BharatNotes Overview
Climate diplomacy has become one of the most consequential arenas of international relations in the 21st century. India — the world's third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases in absolute terms but with per capita emissions far below the global average — occupies a unique position. It demands climate justice based on the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), while simultaneously leading global initiatives like the International Solar Alliance (ISA), the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), and the Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) movement. This chapter examines India's evolving climate positions from Copenhagen to Belém (COP30, November 2025) and on to the NDC 3.0 that India communicated to the UNFCCC in April 2026, its leadership of green initiatives, governance of global commons, and the complex politics of climate finance. The regime India now negotiates in has one major party fewer: the United States' second withdrawal from the Paris Agreement took legal effect on 27 January 2026, and the next conference, COP31, meets at Antalya, Türkiye, from 9 to 20 November 2026 under an unprecedented split presidency.
India's Core Climate Positions
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR-RC)
| Concept | Detail |
|---|---|
| Origin | Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration (1992) at the Earth Summit |
| Full name | Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) |
| Core idea | All nations share responsibility for addressing climate change, but developed countries bear greater responsibility because they have historically emitted the most and have greater financial and technological capacity |
| India's position | India consistently argues that developed nations (responsible for ~79% of cumulative CO2 emissions since 1850) must take the lead in mitigation and provide finance and technology to developing countries |
| Legal basis | Enshrined in UNFCCC (1992), Kyoto Protocol (1997), and the Paris Agreement (2015) — though Paris shifted toward self-determined nationally determined contributions (NDCs) |
Per Capita Emissions Argument
| Metric | India | USA | China | EU | World Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Per capita CO2 (2023, approx.) | ~2.0 tonnes | ~14 tonnes | ~8 tonnes | ~6 tonnes | ~4.7 tonnes |
| Share of global emissions | ~7% | ~13% | ~30% | ~7% | — |
| Historical cumulative emissions | ~3--4% | ~25% | ~13% | ~22% | — |
India's per capita emissions are approximately half the global average and a fraction of developed nations' per capita emissions. This is the foundation of India's demand for equitable climate action and climate justice.
Climate Justice
| Dimension | India's Argument |
|---|---|
| Historical responsibility | The climate crisis was created by industrialised nations over 200+ years; developing countries should not bear equal mitigation burden |
| Development rights | India has the right to develop its economy and lift millions out of poverty; climate action cannot come at the cost of development |
| Technology transfer | Developed countries must transfer clean energy technologies at affordable cost — not just sell them at commercial rates |
| Climate finance | Developed countries must honour their financial commitments — the $100 billion/year promise (from 2009 Copenhagen) was met with significant delays and creative accounting |
| Adaptation equity | Developing countries face the worst impacts of climate change but have contributed the least — they need adaptation finance, not just mitigation targets |
Mains Favourite: "India contributes only 7% of global emissions but faces some of the worst climate impacts. Discuss India's climate justice argument and its implications for global climate negotiations." A strong answer should cover CBDR, per capita vs absolute emissions, historical responsibility, development rights, and the need for climate finance.
India at Major COPs — A Timeline
Copenhagen (COP15, 2009)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| India's position | Led by PM Manmohan Singh; India resisted legally binding emission cuts for developing countries |
| Key outcome | Copenhagen Accord — non-binding; developed countries pledged $100 billion/year by 2020 in climate finance (not met on time) |
| India's commitment | Voluntary pledge to reduce emissions intensity of GDP by 20--25% by 2020 over 2005 levels (achieved ahead of schedule) |
| Significance | Marked the emergence of BASIC bloc (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) as a negotiating force |
Paris (COP21, 2015)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Historic outcome | Paris Agreement — universal, legally binding agreement to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius, preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius, above pre-industrial levels |
| NDC mechanism | Countries submit self-determined nationally determined contributions (NDCs) every 5 years with a ratchet mechanism (must be progressively more ambitious) |
| India's NDC (2016) | (1) Reduce emissions intensity of GDP by 33--35% by 2030 over 2005 levels; (2) Achieve 40% cumulative electric power from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030; (3) Create additional carbon sink of 2.5--3 billion tonnes of CO2 through forest cover |
| India's role | Co-launched ISA with France at COP21; key player in negotiating equity provisions |
Glasgow (COP26, 2021) — Panchamrit
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| India's Panchamrit | PM Modi announced five commitments ("Panchamrit" — five nectars of climate action): |
The Five Panchamrit Pledges:
| Pledge | Target |
|---|---|
| 1. Non-fossil energy capacity | 500 GW by 2030 |
| 2. Renewable energy share | 50% of energy requirements from renewable sources by 2030 |
| 3. Carbon emission reduction | Reduce total projected carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes by 2030 |
| 4. Carbon intensity reduction | Reduce carbon intensity of the economy by 45% over 2005 levels by 2030 |
| 5. Net Zero | Achieve net-zero emissions by 2070 |
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Updated NDC (August 2022) | India formally updated its NDC incorporating the Panchamrit targets |
| Significance | India was the last major emitter to announce a net-zero target; 2070 timeline criticised by some developed nations but defended by India as realistic given development needs |
| LiFE announcement | PM Modi introduced Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) — calling for a shift from mindless consumption to mindful utilisation |
Sharm el-Sheikh (COP27, 2022)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Key outcome | Establishment of a Loss and Damage Fund for climate-vulnerable countries — a historic win for developing nations |
| India's role | Strongly supported the Loss and Damage fund; argued for separate adaptation finance |
| Implementation challenge | Fund structure and contributor base left for COP28 to finalise |
Dubai (COP28, 2023) — Global Stocktake
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Global Stocktake (GST) | First-ever assessment of collective progress under the Paris Agreement — found the world is not on track to meet the 1.5 degrees Celsius target |
| Fossil fuel transition | Historic language calling on countries to "transition away from fossil fuels" — first time fossil fuels explicitly mentioned in a COP decision |
| Loss and Damage Fund operationalised | Adopted on the first day; World Bank designated as interim trustee for 4 years; announcement-day pledges (December 2023): UAE $100M, Germany $100M, UK GBP 60M, USA $17.5M, Japan $10M, EU EUR 225M |
| India's position | Supported the GST outcome but emphasised that transition must be equitable and just; cautioned against "unilateral trade measures" (reference to EU CBAM) |
Baku (COP29, 2024) — NCQG
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Key outcome | New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance — developed countries to mobilise $300 billion annually by 2035 for developing countries |
| Additional layer | A broader aspiration of mobilising up to $1.3 trillion (primarily from private sources) |
| Developing country reaction | Many developing countries (including Bolivia, Nigeria, small island states) called the $300 billion "insultingly low" — they had demanded $1.3 trillion in public finance |
