India's Neighbourhood First Policy — SAARC, BIMSTEC & Sub-Regional Cooperation

Neighbourhood First — India's Strategic Imperative

India shares land or maritime boundaries with eight countries. How New Delhi manages these relationships determines its ability to project power beyond the subcontinent, protect its internal security, and realise its ambitions as a leading power. Neglecting the neighbourhood creates vacuums that strategic rivals — above all China — are quick to fill.

The Neighbourhood First Policy (NFP) was adopted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the very outset of his first term. Its symbolic launch came on 26 May 2014, when Modi invited the heads of all eight SAARC member-states to his swearing-in ceremony — an unprecedented gesture that signalled a deliberate shift in India's diplomatic priorities.

The policy seeks economic prosperity through trade and connectivity, security against cross-border terrorism and insurgency, and relations with smaller neighbours built on sovereign equality rather than dominance.

Five operational pillars: enhanced physical connectivity; economic integration and trade; people-to-people contacts; security cooperation; and multilateral institutional engagement through SAARC and BIMSTEC.

In practice, the policy now works alongside the Act East Policy and MAHASAGAR, India's Indian Ocean outlook. The India-Myanmar Joint Statement of 1 June 2026 describes Myanmar as lying "at the confluence" of all three (MEA, 1 Jun 2026). Disaster relief has become one of its most visible tools: India called itself the first responder after the Myanmar earthquake of 28 March 2025 (Operation Brahma, MEA), and it launched Operation Sagar Bandhu on 28 November 2025 after Cyclone Ditwah struck Sri Lanka.

SAARC — Structure, Summits and Paralysis

Key Facts

Summit History

SAARC holds summits at the level of Heads of State or Government. The 18th SAARC Summit was held in Kathmandu, Nepal on 26–27 November 2014 — and remains the last summit held to date (as of 2026). The 19th Summit was scheduled in Islamabad in November 2016 but was indefinitely postponed after India and several other members withdrew following the Uri terrorist attack.

Why SAARC Is Paralysed

SAARC's charter requires consensus for all decisions — giving any single member an effective veto. Pakistan's state-sponsorship of cross-border terrorism, and the resulting breakdown in India-Pakistan relations, have made progress impossible. India has consistently maintained that meaningful regional cooperation cannot proceed in an atmosphere of cross-border violence.

SAARC's intra-regional trade is under 5% of members' total trade — one of the lowest figures for any regional grouping — compared with over 25% for ASEAN and over 60% for the EU.

The 2025 rupture with Pakistan froze what little remained. In the Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April 2025, 26 people were killed in a Pakistan-linked attack in Jammu and Kashmir. India's Operation Sindoor (6–7 May 2025) struck 9 terror infrastructure sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, including the Bahawalpur headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Muridke headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the deepest strikes into Pakistani territory since 1971. A ceasefire was reached via the DGMO (Director General of Military Operations) hotline on 10 May 2025.

Even SAARC's working instruments have been hit. Before the strikes, the Cabinet Committee on Security decided on 23 April 2025 that the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) would be held in abeyance "until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism". It closed the Integrated Check Post at Attari, barred Pakistani nationals from travelling under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme (SVES) and cancelled SVES visas already issued to them, declared Pakistan's defence advisers in New Delhi persona non grata, and cut the strength of the two High Commissions from 55 to 30 by 1 May 2025 (MEA briefing, 23 Apr 2025). India also imposed an airspace closure, and the Kartarpur Corridor has been closed since 7 May 2025, the day of Operation Sindoor, "until further notice" (ThePrint, 7 May 2025). One of the few functioning SAARC-wide facilities is thus closed to one member.

Rival formats are emerging. China, Pakistan and Bangladesh held their first trilateral meeting at Kunming on 19 June 2025, on the sidelines of the 9th China-South Asia Expo, and listed infrastructure, connectivity, trade, investment and other areas for cooperation; Bangladesh's interim government said it was not forming an alliance (AIR, 22 Jun 2025). On 3 December 2025, Pakistan's Deputy PM Ishaq Dar suggested such trilaterals be "expanded and duplicated", arguing that regional cooperation should not be "held hostage to anyone's rigidity" (Al Jazeera, 5 Dec 2025). For India, this is the flip side of SAARC's paralysis: if SAARC stays frozen, others may try to build South Asian groupings that leave India out.

BIMSTEC — India's Preferred Regional Architecture

With SAARC stalled, India has actively promoted BIMSTEC as its preferred sub-regional platform. BIMSTEC excludes Pakistan and includes Thailand — spanning both South and Southeast Asia.

Key Facts

BIMSTEC Charter (2022/2024)

The Charter, adopted at the 5th BIMSTEC Summit held virtually in Colombo on 30 March 2022, gave the organisation a formal legal personality. It entered into force on 20 May 2024 after ratification by all seven members. The Charter consolidates BIMSTEC's institutional framework, streamlines the secretariat, and formally reduces the cooperation sectors.

