India-Pakistan Relations, Kashmir & Cross-Border Terrorism

Overview — Why This Is Central to UPSC

India-Pakistan relations are arguably the most intensely examined bilateral relationship in the UPSC GS2 syllabus. The relationship spans partition trauma, four wars, nuclear deterrence, cross-border terrorism, water disputes, and a frozen diplomatic process. Questions appear in Prelims (dates, agreements, treaties) and Mains (bilateral framework, terrorism, way forward). Understanding this relationship is also essential for topics on SAARC, India's neighbourhood policy, and internal security.

Historical Timeline

The Kashmir Dispute — Origins and Status

Accession and the UN Dimension

At partition in August 1947, princely states were given the choice to accede to India or Pakistan. The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, initially sought independence. When Pakistani tribal militias backed by the Pakistani army invaded Kashmir in October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with India, enabling Indian military assistance. The accession was conditional and subject to a future plebiscite as promised by India.

The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established and passed resolutions on August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, which called for a ceasefire and a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices. The plebiscite was never held, and both sides blame each other. The UN resolutions remain technically unimplemented.

Line of Control (LoC)

The Karachi Agreement of July 27, 1949 (under UNCIP supervision) established the Ceasefire Line (CFL) based on troop positions at the end of hostilities. After the 1971 war, the Simla Agreement of 1972 renamed this the Line of Control (LoC).

The LoC spans approximately 740 kilometres, running from Ladakh in the north to Poonch district in the south. It is a de facto border — not a legally recognised international boundary. Both sides have agreed not to alter it unilaterally.

India holds Jammu and Kashmir (now two Union Territories after 2019 reorganisation). Pakistan holds Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan. China holds the Aksai Chin region (claimed by India).

Key Agreements and Diplomatic Frameworks

Simla Agreement, 1972

Signed on July 2, 1972 in Shimla between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, following the 1971 war in which India handed Pakistan a decisive defeat.

Key provisions:

• Both sides shall settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations — explicitly excluding third-party mediation.
• The LoC shall be respected; neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally.
• Indian and Pakistani forces shall withdraw to their side of the international border.
• India agreed to return approximately 13,000 sq km of territory captured on the western front.
• India facilitated repatriation of over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war.

Significance for UPSC: The Simla Agreement is the cornerstone of India's position that Kashmir is a bilateral issue — any internationalisation of the dispute is rejected by India on this basis. Pakistan, conversely, continues to argue for UN or third-party involvement.

Lahore Declaration, 1999

Signed on February 21, 1999 between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, during Vajpayee's historic bus trip to Lahore.

Key provisions:

• Committed both countries to the peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.
• Reiterated determination to implement the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit.
• Recognised that the nuclear dimension of the security environment adds to the responsibility of both countries to avoid conflict.
• Agreed to take immediate steps to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.

The declaration was rendered largely ineffective within months by the Kargil intrusion, which was being planned by the Pakistani military even as Vajpayee was visiting Lahore.

Agra Summit, 2001

A summit between Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in July 2001 ended without agreement, primarily because Pakistan insisted on placing Kashmir at the centre while India wanted terrorism on the agenda first.

Composite Dialogue Process (CDP), 2004–2008

The Composite Dialogue Process was formally launched in 2004 (with roots in a 1997 proposal at Male, Maldives). It covered eight baskets of issues: peace and security, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and people-to-people contacts.

The CDP was suspended after the Mumbai attacks of November 26–29, 2008, and has not been revived in any structured form since.

The Four Wars

1947–48 First Kashmir War

Pakistani tribal militias (lashkars), backed by Pakistani military, invaded Kashmir in October 1947. Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India. Indian forces airlifted to Srinagar halted the advance. The UN brokered a ceasefire on January 1, 1949. India retained approximately two-thirds of Kashmir; Pakistan held approximately one-third.

1965 War

Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in August 1965 — infiltrating thousands of irregular fighters into Indian-administered Kashmir to trigger an insurgency. India responded with a full-scale counter-attack across the international border. The war ended with the Tashkent Agreement (January 10, 1966) brokered by the Soviet Union. Both sides returned to pre-war positions.

1971 War — Creation of Bangladesh

The 1971 war grew from Pakistan's brutal military crackdown (Operation Searchlight) on East Pakistan's population following the Awami League's election victory. India intervened militarily, and a two-front war ensued. Pakistan surrendered on December 16, 1971, with over 93,000 Pakistani soldiers taken prisoner — one of the largest surrenders since World War II. Bangladesh was born as an independent nation. India's decisive victory fundamentally altered the regional power balance.

Kargil War, 1999

From early 1999, Pakistani army regulars (disguised as militants) and paramilitary forces infiltrated high-altitude posts on the Indian side of the LoC in the Kargil-Drass sector of Ladakh. India detected the intrusion in May 1999.

India launched:

• Operation Vijay (Army ground offensive) — mobilising approximately 200,000 troops.
• Operation Safed Sagar (IAF air campaign) — the first use of combat aircraft by India near the LoC.

Under US pressure, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Washington Accord (July 4, 1999) and ordered withdrawal. Indian forces declared victory on July 26, 1999, now commemorated as Kargil Vijay Diwas.

Casualties: India officially recorded 527 killed and 1,363 wounded. Kargil was the first direct conflict between two nuclear-armed states, demonstrating that nuclear deterrence does not preclude conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold.

