement for a person to create a valid Waqf, held as potentially arbitrary without any mechanism to determine who qualifies as a "practising Muslim."
  2. Certain provisions of Section 3C — relating to the District Collector's power to decide whether properties identified as government land overlap with Waqf, finding a prima facie violation of separation of powers.

The Court upheld the removal of "Waqf by user" (Waqf created by long and uninterrupted use), finding prima facie justification for preventing encroachment on government lands. It also directed that the Central Waqf Council must not have more than four non-Muslim members, and State Waqf Boards not more than three. The matter continues before the Court for full hearing.

UPSC angle: Prelims — Waqf Amendment Act 2025; SC partial stay September 15, 2025; five-year Islam practice clause stayed; Section 3C (Collector power) partially stayed; Waqf by user removal upheld. Mains — examine the constitutional dimensions of the Waqf Amendment Act 2025; evaluate the SC's interim order in the context of minority rights under Articles 25–30.


Exam Strategy

For Prelims: Focus on the year, bench size, key ratio decidendi (core holding), and which provisions or amendments were challenged or struck down. The consolidated table above is ideal for quick revision.

For Mains GS-II: Expect questions like "Discuss the evolution of the Basic Structure Doctrine" or "How has the Supreme Court expanded the scope of Article 21?" Structure your answer chronologically, linking one judgment to the next to show evolution.

For Essay: Landmark judgments offer powerful evidence for essays on democracy, rights, judicial activism, and constitutionalism. Quote the most memorable observations — Justice Malhotra's apology to the LGBTQ+ community, Justice Khanna's lonely dissent in ADM Jabalpur, or CJ Chandrachud on electoral transparency.

Common Mains questions:

  • Trace the evolution of the Basic Structure Doctrine from Shankari Prasad to Minerva Mills.
  • "The Supreme Court has been the guardian of fundamental rights in India." Discuss with reference to at least five landmark judgments.
  • Critically examine the role of the judiciary in expanding Article 21 from Maneka Gandhi to Puttaswamy.
  • Evaluate the impact of S.R. Bommai on Centre-State relations and the use of Article 356.

Last updated: 28 March 2026