| India's position | Supported the goal as a floor, not a ceiling; demanded clearer accounting and transparency; pushed for grant-based rather than loan-based financing |
| Baku-to-Belém Roadmap | COP29 mandated the COP29 and COP30 Presidencies to prepare a roadmap to at least $1.3 trillion/year by 2035. The Report on the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T was published only in November 2025, setting out five finance "action fronts" — the 5Rs: Replenishing (grants, concessional finance, low-cost capital), Rebalancing (fiscal space and debt sustainability), Rechannelling (private finance and cost of capital), Revamping (capacity and coordination) and Reshaping (systems for equitable capital flows) — plus five thematic fronts. It is a Presidency product, not a negotiated outcome: the COP30 Mutirão decision (para 47) only "takes note of" it |
Belém (COP30, November 2025) — Mutirão Package
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Held | Belém, Brazil — scheduled for 10–21 November 2025, but negotiations overran and the closing plenaries were gavelled on 22 November 2025; UNFCCC's own session records describe CMA 7 as held in Belém from 10 to 22 November 2025 |
| COP Presidency | Brazil (President of COP30); Troika: UAE (COP28), Azerbaijan (COP29), Brazil (COP30) — reaffirmed 1.5°C commitment |
| Flagship outcome | The "Global Mutirão" decision (Portuguese mutirão: "collective effort"), adopted at the CMA closing plenary on 22 November 2025 (draft FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.24) |
| Climate finance | Reaffirms scaling finance to at least $1.3 trillion/year by 2035 (paras 47–48) and takes note of the Baku to Belém Roadmap; calls for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 (para 53, the original 2030 timeline having been weakened); establishes a two-year work programme on climate finance (para 54) |
| New initiatives | Global Implementation Accelerator (para 41); Belém Mission to 1.5 (para 42); a just transition mechanism, known as the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), under the Just Transition Work Programme; Belém Gender Action Plan |
| Unilateral trade measures | Para 56 reaffirms that climate measures, "including unilateral ones", should not be "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade"; para 57 mandates dialogues at SB 64, SB 66 (June 2027) and SB 68 (June 2028) — India's most concrete gain at Belém, and its opening against CBAM inside the UNFCCC |
| Nature | The Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) was launched by Brazil on 6 November 2025 at the COP30 Leaders' Summit, before the COP opened, with over USD 5.5 billion announced by sponsor countries (as of 6 November 2025); 53 countries endorsed its Launch Declaration and at least 20% of payments are reserved for Indigenous Peoples and local communities. It is a Facility outside the UNFCCC process, not a negotiated COP outcome |
| Fossil fuels | COP30 Presidency issued a separate roadmap on transition away from fossil fuels — but this was outside formal negotiations (the final text did not include a binding fossil fuel phase-out roadmap) |
| India's NDC 3.0 | At Belém (November 2025) Environment Minister Bhupender Yadav said India would submit its 2031–2035 NDC by December 2025. That deadline passed: the NDC was approved by the Union Cabinet on 25 March 2026 and communicated to the UNFCCC on 24 April 2026 |
The sponsor pledges behind that USD 5.5 billion were Norway USD 3 billion over ten years, Brazil USD 1 billion, Indonesia USD 1 billion, the Netherlands USD 5 million for the secretariat, Portugal USD 1 million, and France up to EUR 500 million to 2030, conditionally. The 53 endorsing countries include 34 tropical forest nations covering over 90% of tropical forests in the developing world. Payments are made against satellite-measured standing forest canopy, and the medium-term goal is a USD 125 billion fund.
India's NDC 3.0 (2031–2035) — Communicated April 2026
India's third NDC, dated April 2026 on the UNFCCC NDC Registry, was approved by the Union Cabinet on 25 March 2026 and submitted to the UNFCCC on 24 April 2026, more than a year after the February 2025 deadline for 2035 targets.
| Target (by 2035, against a 2005 baseline) | NDC 3.0 (April 2026) | Previous NDC (August 2022, for 2030) |
|---|---|---|
| Emissions intensity of GDP | Reduce by 47% | Reduce by 45% |
| Non-fossil share of cumulative electric power installed capacity | About 60%, "with the help of transfer of technology and low-cost international finance" | 50% |
| Carbon sink through forest and tree cover | 3.5 to 4.0 billion tonnes CO2e | 2.5–3 billion tonnes CO2e |
The document sets no absolute emissions cap and no sectoral targets, retains net-zero by 2070, repeats the LiFE commitment, and is framed around "Viksit Bharat 2047". Effective implementation is expressly made conditional on finance, technology transfer and capacity-building from developed countries. The NDC records non-fossil capacity at 52.57% of total installed capacity as on 28 February 2026.
Non-Fossil Capacity — Delivery Against the NDC and Panchamrit Targets
India crossed 50% non-fossil installed power capacity as on 30 June 2025: 242.78 GW of a total 484.82 GW, announced by the Minister for New and Renewable Energy, Pralhad Joshi, on 14 July 2025, five years ahead of the 2030 NDC target. The split at that point was renewables 184.62 GW (38.08%), large hydro 49.38 GW (10.19%) and nuclear 8.78 GW (1.81%).
The full-year picture for 2025, announced on 10 January 2026, is stronger still. Non-fossil installed capacity reached 266.78 GW, a 22.6% increase over 2024, with over 49 GW of new non-fossil capacity added during 2025. Solar rose from 97.86 GW to 135.81 GW, growth of 38.8%, and wind from 48.16 GW to 54.51 GW. India crossed the 100 GW solar milestone in January 2025 and the 50 GW wind milestone in March 2025.
Against the Panchamrit target of 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030, 266.78 GW at the end of 2025 leaves, on those figures, roughly 233 GW still to be added by 2030. Solar manufacturing has expanded under the Production-Linked Incentive scheme for solar PV modules, and rooftop deployment is being pushed through the PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana (February 2024), aimed at 10 million households.
These are capacity figures, not generation shares, and the milestone to hold on to is 50% non-fossil capacity as on 30 June 2025, announced by the MNRE Minister on 14 July 2025, not at COP30 and not by the Environment Minister.
Antalya (COP31, November 2026) — A Split Presidency
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Where and when | Antalya, Türkiye, 9–20 November 2026 (official COP31 presidency site, accessed 22 September 2026) |
| The arrangement | Announced on 23 November 2025 after a year-long deadlock in the Western Europe and Others Group: Türkiye physically hosts the conference and the World Leaders Summit and is nominated for election as COP President, while Australia serves as "President of Negotiations" with exclusive authority over the negotiations |
| Who holds what | Murat Kurum (Türkiye's Minister of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change) is COP31 President-Designate; Chris Bowen (Australia) is COP31 President of Negotiations |
| Pacific Pre-COP | Australia, with the Pacific, sets the agenda for and presides over a special Pre-COP for leaders in the Pacific in 2026 |
| Why it matters | An unprecedented arrangement in which the physical host and the negotiating presidency sit in different countries; it lets Australia and the Pacific shape the negotiating agenda while Türkiye hosts |
The Ambition Gap — UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2025
UNEP released the Emissions Gap Report 2025, "Off Target", on 4 November 2025, days before Belém. Full implementation of the latest national climate plans would produce warming of 2.3–2.5°C this century, down from the 2.6–2.8°C projected in the 2024 report. The improvement is real but small, and it rests on a thin base: only 60 Parties, covering 63% of global greenhouse gas emissions, had submitted or announced new NDCs by the 30 September 2025 cut-off, and India was not among them. Global greenhouse gas emissions reached 57.7 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent in 2024. Those two figures, 2.3–2.5°C of projected warming and 57.7 Gt CO2e for 2024, are the standard baseline for any answer on the ambition gap, with the caveat that the projection improved while a majority of Parties had still not filed 2035 plans.