Cross-Border Terrorism — Pakistan's State-Sponsored Policy

India accuses Pakistan's military establishment and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of sponsoring, funding, training, and directing terrorist groups that operate against India. The principal groups include:

• Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): Founded in Pakistan; responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks; designated as a terrorist organisation by the UN.
• Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): Founded by Masood Azhar in 2000 after his release from Indian prison following the IC-814 hijacking; responsible for the 2001 Parliament attack, 2016 Pathankot attack, and 2019 Pulwama attack; designated by the UN Security Council.
• Haqqani Network: Active primarily in Afghanistan; links with ISI well-documented; designated by the USA and UN.

Major Terror Attacks and India's Responses

Indian Parliament Attack, December 13, 2001

A suicide attack by JeM and LeT operatives on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi. Five attackers and six security personnel were killed. India mobilised troops to the border (Operation Parakram), and the two countries came close to a full-scale war. The crisis de-escalated under international pressure.

Mumbai 26/11 Attacks, November 26–29, 2008

Ten LeT operatives sailed from Karachi to Mumbai and carried out twelve coordinated attacks across the city over three days. 175 people were killed (including 9 attackers), and more than 300 were injured. Targets included the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (railway station), Nariman House (Jewish outreach centre), and the Oberoi-Trident hotel. One attacker, Ajmal Amir Kasab, was captured alive, convicted, and executed in November 2012. India suspended the Composite Dialogue Process and demanded Pakistan hand over the masterminds. Pakistan-American David Headley was separately convicted for conducting reconnaissance for the attacks.

Pathankot Attack, January 2, 2016

JeM terrorists attacked the Pathankot Air Force Station in Punjab. The attack killed 7 security personnel. Notably, despite the attack, the Indian government briefly attempted to continue the Composite Dialogue, inviting Pakistani investigators to visit Pathankot — an unprecedented move that yielded little cooperation from Pakistan.

Uri Attack, September 18, 2016

LeT terrorists attacked an Indian Army brigade headquarters camp in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, killing 19 soldiers (the single largest loss of Indian military lives in an attack since the Kargil War). India described the attack as having a "Pakistan footprint."

India's Response — Surgical Strikes (September 29, 2016): Eleven days after the Uri attack, Indian Army Special Forces crossed the LoC and destroyed multiple terrorist launchpads in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. This was the first time India officially acknowledged conducting offensive cross-LoC operations. The action represented a significant doctrinal shift — India signalling willingness to carry out military responses to cross-border terrorism.

Pulwama Attack, February 14, 2019

A JeM suicide bomber rammed a vehicle packed with explosives into a CRPF convoy on the Jammu-Srinagar highway in Pulwama, J&K, killing 40 CRPF personnel. The deadliest ever attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir.

India's Response — Balakot Air Strikes (February 26, 2019): Twelve days after Pulwama, the Indian Air Force conducted air strikes targeting a JeM training camp in Balakot, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan — inside Pakistani territory, not just PoK. This was the first time since 1971 that India's combat aircraft struck inside Pakistani territory. Pakistan retaliated with an air incursion the next day (February 27); in the resulting aerial engagement, India lost one MiG-21 and Pakistan lost an F-16 (India's claim). The crisis de-escalated following back-channel diplomacy and US pressure. India followed up by revoking Pakistan's MFN trade status.

Pahalgam Attack, April 22, 2025

On 22 April 2025, three armed terrorists attacked tourists at Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, Anantnag district, Jammu and Kashmir, killing 26 people — predominantly Hindu tourists (the attackers reportedly separated victims by identity before shooting), including one Christian tourist and one local Muslim pony-ride operator — and injuring 17 others. The attackers were armed with M4 carbines and AK-47s and entered through the surrounding forests. The Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy outfit of Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed responsibility twice (day of attack and following day), stating it was in opposition to non-local settlement resulting from the Article 370 abrogation. It was the deadliest attack on civilians in India since the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

What the investigation established. The NIA filed a 1,597-page chargesheet before the special NIA court at Jammu on 15 December 2025, tracing the conspiracy to Pakistan. It names the Pakistan-based handler Sajid Jatt; the three Pakistani attackers — Faisal Jatt alias Suleman Shah, Habeeb Tahir alias Jibran and Hamza Afghani — who were killed by security forces in Operation Mahadev in the Dachigam forest in July 2025; two local harbourers, Parvaiz Ahmad Jothar and Bashir Ahmad Jothar, arrested on 22 June 2025; and LeT/TRF as a legal entity. On 6 July 2026 a supplementary chargesheet named LeT chief Hafiz Saeed as an accused under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the UAPA. The early police notices naming suspects have since been superseded by this formal case.

India's Response — The CCS Measures and the Trade Ban: The response came in two distinct steps, and the sequence is worth getting right, because it is commonly compressed into one date. On 23 April 2025 the Cabinet Committee on Security announced five measures: the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 held in abeyance; the Integrated Check Post at Attari closed; Pakistani nationals barred under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme and existing SVES visas deemed cancelled; Pakistan's Defence, Naval and Air Advisers in New Delhi declared persona non grata, with India withdrawing its own from Islamabad; and the strength of both High Commissions cut from 55 to 30 by 1 May 2025. The same statement recorded that 25 Indians and one Nepali citizen had been killed at Pahalgam. The CCS decision contained no trade measure.

Trade was cut separately on 2 May 2025, by trade notification rather than by the CCS. DGFT Notification No. 06/2025-26 inserted Para 2.20A into the Foreign Trade Policy 2023, prohibiting the "direct or indirect import or transit of all goods originating in or exported from Pakistan, whether or not freely importable or otherwise permitted", with immediate effect, on grounds of national security and public policy. The words indirect and transit did the real work: they closed the third-country route through which Pakistani goods had continued to reach India after 2019. Pakistan declared any interference with treaty-mandated water flows an "act of war" and responded with reciprocal measures, including closure of its airspace to Indian aircraft and a declaration by its National Security Committee that it would hold "all bilateral agreements with India" in abeyance, the Simla Agreement of 1972 included (Dawn, 24 April 2025).

