BharatNotes What is Tenth Schedule (Defection)?
The Tenth Schedule is the part of the Constitution that contains India's anti-defection law. It was added by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, which also amended Articles 101, 102, 190 and 191 dealing with vacation of seats and disqualification. The Schedule operates under Articles 102(2) and 191(2), enabling disqualification of MPs and MLAs respectively who defect. It came into force on 1 March 1985, responding to the post-1967 wave of "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram" floor-crossing that destabilised governments.
Grounds for Disqualification
A member is disqualified if he or she:
| Ground | Applies to |
|---|---|
| Voluntarily gives up membership of the political party on whose ticket elected | Members of a party |
| Votes or abstains contrary to a party whip without prior permission, and the act is not condoned within 15 days | Members of a party |
| An independent member joins any political party after election | Independents |
| A nominated member joins a party after six months from taking the seat | Nominated members |
The deciding authority is the presiding officer of the House (Speaker or Chairman) under Paragraph 6. The Speaker's or Chairman's own conduct, when first elected to that office, is exempt under Paragraph 5.
Key Amendment: 91st Amendment, 2003
The original Schedule (Paragraph 3) exempted a "split" where one-third of a legislature party broke away. This was widely misused to legitimise group defections. The Constitution (Ninety-first Amendment) Act, 2003 deleted the one-third split exemption entirely. Only a "merger" exemption (Paragraph 4) survives, and it requires that at least two-thirds of the members of the legislature party agree to the merger. The 2003 Act also barred disqualified defectors from holding ministerial or remunerative political posts until re-election, and capped the Council of Ministers at 15% of the House strength.
Judicial Interpretation
In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), a five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the Schedule's validity but, by a 3:2 majority, struck down Paragraph 7, which had ousted judicial review of the presiding officer's decisions — holding it required state ratification (as it affected Articles 136, 226, 227) which was absent. The Court held the Speaker's decision under Paragraph 6 is subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, perversity or constitutional violation, and that the Speaker acts as a tribunal.
In Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020), the Supreme Court held that Speakers should ordinarily decide disqualification petitions within three months, and recommended that Parliament consider an independent permanent tribunal headed by retired judges to replace the Speaker's role, given concerns about partisanship.
UPSC Angle
Master the two operative Articles (102(2), 191(2)), the deleting of the split provision by the 91st Amendment (2003), the surviving two-thirds merger exemption, and the Kihoto Hollohan ruling on judicial review. For Mains GS2, connect this to intra-party democracy, the whip system's effect on legislators' independent voice, and reform proposals for a neutral adjudicating authority.
Sources: legislative.gov.in / mea.gov.in (Tenth Schedule text), PRS Legislative Research, Supreme Court of India (Kihoto Hollohan; Keisham Meghachandra).