India-Led Climate Initiatives
International Solar Alliance (ISA)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Launched | 30 November 2015 at COP21 in Paris by PM Modi and French President Hollande |
| Headquarters | National Institute of Solar Energy (NISE) campus, Gurugram, Haryana |
| Members | 113 Member Countries (signed and ratified the Framework Agreement) and 14 Signatory Countries (signed, not yet ratified), per ISA's own website accessed 22 September 2026 |
| Treaty status | Became a treaty-based international organisation in December 2017 |
| Objective | Promote solar energy deployment in solar-resource-rich countries; mobilise investment; reduce technology costs; build capacity |
| Leadership | Ashish Khanna took office as ISA's third Director General on 17 March 2025, succeeding Ajay Mathur |
| Latest Assembly | Eighth Session of the ISA Assembly, 27–30 October 2025, Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, on the theme "One Sun, One World, One Grid", with participation from more than 120 countries and over 40 ministers |
| Key initiative | One Sun, One World, One Grid (OSOWOG) — a global interconnected solar energy grid where "the sun never sets"; merged with UK's Green Grids Initiative at COP26 (2021); proposed in 3 phases — (1) Middle East-South Asia-Southeast Asia, (2) connect to Africa, (3) global grid |
| Funding target | ISA aims to mobilise $1 trillion by 2030 for solar projects in developing countries |
Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Launched | 23 September 2019 by PM Modi at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York |
| Members | 72 Members, with 183 projects and USD 21.84 million of funding disbursed, per CDRI's own website accessed 22 September 2026. CDRI counts countries and partner organisations in a single combined total, so this figure is not directly comparable with the older "53 countries + 12 organisations" split; the Secretariat's stated expansion goal is 75 countries and 25 organisations |
| Flagship conference | The International Conference on Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (ICDRI). The most recent edition recorded on CDRI's own website is ICDRI 2025, held in Nice, France, with 220 delegates from 52 countries and a focus on Small Island Developing States |
| Founding participants | India, Australia, Bhutan, Fiji, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Maldives, Mexico, Mongolia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, UK |
| Partners | ADB, UNDP, UNDRR, World Bank |
| Objective | Promote resilience of new and existing infrastructure systems to climate and disaster risks |
| Significance | First international coalition focused on disaster resilience of infrastructure; fills a gap in the global climate architecture |
Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Proposed | By PM Modi at COP26 Glasgow, 1 November 2021 |
| Core idea | Shift from "mindless and destructive consumption" to "mindful and deliberate utilisation" — making sustainability a mass movement of individual action |
| Pro-Planet People | Individuals who adopt sustainable lifestyles are recognised as "Pro-Planet People" |
| Implementation | LiFE 21-Day Challenge; integration into government programmes — tree plantation, plastic bans, water conservation; multi-ministry coordination |
| Significance | Shifts the climate narrative from production-side regulation to demand-side behavioural change |
Global Biofuels Alliance (GBA)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Launched | 9 September 2023 at the G20 New Delhi Summit |
| Founding members | India, USA, and Brazil |
| Total membership at launch | 22 countries + 12 international organisations; including 8 G20 members |
| Objective | Accelerate global adoption of sustainable biofuels through capacity building, technology sharing, and policy harmonisation |
| Significance | Positions India at the centre of the global energy transition; complements ISA (solar) with biofuels |
Global Commons Governance
What Are Global Commons?
Global commons are domains that lie beyond the jurisdiction of any single nation and are shared by all humanity. Their governance requires multilateral cooperation.
| Global Common | Key Governance Framework | Key Issues |
|---|---|---|
| High Seas | UNCLOS (1982); BBNJ Treaty (adopted 2023, in force 17 January 2026) | Overfishing, marine biodiversity loss, plastic pollution; India has signed but not ratified BBNJ |
| Deep seabed (the "Area") | UNCLOS Part XI; International Seabed Authority (ISA), Kingston, Jamaica | Exploitation regulations (the "Mining Code") still not adopted as of the ISA's 31st Session (2026); unilateral US permitting outside UNCLOS |
| Antarctica | Antarctic Treaty System (1959); Madrid Protocol (1991); annual ATCM | Climate research, mineral resource exploitation ban, territorial claims frozen; tourism regulation unresolved at ATCM 48 (May 2026) |
| Outer Space | Outer Space Treaty (1967); Moon Agreement (1979) | Weaponisation, space debris, satellite mega-constellations, resource extraction |
| Arctic | Arctic Council (1996); UNCLOS | Ice melt opening shipping routes; resource competition; indigenous peoples' rights; chairship held by the Kingdom of Denmark, 2025–2027 |
| Atmosphere | UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, Montreal Protocol | Climate change; ozone depletion (largely addressed); transboundary pollution; the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement took effect on 27 January 2026 |
BBNJ Treaty — High Seas Biodiversity (2023)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Full name | Agreement under UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction |
| Adopted | 19 June 2023 by the Intergovernmental Conference — by consensus |
| Entered into force | 17 January 2026 — 120 days after the 60th ratification was deposited on 19 September 2025 |
| Scope | Covers the high seas (beyond 200 nautical miles EEZ) and the deep seabed |
| Key provisions | (1) Marine protected areas on the high seas; (2) Environmental impact assessments for high seas activities; (3) Management of marine genetic resources; (4) Capacity building and technology transfer for developing countries |
| India's status | India signed on 25 September 2024 but has not ratified, and is therefore a signatory, not a party. At entry into force the Agreement had roughly 82–83 parties and about 145 signatories |
| Next steps | The Preparatory Commission met in April 2025, August 2025 and from 23 March to 2 April 2026; the first Conference of the Parties (COP1) is due within one year of entry into force |
| Significance | First legally binding treaty for biodiversity protection on the high seas; fills a major governance gap — previously, 64% of the ocean surface had no comprehensive legal protection |
Prelims Alert: The BBNJ Treaty was adopted in June 2023 and entered into force in January 2026. It covers areas beyond national jurisdiction (high seas + deep seabed). Key provisions: marine protected areas, environmental impact assessments, marine genetic resources, capacity building.