Operation Sindoor, May 6–7, 2025

On the intervening night of 6–7 May 2025, between 1:05 and 1:30 am — a window of about 25 minutes — India launched Operation Sindoor, a tri-service precision strike on nine terrorist camps, five in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and four in Pakistan proper. Col Sofiya Qureshi and Wg Cdr Vyomika Singh set out the target list at the special briefing later that morning:

In Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (five): Sawai Nala, Muzaffarabad (LeT); Syedna Bilal, Muzaffarabad (a JeM staging camp); Gulpur, Kotli (LeT); Barnala, Bhimber; Abbas, Kotli (LeT).

In Pakistan (four): Sarjal, Sialkot; Mehmoona Joya, Sialkot (described at the briefing as a major Hizbul Mujahideen camp); Markaz Taiba, Muridke — the LeT headquarters; and Markaz Subhan Allah, Bahawalpur — the JeM headquarters.

Two things about that list repay attention. It spans three separate organisations, LeT, JeM and Hizbul Mujahideen, rather than retaliating against one; and it reaches the two headquarters complexes India has long named in its terrorism dossiers. The official briefings described the means only as precision capability and niche-technology weapons, and named no aircraft or munitions. India explicitly stated that no Pakistani military installations, nuclear facilities, or civilian areas were targeted. PM Modi framed the operation as a "new normal" and a "new benchmark" in India's counter-terrorism doctrine.

Pakistan's response and the four days that followed. Pakistan retaliated with drone and missile attacks on Indian territory over the following nights, which India's integrated air-defence network engaged, and there were exchanges across the next three nights. An all-party meeting on the situation was held in Delhi on 8 May 2025.

Cessation of firing, 10 May 2025. The fighting stopped when Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations approached his Indian counterpart on 10 May 2025 to request a cessation of firing and military activities, which was agreed later the same day. The Government's account in Parliament is unambiguous about how it came about: the understanding "was arrived at directly between the two DGsMO", no third party intervened, and no bilateral agreement was signed afterwards (MEA, Rajya Sabha, 31 July 2025). President Trump nonetheless announced the ceasefire on Truth Social and claimed US mediation; Pakistan's PM Shehbaz Sharif publicly thanked him. In a 35-minute call on 17 June 2025, according to Foreign Secretary Misri's readout, PM Modi told Trump directly that the halt had come through direct India-Pakistan military channels at Pakistan's request, that no trade deal had been discussed in connection with Operation Sindoor, and that India "has never accepted third-party mediation and will not accept such mediation in the future". PM Modi told Parliament on 29 July 2025 that no world leader had asked India to halt the operation.

Operation Sindoor was India's most significant military action inside Pakistani territory since the 1971 war, and the first time it struck terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan's Punjab province rather than confining itself to the LoC, PoJK or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Article 370 Abrogation — August 5, 2019

On August 5, 2019, President Ram Nath Kovind issued a Presidential Order revoking Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution. The Parliament passed a bill to bifurcate Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature) and Ladakh (without a legislature). This ended the special autonomy that J&K had held since 1949.

Supreme Court Verdict (December 11, 2023): A 5-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India unanimously upheld the abrogation of Article 370 — ruling it was within the constitutional powers of Parliament. CJI D.Y. Chandrachud presided; Justices S.K. Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai, and Surya Kant concurred. The court delivered three separate but concurring judgments. The verdict is legally significant as it confirms the permanence of J&K's reorganisation into two Union Territories.

Pakistan's Response:

• Downgraded diplomatic relations — expelled India's High Commissioner and recalled its own from New Delhi.
• Suspended bilateral trade with India.
• Approached the UNSC (which held a closed consultative meeting but issued no statement or resolution).
• Sought but failed to secure international condemnation.

Impact on India-Pakistan relations:

• Already near-frozen relations deteriorated further.
• Pakistan observes August 5 every year as "Youm-e-Istehsal" (Day of Exploitation). India rejects the observance; on 5 August 2026 the MEA dismissed it as "political absurdity" and restated that the 2019 constitutional changes are "entirely an internal matter of India".
• The ceasefire agreement of February 2021 (a rare positive step, reaffirming the 2003 ceasefire understanding) was reached despite the political freeze, indicating that military-level contacts survive diplomatic ruptures.

Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 — Provisions and 2025 Crisis

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960 in Karachi by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan, with the World Bank as guarantor and mediator.

Key provisions:

• The six rivers of the Indus system are divided between the two countries.
• India receives exclusive rights over the three Eastern Rivers: Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej (approximately 20% of total flow).
• Pakistan receives rights over the three Western Rivers: Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum (approximately 80% of total flow).
• India is permitted limited non-consumptive use (run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects) on the Western Rivers.
• A Permanent Indus Commission (one commissioner each from India and Pakistan) oversees implementation.

The treaty survived the 1965 war, the 1971 war, Kargil, and all subsequent crises — making it one of the most durable water-sharing treaties in the world.

2025 Abeyance — Details and Implications: Following the Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, 2025, the Cabinet Committee on Security decided on April 23, 2025 that the Treaty "will be held in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism". This is the first time either country has stepped away from the treaty since its signing in 1960. Note the wording carefully: India speaks of abeyance, not suspension or termination, precisely because the Treaty provides no exit route.

Immediate actions taken by India:

• Stopped water flow on the Chenab River from the Baglihar Dam (off-season, in violation of treaty provisions, without informing Pakistan)
• Conducted reservoir flushing at Salal and Baglihar projects to boost holding capacity
• Announced plans to accelerate dam and hydroelectric projects on Western Rivers

Why this matters:

• The Treaty secures Pakistan's water for around 80% of its agricultural land (Business Standard, 21 June 2025) — wheat, cotton, and rice above all
• Western Rivers (Indus, Chenab, Jhelum) provide approximately one-third of Pakistan's hydropower capacity
• Pakistan called India's action "weaponisation of water" and an "act of war"
• Pakistan halted trade, closed the Wagah border crossing, and suspended overflight rights

Legal dimensions:

• World Bank position: No provision in the IWT for unilateral suspension; any change requires bilateral agreement. World Bank President Ajay Banga stated the treaty has no suspension clause.
• India's position: Abeyance is a political signal, not a termination. In an interview with The Times of India published on 21 June 2025, Home Minister Amit Shah said the Treaty "will never be restored". India has rejected every pronouncement of the arbitral tribunal, which it calls an "illegally constituted so-called Court of Arbitration", and does not participate in its proceedings.
• Pakistan's position: The abeyance is invalid under international treaty law, and the dispute is not purely bilateral. On 31 January 2026, Pakistan convened a UN Security Council Arria-formula meeting on "Upholding the Sanctity of Treaties for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security", where its Permanent Representative Asim Iftikhar Ahmad argued that the IWT is "not a bilateral concern" and that unilateral disruption affects some 240 million people downstream. In April 2026, Pakistan's Foreign Minister wrote to the Security Council warning of grave humanitarian consequences.

Two parallel legal tracks — know the difference:

The Treaty's dispute-settlement architecture is graded. A "difference" of a technical character goes to a Neutral Expert under Annexure F; a "dispute" of interpretation goes to a Court of Arbitration under Annexure G. Pakistan has pursued both tracks over the Kishenganga and Ratle (Chenab) hydroelectric projects, and India recognises only the first.

• Neutral Expert (Annexure F): On 20 January 2025 the World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert ruled that he is competent to decide all seven points of difference on Kishenganga and Ratle; India welcomed the decision on 21 January 2025, since it vindicated India's position that the questions are technical, not a "dispute". His final decision is expected around 16 July 2027 (PCA press release, 31 August 2026).
• Court of Arbitration (Annexure G): The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague acts only as registry/secretariat; the adjudicating body is the five-member Court of Arbitration chaired by Prof. Sean D. Murphy. It has issued a Supplemental Award on Competence (27 June 2025) holding that India's abeyance decision cannot limit its competence, an Award on Issues of General Interpretation (8 August 2025), a clarification decision (8 November 2025), and an Award Concerning Maximum Pondage (15 May 2026), which India rejected on 16 May 2026.
• Award on Treaty Status, 31 August 2026: In a unanimous award the Court held that none of the grounds available in general international law — material breach, fundamental change of circumstances, the effect of armed conflict, or countermeasures — justified suspending or terminating the Treaty, and that it therefore "remains fully in force, and India must observe its obligations under the Treaty". A separate unanimous order on interim measures bars India from concreting the Ratle dam wall and power intake above set levels until 90 days after the Neutral Expert's final decision. India did not take part in the proceedings, and the MEA the same day "categorically rejected its so-called award", restating that the decision to hold the Treaty in abeyance "remains in force".

Status as of 22 September 2026: The abeyance continues and has been reaffirmed in Parliament (Rajya Sabha, 13 August 2026). There is no substantive bilateral water dialogue, and the two legal tracks run on regardless of India's non-participation in one of them.

UPSC angle: Prelims — IWT signed 1960; World Bank mediator; 6 rivers (3 Eastern to India, 3 Western to Pakistan); India's water share ~20%; held in abeyance April 23, 2025 (first time in history); Baglihar Dam; Salal Dam; Neutral Expert (Annexure F) vs Court of Arbitration (Annexure G); Kishenganga and Ratle projects. Mains (GS2) — water as a geopolitical tool; the limits of weaponising water (infrastructure constraints, international law); whether a treaty with no exit clause can be held "in abeyance"; compare with the Nile Basin dispute and the Mekong River Commission as water-sharing frameworks.

CPEC — China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a 3,000-km infrastructure network of roads, pipelines, railways, and energy projects connecting Gwadar Port (Balochistan, Pakistan) to Kashgar (Xinjiang, China). It is a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

India's core objection: A significant portion of CPEC's western alignment passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which is part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) — territory India considers an integral part of its sovereign territory (UT of Jammu and Kashmir). India has consistently protested CPEC's inclusion in China's BRI framework, stating to Parliament that "no third country should be involved in it." India has boycotted all BRI forums and declined to join any BRI projects.

Strategic concern: CPEC deepens the China-Pakistan strategic nexus, giving China a stake in PoK's development and embedding Chinese infrastructure in territory India claims. India views this as a direct threat to its sovereignty and a strategic encirclement effort.

Trade Relations — MFN and Beyond

Bilateral trade was minuscule even before 2025; the 200% duty of February 2019 made most of it uneconomic, and the notification of 2 May 2025 closed what remained of imports, including the third-country route that Pakistani goods had used to reach India. Imports from Pakistan are now prohibited outright; what survives is a thin residual flow of Indian exports.

Kartarpur Corridor — A Rare Positive Step

The Kartarpur Corridor opened on November 9, 2019 — coinciding with Guru Nanak Dev Ji's 550th Prakash Purab (birth anniversary). The corridor:

• Links Dera Baba Nanak (Punjab, India) to Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur (Punjab, Pakistan), where Guru Nanak spent the last 18 years of his life.
• Spans approximately 4.7 kilometres.
• Allows Indian Sikh pilgrims to visit Kartarpur Sahib without a visa, using an Electronic Travel Authority (ETA).
• The idea was first mooted by Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif in 1999.
• Foundation stone laid simultaneously by Prime Minister Narendra Modi (India side, November 26, 2018) and Prime Minister Imran Khan (Pakistan side, November 28, 2018).