Antarctica
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Antarctic Treaty (1959) | Signed by 12 original parties; India acceded in 1983 and became a Consultative Party the same year; Antarctica designated for peaceful purposes only, with military activity prohibited |
| Madrid Protocol (1991) | Designates Antarctica as a "natural reserve devoted to peace and science"; bans mineral resource exploitation for 50 years (until 2048) |
| India's presence | Maitri Station (est. 1989, Schirmacher Oasis) and Bharati Station (est. 2012, Larsemann Hills); India conducts regular Antarctic Expeditions under NCPOR (National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research, Goa). India has been a Consultative Party since 1983 and hosted ATCM 46 at Kochi in May 2024 |
| ATCM 48 | Japan hosted the 48th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting at Hiroshima, 11–21 May 2026. It closed with an ATCM 48 Host Country Communiqué, adopted new Antarctic Specially Protected Areas and reached consensus on emperor penguin protection, but produced no regulatory framework for Antarctic tourism — no binding visitor caps, no tourism fee and no agreed method for measuring cumulative impacts, with Parties agreeing only to continue intersessional discussion |
| Key issues | Climate research (ice core data), krill fishing, tourism regulation, 2048 review of mineral ban |
Deep Seabed — the "Area" and the ISA
The deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction is the "Area", declared the common heritage of mankind under Article 136 of UNCLOS and administered by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) at Kingston, Jamaica. No commercial exploitation is lawful until the ISA adopts its exploitation regulations, the "Mining Code" — and it has not.
| Development | Detail |
|---|---|
| US executive order | President Trump issued Executive Order 14285, "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources", on 24 April 2025, directing NOAA and BOEM to expedite permitting for seabed mining in international waters outside the UNCLOS framework; a US subsidiary of The Metals Company had already applied in March 2025 under the US Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 1980. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS |
| ISA's response | On 30 April 2025 the ISA Secretary-General stated that "no State has the right to unilaterally exploit the mineral resources of the Area outside the legal framework established by UNCLOS", warning that unilateral action "sets a dangerous precedent that could destabilize the entire system of global ocean governance" |
| ISA 31st Session (2026) | Part I was scheduled for 9–20 March 2026, with the Council sitting 9–19 March, and Part II ran from 29 June to 31 July 2026 in Kingston. The Mining Code was again not adopted; the Council asked the Secretariat to draft a roadmap with milestones for timely adoption and an advanced negotiating text for the 32nd Session, with negotiations resuming in March 2027 |
| The multilateral counter-move | The Assembly considered a possible request for an advisory opinion from the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS under Article 191 of UNCLOS on the legal implications of activities in the Area conducted outside the Convention, facilitated intersessionally by Malta. Member States reaffirmed "the principle of the common heritage of humankind at the heart of the regime of the Area" |
India pursues deep-ocean capability through the Deep Ocean Mission under the Ministry of Earth Sciences, so the common heritage principle is not an abstraction for it: a unilateral track outside UNCLOS would devalue the multilateral one India has invested in.
Prelims Alert — a classic confused pair: the International Seabed Authority (ISA) sits at Kingston, Jamaica, under UNCLOS; the International Solar Alliance (ISA) sits at Gurugram, Haryana, under its own Framework Agreement. Same acronym, entirely different bodies.
Arctic
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Arctic Council | The principal intergovernmental forum for the Arctic, established in 1996; the chairship rotates among the Arctic States |
| Current chairship | The Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands) took over from Norway at the 14th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting on 12 May 2025, for 2025–2027. It is Denmark's second chairship, after 2009–2011, and its stated priorities are Indigenous Peoples and communities; sustainable economic development and energy transition solutions; oceans; climate change; and biodiversity, against a background of geopolitical tension over Greenland |
| India's stake | India is an Observer at the Arctic Council (since 2013), released a national Arctic Policy in 2022, and runs the Himadri research station at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard |
Outer Space
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Outer Space Treaty (1967) | Prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies; bans nuclear weapons in space; space exploration for benefit of all nations |
| India's position | Supports prevention of arms race in outer space (PAROS); opposes weaponisation; advocates for equitable access to space resources |
| ISRO's contributions | Chandrayaan missions; Mangalyaan; satellite launches for developing countries at affordable cost |
| Emerging issues | Space debris; Artemis Accords (US-led) vs multilateral governance; asteroid mining rights; satellite mega-constellations (Starlink) affecting astronomy |
Climate Finance
The $100 Billion Promise
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Origin | COP15 Copenhagen (2009) — developed countries committed to mobilise $100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries |
| Delivery | The target was reportedly met for the first time in 2022 — two years late — and with significant reliance on loans rather than grants |
| Criticism | Developing countries argue that much of the "climate finance" counted was repurposed development aid, commercial-rate loans, or private investment — not new, additional, grant-based public finance |
| India's position | Demands transparent accounting; insists on grant-based finance; argues that loans increase debt burden of developing countries |
New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) — COP29
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Agreed at | COP29 Baku (November 2024) |
| Core target | $300 billion per year by 2035 from developed to developing countries |
| Additional layer | Aspiration of mobilising $1.3 trillion (including private sector) |
| Controversy | Developing countries demanded $1.3 trillion in public finance; $300 billion called "insultingly low" by several nations |
| India's critique | Supported $300B as a floor; demanded grant-dominant funding, not loans |
At Baku India called the USD 300 billion goal "abysmally poor" and an "optical illusion", far short of the USD 1 trillion per year that developing nations had demanded on independent expert estimates, and India's Environment Minister described the agreement as reflecting the "unwillingness of developed countries to engage seriously" on climate finance. India's asks at COP29 were an NCQG of at least USD 1 trillion per year, removal of IPR barriers on green technologies for developing countries, application of CBDR in the mitigation work programmes, and an assurance that private finance would be additional to public finance rather than a substitute for it.
Loss and Damage Fund
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Established | COP27 Sharm el-Sheikh (2022) — decision to create the fund |
| Operationalised | COP28 Dubai (December 2023) — adopted on day one of the summit |
| Structure | Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) hosted by the World Bank for an interim period of 4 years |
| Governance | Independent governing board and secretariat |
| Announcement-day pledges (December 2023) | UAE: $100M; Germany: $100M; UK: GBP 60M; EU: EUR 225M; USA: $17.5M; Japan: $10M |
| Pledges vs delivery | About USD 820 million pledged, of which roughly 55% has actually been delivered (position as of July 2026); most of that total dates from the COP28 pledging round of December 2023 |
| Demand for its money | At its ninth Board meeting in Manila, 8–10 July 2026, the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) reported that 119 countries had submitted 176 funding requests totalling about USD 2.8 billion under the Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM), its start-up phase — roughly eight times the money available |
| Board response | The Board raised the BIM allocation from USD 250 million to USD 342 million, keeping the commitment that at least 50% goes to small island developing States and least developed countries, and deferred the first funding decisions to its tenth meeting in Manila in December 2026. As of September 2026 the Fund had approved no projects. Executive Director: Ibrahima Cheikh Diong |
| Purpose | Assist climate-vulnerable developing countries in managing economic and non-economic losses from climate impacts (extreme weather, sea-level rise, desertification) |
| India's position | Strongly supports; argues that loss and damage finance must be separate from adaptation finance — not counted as the same |
Green Climate Fund (GCF)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Established | 2010 (under UNFCCC); HQ in Incheon, South Korea |
| Purpose | Channel climate finance from developed to developing countries; fund both mitigation and adaptation projects |
| Capitalisation | Replenished in multi-year pledging rounds; the second replenishment was pledged in 2023 |
| India's access | India accesses GCF through accredited entities (NABARD is India's Direct Access Entity); funded projects include coastal resilience, solar energy, and sustainable agriculture |
EU CBAM — Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| What | A tariff mechanism that imposes a carbon price on imports based on their embedded carbon content — applicable to cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity, and hydrogen |
| Transitional phase | 1 October 2023 – 2025 (reporting only, no payment) |
| Definitive phase | Began on 1 January 2026: importers must be authorised CBAM declarants and pay for the CO2 embedded in imports such as steel, cement and fertilisers. Full phase-in runs to 2034 |
| The 2025 softening | The CBAM Omnibus Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2025/2083 — adopted 8 October 2025, published in the Official Journal on 17 October 2025 and in force from 20 October 2025 — introduced a cumulative de minimis exemption of 50 tonnes net mass per importer per year for iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers and cement (not hydrogen or electricity). The Commission's own estimate is that this exempts about 90% of importers while still covering about 99% of embedded emissions |
| Impact on India | Affects ~$8.2 billion worth of Indian exports to the EU (27% of iron/steel and aluminium exports); estimated price burden of ~25% on affected steel and aluminium exports |
| India's response | (1) Called CBAM a trade barrier that contradicts CBDR; (2) built a domestic compliance carbon market — the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), whose greenhouse gas emission intensity targets are now legally live (below); (3) pressed the issue inside the UNFCCC, winning paragraphs 56–57 of the COP30 Mutirão decision and three dialogues on unilateral trade measures at SB 64, SB 66 (June 2027) and SB 68 (June 2028); (4) negotiated the India–EU FTA, concluded on 27 January 2026 at the 16th India–EU Summit in New Delhi — it commits both sides to implementing the Paris Agreement but grants India no CBAM exemption or carve-out, and as of 11 September 2026 it had not been signed or brought into force |
| UPSC angle | CBAM raises questions about trade-climate nexus, equity, WTO compatibility, and the future of CBDR |
Mains Favourite: "The EU's CBAM threatens to shift the climate burden onto developing countries. Critically examine India's options." Cover: (1) What CBAM is and how it works, (2) Impact on Indian exports, (3) India's climate justice argument (CBDR, per capita emissions), (4) Policy options (domestic carbon pricing, FTA negotiations, WTO challenge, coalition-building with other developing countries).
India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS)
India's structural answer to CBAM is a domestic carbon price, so that carbon already paid for in India can be claimed against the EU levy. The CCTS rests on the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022; the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) administers the scheme, while the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) issues the greenhouse gas emission intensity (GEI) targets that create the compliance obligation.
Targets were notified in phases. The first four sectors — aluminium, cement, chlor-alkali and pulp and paper — were notified in October 2025, followed by petroleum refining, petrochemicals and textiles in January 2026; compliance obligations entered into force for these seven sectors, covering roughly 490 obligated entities (ICAP, March 2026). With fertiliser and iron and steel added, GEI targets have been notified across nine energy-intensive sectors covering about 740 entities. The first compliance cycle covers FY 2025-26 and FY 2026-27, with compliance certificates traded thereafter.
For the exam, the significant point is that India's compliance carbon market is legally live, which is the precondition for any future claim of CBAM equivalence.
Climate Litigation and Emerging Trends
| Trend | Detail |
|---|---|
| Global rise | Over 2,600 climate litigation cases filed worldwide as of 2024; courts increasingly holding governments and corporations accountable for climate action |
| India | MC Mehta v. Union of India (pollution); Ridhima Pandey (9-year-old) — petition to NGT (2017) demanding government action on climate change; In Re: Climate Change (Supreme Court, 2024) — recognised the right against climate change under Articles 14 and 21 |
| International | Urgenda Foundation v. Netherlands (2019) — Dutch government ordered to cut emissions 25% by 2020; ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Obligations (23 July 2025) — the Court's first opinion on climate obligations and only the fifth unanimous advisory opinion in its nearly eighty-year history; confirmed states' legal obligation to prevent significant climate harm; held that NDCs, taken together, must be capable of achieving the 1.5°C limit |
| Significance | Courts emerging as a third pillar of climate governance alongside negotiations (COPs) and legislation |
The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Obligations (23 July 2025)
The International Court of Justice delivered its Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change on 23 July 2025, in response to UN General Assembly resolution 77/276 of 29 March 2023. The Court adopted it unanimously, only the fifth time in its nearly eighty-year history that it has done so. Participation was the highest in the Court's history: 91 written statements and 62 written comments, with 96 States and 11 international organisations appearing at the hearings held from 2 to 13 December 2024.
The holdings go further than the headlines suggested. Parties to the Paris Agreement must prepare NDCs which, "when taken together, are capable of achieving the temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels", an objective standard against which national plans can be measured. A State's failure to take appropriate action to protect the climate system, "including through fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies", may constitute an internationally wrongful act attributable to that State. Obligations to prevent significant transboundary harm are owed erga omnes, that is to the international community as a whole, so the class of States that may invoke a breach is wide. The consequences of a breach are the ordinary ones of State responsibility: cessation, guarantees of non-repetition, and full reparation through restitution, compensation and satisfaction. CBDR-RC, equity, intergenerational equity, sustainable development and the precautionary principle are treated as guiding principles for the interpretation and application of these rules.
India participated in the oral hearings in December 2024, arguing for the primacy of CBDR and the right of developing nations to equitable climate space. The opinion is advisory and non-binding, which is precisely why its language is now cited in domestic climate litigation.
Sectoral Climate Rules Outside the UNFCCC — Shipping and Plastics
Two negotiations outside the UNFCCC show how fragile consensus has become.
At the IMO, an extraordinary session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee met in London from 14 to 17 October 2025 to adopt the IMO Net-Zero Framework, amendments to MARPOL Annex VI combining a global marine fuel standard with a global greenhouse gas emissions pricing mechanism, which would have been the first sector-wide carbon price of its kind. The framework had been approved at MEPC 83 in April 2025. Instead of adopting it, members voted to adjourn the session for twelve months, by 57 votes in favour to 49 against with 21 abstentions, under sustained US pressure; several earlier supporters changed position, China voting with the majority for postponement while Greece and Cyprus abstained. The session reconvenes in October 2026. It is a textbook illustration that "approved" is not "adopted", and it matters for India, whose bunker-fuel costs and shipping interests sit alongside its insistence that CBDR should qualify the IMO's no-more-favourable-treatment rule.