Despite opening just months after the Article 370 abrogation, the corridor represented a rare area of bilateral cooperation driven by religious and people-to-people sentiment. The underlying agreement of 24 October 2019 was renewed for a further five years in October 2024, and the corridor remained operational through 2022–24.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, India suspended Kartarpur Sahib Corridor services with effect from 7 May 2025. The Government told the Lok Sabha on 31 July 2026 that, despite representations from Sikh religious bodies seeking resumption, "the extant security scenario compels Sri Kartarpur Sahib Corridor to remain suspended". The agreement itself has not been terminated, which leaves the corridor available as a low-cost gesture whenever India judges the security climate to have changed.

FATF and Pakistan's Terror Financing Record

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) placed Pakistan on its grey list (Increased Monitoring) in 2018, citing inadequate action on terror financing and money laundering — particularly related to UN-designated groups LeT and JeM operating on Pakistani soil.

Pakistan was given a 27-point (later extended to 34-point) action plan. After completing the action plan requirements, Pakistan was removed from the FATF grey list in October 2022.

Delisting has not ended FATF's relevance to this relationship. The FATF Public Document of 16 June 2025 condemning the Pahalgam attack is one of the multilateral outcomes the Government of India cites when listing international action against cross-border terrorism (Lok Sabha, 31 July 2026).

UPSC relevance: The FATF grey listing was a major diplomatic tool India and the international community used to pressure Pakistan on state-sponsored terrorism. India consistently raised FATF compliance issues in multilateral forums.

After Operation Sindoor — The Diplomatic Balance Sheet

What India Secured

Seven all-party parliamentary delegations were sent to world capitals in the weeks after the operation, carrying a single message: "the perpetrator of terrorism, i.e., Pakistan, cannot be equated with the victim". On the multilateral side, MEA points to the UNSC Press Statement (25 April 2025), the 4th India-Central Asia Foreign Ministers' Dialogue (6 June 2025), the FATF Public Document (16 June 2025), the Quad Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement (1 July 2025) and the BRICS Leaders' Declaration (6 July 2025), all of which condemned Pahalgam.

The sharpest single outcome came from Washington. On 18 July 2025 the US State Department designated The Resistance Front (TRF) as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and India welcomed the step the same day. The 36th report of the UNSC 1267 Monitoring Team (24 July 2025) also referred to TRF's links to the attack. Separately, the United States had extradited Tahawwur Hussain Rana on 9 April 2025 to stand trial in India for his role in planning the 2008 Mumbai attacks — an accountability milestone more than sixteen years after the event.

Where India's Leverage Ran Out

• Limited international backing: India was unable to rally multilateral support before or during the operation; major powers (US, China, Saudi Arabia) focused on preventing escalation rather than condemning Pakistan-backed terrorism.
• "Re-hyphenation" risk: Trump's Kashmir mediation claim placed India and Pakistan back in a joint US diplomatic frame, reversing decades of Indian diplomacy that had de-hyphenated them. India vigorously contested this framing, and Modi corrected Trump directly in the call of 17 June 2025.
• Pakistan's narrative: Pakistan promoted a "successful deterrence" narrative at home, and Chinese commentary treated the air battle as a validation of Chinese export weaponry. Army chief Asim Munir was elevated to Field Marshal in 2025, the start of a steady concentration of authority in his hands.
• SCO complications: the Qingdao Defence Ministers' meeting of June 2025 ended without an agreed outcome document because India would not accept a text that finessed terrorism.
• The financial institutions: at the IMF Executive Board on 9 May 2025 — three days into the fighting — India argued that Pakistan had drawn IMF money in 28 of the 35 years since 1989 and warned that funds could be misused for cross-border terrorism. India then abstained, and the IMF took note of India's statements and of the abstention. The Board completed the first review of Pakistan's Extended Fund Facility (USD 1 billion) and approved a new Resilience and Sustainability Facility the same day — described by PIB as USD 1.3 billion, and by the IMF's own Board release as access of about USD 1.4 billion (SDR 1 billion) over 28 months. Pakistan's economic lifelines are, in practice, beyond India's reach.

Pakistan's Diplomatic Recovery and New Alignments (2025–2026)

A seat at the counter-terrorism table. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2025–26, Pakistan was appointed Chair of the UNSC 1988 (Taliban) Sanctions Committee for 2025 and a Vice-Chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee, alongside Russia and France. MEA has described these as routine, consensus-based annual allocations, and refused to treat them as a scandal.

Utility to Washington. The Islamabad Talks of 11–12 April 2026, facilitated by Pakistan, produced the first direct US-Iran encounter in more than a decade and the most senior engagement between the two since Iran's 1979 revolution, with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt also involved. President Trump publicly credited Field Marshal Asim Munir and PM Shehbaz Sharif more than once.

A West Asian security bloc. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in Riyadh on 17 September 2025; MEA said it would "study the implications of this development for our national security as well as for regional and global stability". On 7 August 2026 the arrangement was widened to include Türkiye as the "Makkah Joint Defence Agreement", which treats an attack on any one of the three as an attack on all three.

Command consolidated at home. Pakistan's 27th Constitutional Amendment (November 2025) created the post of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and abolished the post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. On 4 December 2025 President Zardari appointed Field Marshal Asim Munir the first CDF for a five-year term, while he continued as Army Chief; a Commander, National Strategic Command was also created. The Defence Forces Act 2026 and the National Command Authority (Amendment) Act 2026 followed in August 2026. The army chief is now also the legally unified commander of all three services and sits atop the nuclear command structure.

Pakistan's western front. None of this has stabilised Pakistan's own periphery. India condemned Pakistani air strikes on Afghan territory on 22 February 2026, called the strike of 16 March 2026 on the Omid Addiction Treatment Hospital in Kabul "cowardly and unconscionable", and condemned further strikes on 29 June 2026 — each time saying Pakistan was trying to "externalise its internal failures" and reaffirming Afghanistan's sovereignty.

Way Forward — A Frozen but Complex Relationship

SAARC Paralysis

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been effectively paralysed since India boycotted the 2016 Islamabad SAARC Summit following the Uri attack, citing "increasing cross-border terrorist attacks." The summit was postponed and has not been rescheduled. SAARC cannot function without India-Pakistan normalisation.

SCO as an Engagement Platform

Both India and Pakistan are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) since 2017. SCO summits provide one of the few multilateral platforms where Indian and Pakistani leaders can be in the same room, though bilateral pull-asides are rare. India hosted the SCO summit in 2023 (virtually). Foreign ministers have had brief interactions on the sidelines of SCO meetings.

The platform cuts both ways, as 2025–26 showed. At the SCO Defence Ministers' meeting in Qingdao (June 2025) India refused to endorse a draft that treated terrorism evasively, and the meeting ended without any agreed outcome document for want of consensus. The Tianjin Declaration (1 September 2025) did strongly condemn the Pahalgam attack, but in the same passage condemned the attacks on the Jaffar Express (11 March 2025) and at Khuzdar (21 May 2025) inside Pakistan, an equivalence India does not accept. At the 26th SCO summit in Bishkek (31 August–1 September 2026), PM Modi returned to the theme directly, saying there can be "no place for double standards" on terrorism and that countries which use terrorism as an instrument of policy and give safe haven to terrorists must be told "terrorism can never be a strategic asset for anyone".

Back-Channel Diplomacy

Even during the most severe diplomatic freezes, India and Pakistan maintain intelligence-level back-channel contacts. The February 2021 ceasefire reaffirmation (both sides committed to honour the 2003 ceasefire along the LoC) was reportedly facilitated through back-channel contacts — indicating pragmatic military-level cooperation survives political rupture.

Post-Pahalgam 2025 Context

The Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, 2025, the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty, the closure of airspace and the total import ban mark the most severe deterioration of India-Pakistan relations since Pulwama-Balakot. But "deep freeze" needs qualifying, and the Government's own description is the safest one to carry into an answer.

Setting out the position in the Lok Sabha on 7 August 2026, the External Affairs Minister said both countries still maintain missions in each other's capitals (headed by Chargés d'Affaires rather than High Commissioners) and that "both sides continue to have functional engagements, including DGMO-level talks, exchange of pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles, exchange of list of nuclear installations, and exchange of list of prisoners in each other's custody." What is absent is not contact but a structured political dialogue, and the Government's stated condition for one is unchanged: "normal bilateral relations require an end to cross-border terrorism."

The distinction matters for Mains. India has dismantled the cooperative layer of the relationship — water, trade, pilgrimage, visas, air connectivity — while deliberately preserving the risk-reduction layer of military hotlines and treaty-mandated notifications. That is a design, not an oversight: it keeps escalation manageable while removing every benefit Pakistan derived from normalcy.

The floor that has held. The lists under the 1988 Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations (in force since 27 January 1991) were exchanged on 1 January 2026, the 35th consecutive exchange. Under the 2008 Agreement on Consular Access, on 1 July 2026 India shared a list of 386 civil prisoners and 53 fishermen in its custody who are Pakistani or believed to be, and Pakistan shared a list of 52 civil prisoners and 198 fishermen who are Indian or believed to be. These exchanges have survived every crisis since 1992.

The ceiling that keeps getting lower. Pakistan's airspace has been closed to Indian-registered, Indian-operated and Indian military aircraft since late April 2025, and the ban has been renewed by NOTAM month after month — the notice of 16 September 2026 extends it to 04:59 on 24 October 2026, the seventeenth such extension. The Kartarpur Corridor remains suspended and imports are banned outright. The sovereignty quarrels continue in parallel: in May 2026 India rejected the references to Jammu and Kashmir and to CPEC in a China-Pakistan joint statement, and objected that since "there is no boundary between Pakistan and China", the statement's talk of "trans-boundary water resources cooperation" could not arise; on 16 September 2026 MEA rejected the so-called Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission outright, restating that India has never recognised the 1963 China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement.

Risk has moved to sea. On 15 September 2026, Indian and Pakistani naval vessels collided in the North Arabian Sea. On 16 September 2026 MEA summoned Pakistan's Chargé d'Affaires and lodged a strong protest over "the unacceptable and unprofessional conduct of Pakistani naval units at sea", saying the Pakistani ship's conduct was "in direct contravention of Article 10 of the Agreement between India and Pakistan on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troops Movements of April 1991", the provision requiring warships to stay at least three nautical miles apart. Pakistan's Foreign Office summoned India's Chargé d'Affaires the same day, said its navy had been conducting its biennial SEASPARK-26 exercise, placed the incident in Pakistan's exclusive economic zone and blamed the Indian ship. Each side's account contradicts the other's.