The global plastics treaty has gone the same way. The resumed fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-5.2) ended in Geneva on 15 August 2025 without agreement on a text, deadlocked over whether the instrument should cap plastic production, cover the full life cycle including chemicals, and impose binding rather than voluntary obligations. Chair Luis Vayas Valdivieso of Ecuador stepped down in October 2025. A one-day organisational session, INC-5.3, was held in Geneva on 7 February 2026 solely to elect Ambassador Julio Cordano of Chile as the new Chair; no substantive negotiation took place. The UNEA mandate of 2022 had aimed at a treaty by the end of 2024; the treaty remains unconcluded as of September 2026.
Summary Table — India's Climate Diplomacy at a Glance
| Forum / Initiative | Year | India's Key Contribution |
|---|---|---|
| UNFCCC | 1992 | CBDR-RC principle champion |
| Kyoto Protocol | 1997 | No binding targets for developing countries (CDM participant) |
| Copenhagen (COP15) | 2009 | BASIC bloc formation; voluntary intensity target |
| Paris (COP21) | 2015 | NDC submitted; co-launched ISA |
| ISA | 2015 | Co-founded with France; 113 Member Countries + 14 signatories (Sep 2026); Gurugram HQ; 8th Assembly, New Delhi, Oct 2025 |
| CDRI | 2019 | Launched at UN Climate Summit; 72 Members (Sep 2026); latest conference ICDRI 2025, Nice |
| Glasgow (COP26) | 2021 | Panchamrit; Net Zero 2070; LiFE |
| GBA | 2023 | Co-founded with USA, Brazil at G20 |
| Dubai (COP28) | 2023 | Supported GST; Loss and Damage Fund operationalised |
| Baku (COP29) | 2024 | NCQG $300B; demanded grant-dominant finance; Baku-to-Belém Roadmap launched |
| BBNJ Treaty | 2023/2026 | Supported high seas biodiversity governance; signed 25 Sep 2024, not yet ratified |
| Belém (COP30) | 2025 | Mutirão decision (22 Nov 2025); adaptation finance to be tripled by 2035; unilateral-trade-measures dialogues won at SB 64/66/68; TFFF launched with over $5.5 bn |
| NDC 3.0 | 2026 | Cabinet approval 25 Mar 2026, communicated to UNFCCC 24 Apr 2026: 47% intensity cut, ~60% non-fossil capacity, 3.5–4.0 bn t CO2e sink, all by 2035 |
| Antalya (COP31) | 2026 | Türkiye hosts 9–20 Nov 2026; Murat Kurum President-Designate, Chris Bowen President of Negotiations |
UPSC Relevance
Prelims Focus Areas
- CBDR-RC: Principle 7 of Rio Declaration (1992); Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
- Paris Agreement (2015): limit warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius (preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius); NDCs; ratchet mechanism
- India's Panchamrit (COP26, 2021): 500 GW non-fossil capacity; 50% renewable energy; 1 billion tonnes reduction; 45% intensity reduction; net zero by 2070
- India's NDC 3.0 (2031–2035): Cabinet approval 25 March 2026, communicated to the UNFCCC 24 April 2026; 47% emissions-intensity cut by 2035 over 2005; about 60% non-fossil installed capacity by 2035; 3.5–4.0 billion tonnes CO2e sink; net-zero 2070 unchanged
- US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Executive Order 14162 signed 20 January 2025; effective for the United States on 27 January 2026 under Article 28(1)–(2)
- COP31: Antalya, Türkiye, 9–20 November 2026; Murat Kurum (Türkiye) President-Designate; Chris Bowen (Australia) President of Negotiations
- ISA: launched COP21, 2015; Gurugram, Haryana; 113 Member Countries + 14 signatory countries (ISA website, 22 September 2026); 8th Assembly, New Delhi, 27–30 October 2025; Director General Ashish Khanna since 17 March 2025
- CDRI: launched September 2019 at UN Climate Summit; 72 Members (CDRI website, 22 September 2026); most recent conference ICDRI 2025, Nice, France; infrastructure resilience
- LiFE: announced COP26, 2021; "mindful utilisation"
- GBA: launched G20 New Delhi (September 2023); India, USA, Brazil founding members
- OSOWOG: One Sun One World One Grid; merged with GGI at COP26
- Loss and Damage Fund: established COP27 (2022); operationalised COP28 (2023); World Bank as trustee; USD 342 million available under the Barbados Implementation Modalities against USD 2.8 billion of requests (Board meeting, July 2026); no project approved as of September 2026
- NCQG: COP29 Baku (2024); $300 billion/year by 2035; the Baku to Belém Roadmap report (November 2025) and its 5Rs, only "taken note of" at COP30
- COP30 Belém: scheduled 10–21 November 2025, closed 22 November 2025; Global Mutirão decision; adaptation finance to be at least tripled by 2035; two-year work programme on climate finance; Belém Action Mechanism (just transition); Belém Gender Action Plan; dialogues on unilateral trade measures at SB 64, SB 66 and SB 68
- Tropical Forest Forever Facility: launched 6 November 2025 at the COP30 Leaders' Summit with over USD 5.5 billion; 53 endorsing countries; 20% floor for Indigenous Peoples and local communities; a Facility, not a UNFCCC outcome
- BBNJ Treaty: adopted 19 June 2023; 60th ratification 19 September 2025; entered into force 17 January 2026; India signed 25 September 2024 but has not ratified
- ISA (seabed) vs ISA (solar): International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica, Mining Code still unadopted (31st Session, 2026) — distinct from the International Solar Alliance, Gurugram
- Arctic Council: chairship with the Kingdom of Denmark, 2025–2027, handed over on 12 May 2025; India an Observer since 2013
- ATCM 48: Hiroshima, 11–21 May 2026; host country communiqué and new protected areas adopted; no agreement on an Antarctic tourism framework
- ICJ Climate Advisory Opinion: 23 July 2025; the fifth unanimous advisory opinion in the Court's history; requested by UNGA resolution 77/276; fossil fuel production, licensing and subsidies may constitute an internationally wrongful act
- EU CBAM: transitional phase from 1 October 2023; definitive period from 1 January 2026; 50-tonne de minimis threshold under Regulation (EU) 2025/2083; full phase-in by 2034
- India's CCTS: GEI targets notified by MoEFCC, scheme administered by BEE under the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022; first compliance cycle FY 2025-26 and FY 2026-27
- UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2025 ("Off Target", 4 November 2025): projected warming 2.3–2.5°C; global emissions 57.7 Gt CO2e in 2024
- IMO Net-Zero Framework: approved at MEPC 83 (April 2025), adoption adjourned for 12 months in October 2025
- Green Climate Fund: HQ Incheon, South Korea; NABARD is India's Direct Access Entity
Mains Focus Areas
- Evaluate India's climate justice argument. Is the CBDR principle still relevant in the context of India's rising absolute emissions?
- Assess the role of India-led initiatives (ISA, CDRI, LiFE, GBA) in shaping global climate governance
- "The Paris Agreement marked a paradigm shift in climate diplomacy." Discuss with reference to India's evolving position
- How does the EU CBAM challenge India's trade interests and the CBDR principle? What should India's response strategy be?