Contacts short of dialogue. Former Pakistani diplomat Jauhar Saleem told Al Jazeera (23 May 2026) that roughly four Track-2 and Track-1.5 meetings, some involving serving officials, were held in the year after the May 2025 fighting, in Muscat, Doha, Thailand and London. The Government of India's position is that Indians who take part do so "in their private capacity" (Rajya Sabha, 13 August 2026), which is precisely what allows them to continue while formal dialogue is ruled out. On 31 December 2025, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar shook hands with Pakistan's National Assembly Speaker Sardar Ayaz Sadiq at the state funeral of former Bangladesh PM Khaleda Zia in Dhaka — the first high-level India-Pakistan contact since the May 2025 conflict; Indian commentators quoted by Al Jazeera called it a courtesy rather than a breakthrough.

Exam-Ready Reference: Key Dates and Facts for Prelims

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 (primary) — India-Pakistan relations; Kashmir dispute; Indus Waters Treaty; cross-border terrorism; diplomatic isolation of Pakistan; Operation Sindoor (2025)
• GS3 — Internal security: cross-border terrorism; radicalisation; proxy war; Article 370 abrogation and J&K reorganisation
• GS4 (Ethics) — Use of force and just war theory; retaliation vs. escalation ethics; civilian casualties in anti-terror operations
• Essay — "India-Pakistan: is normalisation possible?"; "Cross-border terrorism: a threat to regional peace and global security"

What Changed in 2025–2026

The Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025 did not add another entry to a long list of provocations. It ended the framework within which India had answered them.

Doctrine. Uri in 2016 produced a raid on launchpads across the LoC; Pulwama in 2019 produced an air strike on a single camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Operation Sindoor, on the night of 6–7 May 2025, struck three organisations at once and reached the headquarters complexes at Muridke and Bahawalpur, in Pakistan's Punjab. The doctrinal distance travelled since the strategic restraint that followed Mumbai in 2008 is the point an answer should make: terrorist infrastructure anywhere in Pakistan is now treated as targetable, and the nuclear threshold did not prevent conventional action. Pakistan's retaliation over the following nights, and the cessation of firing agreed directly between the two DGsMO on 10 May 2025 after Pakistan's DGMO made contact, also showed how compressed the escalation ladder has become: from mass-casualty attack to four days of exchanges to a military-channel halt, inside three weeks.

Instruments. The more lasting change is that India dismantled the non-military parts of the relationship and has kept them dismantled. Holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance on 23 April 2025 broke a compact that had survived three wars, and Home Minister Amit Shah's statement of 21 June 2025 that it "will never be restored" removed the expectation that it was a bargaining posture. The total import ban of 2 May 2025 closed the third-country workaround that had survived the 2019 tariff wall. The Kartarpur Corridor has stayed shut, and the Lok Sabha was told on 31 July 2026 that the security climate still compels it. What India has deliberately preserved is the risk-reduction layer: hotlines, missile-test pre-notification and the treaty-mandated list exchanges continue, so the relationship has a floor even with no dialogue above it. Reading the freeze as total is the commonest error in an answer on this period.

Law. The IWT quarrel has moved into arbitration, and India has chosen not to be in the room. The Court of Arbitration held on 31 August 2026 that the Treaty remains fully in force; India rejected the award within hours as the product of an illegally constituted body, as it had rejected the Maximum Pondage award that May. Because India accepts the Neutral Expert track but not the Court, and because the Neutral Expert's final decision on Kishenganga and Ratle is not expected until around July 2027, the legal position is set to remain contested for years while the abeyance continues on the ground. Pakistan's counter-move has been to internationalise the water question, through the Arria-formula meeting of 31 January 2026 and letters to the Security Council; India's answer is that the Treaty is bilateral and that abeyance is a political response to terrorism, not a legal repudiation.

Diplomacy. Here the balance is genuinely mixed, and that is what makes it good Mains material. India obtained condemnation of Pahalgam in the UNSC press statement, at FATF, in the Quad and in the BRICS declaration, secured the US designation of TRF on 18 July 2025, and used seven all-party delegations to press the argument that perpetrator and victim cannot be equated — a deliberately cross-party answer to the re-hyphenation problem that Trump's mediation claim created. Against that, no major power condemned Pakistan-backed terrorism during the crisis itself, the SCO texts kept insisting on an equivalence India will not accept, and India's abstention at the IMF Board on 9 May 2025 changed nothing about Pakistan's financing.

The strategic environment has moved against India since. Pakistan spent the following sixteen months rebuilding external relevance on three fronts: a seat at the UN's own counter-terrorism tables during its 2025–26 Security Council term, renewed utility to Washington after facilitating the US-Iran talks at Islamabad in April 2026, and a defence architecture in West Asia that now, on paper, binds Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to its defence. Command at home has been consolidated in one person through the 27th Amendment and the CDF appointment of December 2025, which means any Islamabad interlocutor India might engage speaks with borrowed authority. None of these existed as constraints when Operation Sindoor was planned.

What to watch. On land the understanding of 10 May 2025 has held, with no official record of renewed hostilities on the LoC. At sea it took a single collision in September 2026 to produce reciprocal summonses within a day, and the maritime domain is where the two navies operate in close proximity with the thinnest set of agreed rules and no equivalent of the DGMO hotline. That asymmetry, rather than the LoC, is where the next crisis is likeliest to begin. Whether the back-channel contacts of 2025–26 amount to a thaw is contested: Al Jazeera asked the question on 23 May 2026, prompted by RSS general secretary Dattatreya Hosabale's call not to close the door on engagement, found no formal response from the Government, and concluded that the political will is not yet clearly evident. A week earlier the Army Chief had told Pakistan to decide whether it wished to be "part of geography or history". Converting the battlefield outcome of May 2025 into durable diplomatic gain remains India's unfinished task.