- Analyse the governance challenges of global commons — high seas, Antarctica, outer space — in the context of geopolitical competition
- Evaluate the adequacy of climate finance mechanisms (GCF, Loss and Damage Fund, NCQG) for addressing the needs of developing countries
- Has the concept of "net zero" become an excuse for delaying near-term climate action? Discuss with reference to India's 2070 target
Cross-paper relevance
- GS2 (primary) — Paris Agreement NDCs and the US withdrawal effective 27 January 2026; CBDR principle; Loss and Damage Fund; NCQG at COP29 Baku; the COP30 Mutirão decision; COP31 Antalya; ISA (113 Members, September 2026); CDRI (72 Members, September 2026); India's NDC 3.0
- GS3 — Renewable energy transition; green hydrogen; climate and economy; carbon markets (India's CCTS); CBAM and the trade-climate nexus; net zero pathways
- GS4 (Ethics) — Climate justice: historical emitters vs. developing nations; intergenerational equity; India's ethical claim to development space
- Essay — "Climate justice: who owes what to whom?"; "India's climate diplomacy: leadership or compromise?"
What Changed in 2024–26
The two years from Baku to Belém shifted the terms of India's climate diplomacy more than any period since Paris, and three changes matter most.
The finance argument moved from the size of the number to the quality of it. India rejected the NCQG at Baku in November 2024 in unusually blunt terms, and the Baku to Belém Roadmap that was meant to close the gap arrived a year late, in November 2025, as a Presidency report that COP30 did no more than take note of. India's demands have narrowed accordingly, to what can actually be enforced: grant-dominant rather than loan-based finance, transparent accounting, and public finance that private flows supplement rather than replace. The Loss and Damage Fund is the test case. Established at Sharm el-Sheikh and operationalised at Dubai, it reached its ninth Board meeting in Manila in July 2026 with requests from well over a hundred countries, a start-up allocation many times smaller than what was asked of it, and not a single project approved. The first funding decisions were deferred to December 2026, and that is where the Fund's credibility will be settled.
The United States left, and the room India argues in changed shape. The second withdrawal took legal effect on 27 January 2026, a year after the executive order, because Article 28 of the Paris Agreement says so; the testable pair is those two dates and the reason for the gap between them. The consequence is not rhetorical. India's CBDR case has always been addressed principally to Washington, and it must now be made in rooms Washington has left, while US pressure continues to be felt in the sectoral bodies, as the IMO vote of October 2025 showed. The shortfall in the NCQG falls on the remaining contributors, and so on the Green Climate Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund that India argues for.
India's own pledge arrived late and moved cautiously. The 2035 targets were due in February 2025; the Environment Minister said at Belém they would come by December 2025; the Cabinet approved them only in March 2026 and the UNFCCC received them in April 2026. The substance is a measured step up rather than a change of approach: intensity rather than absolute cuts, capacity rather than generation, net-zero 2070 retained, no sectoral targets, and implementation expressly conditional on finance and technology transfer. Read beside the delivery record, where the non-fossil capacity target was met five years early, that conditionality looks like a negotiating position as much as a constraint.
Three further shifts are worth watching.
Law is becoming a second front. The ICJ's advisory opinion of 23 July 2025 gave developing countries an objective standard against which national plans can be measured, and placed fossil fuel licensing and subsidies inside the law of State responsibility. It is advisory and non-binding, which is exactly why its language is now being argued in domestic courts rather than at the COPs.
On trade, India won a process, not an exemption. CBAM's definitive period began on 1 January 2026, and the India–EU FTA was concluded three weeks later at the New Delhi Summit with no carve-out, and is still not in force. What India did win was at Belém: the paragraph 56 language on unilateral measures and the dialogues mandated at SB 64, SB 66 and SB 68. That is a standing forum, on the UNFCCC's own calendar, in wording borrowed from the trade regime. It is worth something only because India's compliance carbon market is now legally live, which is the precondition for any future claim that Indian exporters should not pay twice.
Consensus is failing outside the UNFCCC. The IMO adjourned adoption of its Net-Zero Framework in October 2025 after approving it in April, and the plastics treaty collapsed in Geneva in August 2025, then spent its next session only electing a new Chair. Both are ready examples for a Mains answer on consensus-rule paralysis in environmental multilateralism, and both turn on the distinction between "approved" and "adopted".
The oceans tell the opposite story, and a cautionary one. The BBNJ Agreement entered into force on 17 January 2026, and India, which helped negotiate it, stands outside it as a signatory rather than a party, with domestic ratification work begun only weeks before. The first Conference of the Parties, which will design the treaty's institutions, is due within a year of entry into force. On the deep seabed the contest is sharper: a unilateral US permitting track outside UNCLOS, an International Seabed Authority that again failed to adopt the Mining Code and pushed negotiations to March 2027, and an Assembly weighing an ITLOS advisory opinion on activities in the Area conducted outside the Convention.
What to watch on the road to Antalya in November 2026: whether the Loss and Damage Board approves its first projects in December 2026; whether the two-year finance work programme yields anything the NCQG did not; whether the first trade-measures dialogue at SB 64 constrains CBAM in practice; whether India ratifies BBNJ before COP1; and whether the IMO, reconvening in October 2026, adopts what it had already approved.
Vocabulary
Key Terms
Global Commons
- Definition: Global Commons are resource domains that lie outside the national jurisdiction of any single state and to which all nations have access. International law traditionally recognises four such commons: the High Seas, the Atmosphere, Antarctica and Outer Space.
- Context: Because no state owns them, the global commons are governed through multilateral treaties guided by principles such as the "common heritage of mankind", first applied to the deep seabed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 (1970) and codified in Article 136 of UNCLOS (adopted 1982, in force 16 November 1994). Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay "The Tragedy of the Commons" framed the core governance problem — unrestricted access leads to over-exploitation. The concept has gained renewed salience with the BBNJ (High Seas) Agreement, adopted on 19 June 2023, which entered into force on 17 January 2026 after crossing 60 ratifications in September 2025. Some scholars now extend the idea to cyberspace and biodiversity, though these lack the same legal status.
- UPSC Relevance: A foundational GS2 (International Relations) and GS3 (Environment) concept — it underpins questions on UNCLOS and the High Seas Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty System and the Indian Antarctic Act 2022, outer space governance, and climate negotiations. Prelims typically tests which domains qualify as global commons and the treaties governing each; Mains questions probe governance gaps, the common-heritage-of-mankind principle, and India's stakes in deep-sea mining, Antarctica and space. No specific PYQ is cited here, but the theme recurs across questions on oceans, Antarctica and international environmental law.
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities
- Definition: Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) is a foundational principle of international environmental law holding that while all states share a common obligation to protect the global environment, their specific responsibilities differ according to their historical contribution to the problem and their respective economic and technological capabilities — placing the lead burden on developed countries.
- Context: CBDR was formally articulated as Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration and embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1992, particularly Article 3. It reflects the recognition that industrialised nations contributed disproportionately to cumulative greenhouse-gas emissions and possess greater financial and technological means to respond. The principle drove the dichotomy between Annex I (developed) and non-Annex I (developing) countries in the Kyoto Protocol, 1997, and later evolved into the more flexible CBDR-RC formula ("respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances") under the Paris Agreement, 2015.
- UPSC Relevance: CBDR is a high-yield GS2 (international relations, global groupings, agreements involving India) and GS3 (environment, climate change) concept. In Mains, it underpins answers on climate-finance equity, India's negotiating position, and North-South divides in environmental governance; in Prelims it supports questions on the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement architecture. Foundational concept — no direct standalone PYQ is cited here, but it underpins recurring questions on the climate-change negotiation regime and India's stance on climate justice.
International Solar Alliance (ISA)
- Pronunciation: /ˌɪn.təˈnæʃ.ən.əl ˈsəʊ.lər əˈlaɪ.əns/
- Definition: A treaty-based international organisation co-founded by India and France at COP21 Paris on 30 November 2015, headquartered in Gurugram, Haryana, with the objective of promoting solar energy deployment, mobilising investment ($1 trillion target by 2030), reducing technology costs, and building capacity in solar-resource-rich countries.
- Context: Became a treaty-based organisation in December 2017; 113 Member Countries (signed and ratified) and 14 Signatory Countries per ISA's own website accessed 22 September 2026; its Eighth Assembly met at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, from 27 to 30 October 2025 on the theme "One Sun, One World, One Grid", and Ashish Khanna has been Director General since 17 March 2025; key initiative: One Sun One World One Grid (OSOWOG) — a global interconnected solar energy grid.
- UPSC Relevance: GS2 (International Relations) and GS3 (Environment). Prelims: founding date (November 2015, COP21), co-founders (India and France), HQ (Gurugram, Haryana), current membership with its as-of date, and the distinction from the International Seabed Authority (Kingston, Jamaica), which shares the acronym. Mains: evaluate ISA's effectiveness in promoting solar energy in developing countries; assess India's leadership in global renewable energy governance.
Panchamrit
- Pronunciation: /ˈpʌn.tʃɑːm.rɪt/
- Definition: The five climate action pledges announced by PM Modi at COP26 Glasgow in November 2021, comprising: (1) 500 GW non-fossil energy capacity by 2030, (2) 50% energy from renewables by 2030, (3) reduce total projected carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes by 2030, (4) reduce carbon intensity of GDP by 45% over 2005 levels by 2030, and (5) achieve net-zero emissions by 2070.
- Context: "Panchamrit" means "five nectars" in Sanskrit — derived from the five sacred ingredients (milk, curd, ghee, honey, sugar) offered in Hindu rituals; these pledges were formally incorporated into India's updated NDC in August 2022.
- UPSC Relevance: GS2 (International Relations) and GS3 (Environment). Prelims: all five targets are frequently tested — memorise the specific numbers (500 GW, 50%, 1 billion tonnes, 45%, 2070). Mains: evaluate whether India's Panchamrit pledges are achievable and sufficient; compare India's net-zero target (2070) with other major emitters.
Sources & Verification
India's NDC 3.0 (2031–2035)
- UNFCCC NDC Registry — India's NDC 2031-35 (April 2026)
- The Wire — Cabinet approves India's third climate targets, aims for 47% emissions cut by 2035 (25 March 2026)
- LSEG — India's new NDC: the final piece in the 2035 climate targets puzzle (2026)
COP30 Belém and COP31 Antalya
- UNFCCC — Global Mutirão decision, draft FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.24 (22 November 2025)
- UNFCCC — CMA 7 session report, FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19 (2025)
- UNFCCC — COP30 (November 2025)
- UNFCCC — Report on the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T (November 2025)
- Eurodad — COP30: a win for just transition, a loss for climate ambition (26 November 2025)
- Climate Action Network — COP30 takes a hopeful step towards justice but does not go far enough (22 November 2025)
- TFFF — Over USD 5.5 billion announced for the Tropical Forest Forever Facility as 53 countries endorse the Launch Declaration (7 November 2025)
- Prime Minister of Australia — COP to be hosted by Türkiye, with Australia leading negotiations (23 November 2025)
- COP31 Presidency of Türkiye — official site (accessed 22 September 2026)
Paris Agreement and the US withdrawal
Climate finance, loss and damage, and the ambition gap
- Fund for responding to Loss and Damage — Press release on the B.9 communiqué (10 July 2026)
- Fund for responding to Loss and Damage — Board meetings (accessed September 2026)
- Climate Home News — Loss and Damage Fund delays first project approvals as needs dwarf resources (10 July 2026)
- UNEP — Emissions Gap Report 2025, "Off Target" press release (4 November 2025)
CBAM, India's carbon market and the India–EU FTA
- European Commission, Access2Markets — Start of the definitive period of CBAM (28 January 2026)
- European Commission, DG TAXUD — Officially published: simplifications to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (20 October 2025)
- European Commission — EU–India trade agreement (11 September 2026)
- Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce — India–EU Free Trade Agreement Concluded, dated 27.01.2026
- ICAP — Compliance obligations under India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme enter into force for seven sectors (30 March 2026)
- ICAP — India notifies emission intensity targets for nine sectors under the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme
Oceans, the seabed and the poles
- High Seas Alliance — Historic High Seas Treaty enters into force (16 January 2026)
- International Seabed Authority — Statement on the US Executive Order "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources" (30 April 2025)
- International Seabed Authority — From the 31st to the 32nd Session: advancing the Mining Code and strengthening the common heritage of humankind (2026)
- Ministry of the Environment, Japan — The 48th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Hiroshima, 11–21 May 2026
- Arctic Council — The Kingdom of Denmark's Chairship 2025–2027 (accessed 22 September 2026)
- Arctic Council — 14th Meeting of the Arctic Council (12 May 2025)
Shipping, plastics and international law
- IMO — Net-zero shipping talks to resume in 2026 (17 October 2025)
- UNEP — Talks on global plastic pollution treaty adjourn without consensus (15 August 2025)
- UNEP — New Chair elected to lead negotiations on a global plastic pollution treaty (February 2026)
- International Court of Justice — Case 187, Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (23 July 2025)
India-led initiatives and energy data
- International Solar Alliance — About (accessed 22 September 2026)
- CDRI — Home page figures (accessed 22 September 2026)
- CDRI — ICDRI 2025: outcomes, recommendations and next steps (Nice, France)
- Down To Earth — India reaches 50% non-fossil fuel power capacity, five years ahead of target (15 July 2025)
- NewsOnAir (Prasar Bharati) — India's non-fossil fuel capacity rises to 266.78 GW in 2025 (10 January 2026)
General references: UNFCCC — Paris Agreement and COP26–COP30 decision texts, PIB — India's NDC updates, ISA (isa.int), CDRI (cdri.world), IPCC AR6 (2021–2023), European Commission — CBAM Regulation, UN — BBNJ Agreement.