Mains Tip: A common question format asks to "evaluate the prospects for normalisation of India-Pakistan relations." Structure your answer around: (1) structural impediments — military's role in Pakistani foreign policy, nuclear deterrence creating risk tolerance; (2) key bilateral issues — Kashmir, terrorism, water; (3) multilateral frameworks — SCO, SAARC; (4) way forward — graduated confidence-building, back-channel diplomacy, people-to-people ties. Always anchor your answer to the Simla Agreement's bilateral framework as India's foundational position.

Prelims Tip: The Indus Waters Treaty (1960), Simla Agreement (1972), and Lahore Declaration (1999) are the three most frequently tested agreements. Know who signed them, when, and the one-line significance of each. Kargil War dates (May–July 1999, Vijay Diwas = July 26) and the sequence Uri → Surgical Strikes → Pulwama → Balakot → Pahalgam → Operation Sindoor are standard question patterns. For Operation Sindoor 2025: 9 camps (5 in PoJK + 4 in Pakistan), strike window 1:05–1:30 am on 7 May 2025, cessation of firing agreed between the two DGsMO on 10 May 2025, IWT held in abeyance 23 April 2025 and imports banned 2 May 2025. Two more pairs are easy to confuse and worth separating: Neutral Expert (Annexure F, technical differences) vs Court of Arbitration (Annexure G, disputes of interpretation), and Balakot 2019 (Mirage 2000) vs Operation Sindoor 2025.

Sources & Verification

Pahalgam attack and India's response (April–May 2025)

• MEA — Statement by the Foreign Secretary on the decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (23 Apr 2025)
• PIB, Ministry of Commerce & Industry — DGFT Notification 06/2025-26 prohibiting imports from Pakistan (3 May 2025)
• Al Jazeera — The $10bn India-Pakistan trade secret hidden by official data (1 May 2025)
• ThePrint — NIA chargesheet in the Pahalgam case (15 Dec 2025)
• India TV — NIA supplementary chargesheet names Hafiz Saeed (6 Jul 2026)

Operation Sindoor and the cessation of firing

• MEA — Transcript of the Special Briefing on Operation Sindoor (7 May 2025)
• MEA, Rajya Sabha USQ 1361 — Third-party intervention in ceasefire negotiations (31 Jul 2025)
• The Federal — Foreign Secretary's readout of the Modi-Trump call of 17 June 2025 (18 Jun 2025)
• Hindustan Times — IAF Mirage 2000s and Spice-2000 bombs at Balakot, 2019 (27 Feb 2021)

Indus Waters Treaty — abeyance, Neutral Expert and Court of Arbitration

• MEA — Indus Waters Treaty 1960: Decision by the Neutral Expert on his competence (21 Jan 2025)
• Business Standard — Amit Shah's Times of India interview on the Treaty (21 Jun 2025)
• PCA — Press release on the Award on Treaty Status and Order on Interim Measures, Indus Waters Arbitration (31 Aug 2026)
• MEA — Matters pertaining to the illegally-constituted so-called Court of Arbitration (31 Aug 2026)
• Arab News PK — Pakistan at the UNSC Arria-formula meeting on the IWT (1 Feb 2026)

Multilateral action, designations and extradition

• MEA — Designation of The Resistance Front (TRF) by the US Department of State (18 Jul 2025)
• MEA, Lok Sabha USQ 2276 — Action against cross-border terrorism (31 Jul 2026)
• MEA, Rajya Sabha USQ 3290 — Diplomatic measures regarding India-Pakistan hyphenation (21 Aug 2025)
• MEA, Rajya Sabha USQ 1363 — Pakistan as Chair of a UNSC sanctions committee (31 Jul 2025)
• IMF — Pakistan: first review of the EFF and approval of the RSF arrangement (9 May 2025)
• PIB, Ministry of Finance — India's statement and abstention at the IMF Board on Pakistan (9 May 2025)
• MEA — PM's statement at the 26th SCO Summit, Bishkek (1 Sep 2026)

Pakistan's alignments and internal restructuring

• The Hindu — Asim Munir appointed Pakistan's first Chief of Defence Forces (5 Dec 2025)
• The Diplomat — Pakistan passes legislation to formalise the new military command structure (Aug 2026)
• Al Jazeera — The Saudi-Pakistan-Türkiye "Makkah Joint Defence Agreement" (8 Aug 2026)
• Al Jazeera — How the US-Iran talks in Islamabad unfolded (13 Apr 2026)
• MEA — Statement on Pakistan's targeting of the Omid Addiction Treatment Hospital, Kabul (17 Mar 2026)

The relationship in 2026 — official position, CBMs and incidents

• MEA, Lok Sabha Starred Q 289 — Bilateral relations between India and Pakistan (7 Aug 2026)
• MEA, Rajya Sabha USQ 2950 — Status of India-Pakistan engagement (13 Aug 2026)
• MEA, Lok Sabha USQ 2262 — Sri Kartarpur Sahib Corridor (31 Jul 2026)
• MEA — Exchange of lists of prisoners between India and Pakistan (1 Jul 2026)
• MEA — Pakistan's Chargé d'Affaires summoned after the naval collision (16 Sep 2026)
• Al Jazeera — India-Pakistan navy ship collision sparks alarm over unintended escalation (17 Sep 2026)
• MEA — Response on the so-called Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission (16 Sep 2026)
• MEA — Response on Pakistan's so-called Youm-e-Istehsal (5 Aug 2026)
• Dawn — Pakistan extends its airspace ban on Indian aircraft to 24 October 2026 (16 Sep 2026)
• Dawn — Jaishankar-Ayaz Sadiq handshake in Dhaka (31 Dec 2025)
• Al Jazeera — Are India and Pakistan quietly preparing to restart dialogue? (23 May 2026)