Sectors of Cooperation (Restructured 2022)

At the Colombo Summit, BIMSTEC reduced its thematic pillars from 14 unwieldy sectors to 7 pillars, each led by one member (MEA brief on BIMSTEC, Mar 2025):

India leads one pillar, Security, under which counter-terrorism and transnational crime, disaster management and energy security sit as sub-sectors (MEA brief, Mar 2025).

6th BIMSTEC Summit — Bangkok, 4 April 2025

The 6th Summit was held in Bangkok on 4 April 2025 under the theme "BIMSTEC: Prosperous, Resilient and Open" — the first in-person leaders' meeting in seven years. Documents adopted or signed:

India's announcements (MEA, 4 Apr 2025): PM Modi announced BODHI (BIMSTEC for Organized Development of Human Resource Infrastructure), a training and scholarship programme for the region's youth; a BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce; an annual BIMSTEC Business Summit in India; a BIMSTEC Athletics Meet in 2025; and the first BIMSTEC Games in 2027, BIMSTEC's 30th anniversary year. He also used the summit for bilaterals, most significantly with Bangladesh's Muhammad Yunus (the first since the August 2024 transition) and Sri Lanka's President Dissanayake, whom he visited in Colombo immediately afterwards (4–6 April 2025).

Working Level Under Bangladesh's Chairmanship (2025–2026)

With Bangladesh in the chair since April 2025, BIMSTEC's routine machinery has kept working. The 9th BIMSTEC Permanent Working Committee met in Dhaka on 7–8 April 2026, addressed by Secretary General Indra Mani Pandey (BIMSTEC, Apr 2026). The 5th meeting of BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs, chaired by NSA Ajit Doval in New Delhi on 16 July 2026 with all seven members present, adopted the BIMSTEC Guidelines for the Maritime Component of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and guiding principles on the conduct of maritime law enforcement agencies during interactions at sea (BIMSTEC, 16 Jul 2026). The 4th such meeting had been held in Nay Pyi Taw in July 2024.

India-Bangladesh

Historical foundation: Bangladesh was born in 1971 with direct Indian military intervention against Pakistan — the Liberation War remains the bedrock of the bilateral relationship.

Sheikh Hasina era (2009–2024): Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina presided over the strongest phase of India-Bangladesh ties. Land Boundary Agreement (2015) resolved the decades-old enclave problem; connectivity through rail and road was deepened; power and energy trade expanded significantly.

Political change — August 2024: In a student-led mass uprising, Sheikh Hasina resigned on 5 August 2024 and fled to India. Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as Chief Adviser of the interim government on 8 August 2024. That government sought a recalibration away from what critics had called an "India-centric" foreign policy.

Hasina verdict and extradition request (November 2025): On 17 November 2025, Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal sentenced Hasina, who has been in India since August 2024, to death in absentia for crimes against humanity over the 2024 crackdown (AIR, 17 Nov 2025). Dhaka then formally sought her extradition; MEA said it was examining the request, and no Indian decision is on record (Al Jazeera, 26 Nov 2025).

Elected government returns (February 2026): The BNP won the parliamentary election of 12 February 2026, ending about 18 months of the Yunus-led interim administration. Tarique Rahman was sworn in as Prime Minister on 17 February 2026, with Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri representing India at the ceremony (AIR, 17 Feb 2026).

Teesta water sharing: A draft agreement on sharing the Teesta river waters has been ready since 2011 but remains unsigned, blocked by West Bengal's opposition at the domestic level. The Teesta is crucial for Bangladesh's agriculture in the north-west. The Yunus interim government had signalled its intent to revive negotiations.

Connectivity: The Agartala–Akhaura rail link, renewed BIMSTEC engagement, and Mongla/Chittagong port access agreements are key connectivity anchors for India's North-East.

India-Nepal

Special relationship: India and Nepal share an open, Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950)-governed border. Millions of Nepali citizens work in India; both armies share an exceptional institutional bond.

Kalapani border dispute: In May 2020, India inaugurated a road connecting Dharchula in Uttarakhand to the Lipulekh Pass. Nepal immediately protested, claiming the road passes through Nepali territory. On 20 May 2020, Nepal's parliament approved a new political map incorporating Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura as Nepali territory. The dispute roots in differing interpretations of the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli regarding the true source of the Mahakali River.

Lipulekh revived (2025–2026): When India and China agreed in August 2025, during Wang Yi's visit, to reopen border trade routes including Lipulekh, Nepal's foreign ministry reasserted that Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani are Nepali territory. MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal replied that trade through Lipulekh began in 1954 and that Nepal's claims are "neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence" (Kathmandu Post, 21 Aug 2025). Trade through the pass resumed on 1 August 2026 after six years, though China initially cleared only 20 of the 62 Indian pass-holders and allowed no goods to move (ETV Bharat, 30 Jul 2026). By 21 September 2026, 174 trade passes had been issued for the season and 47 traders in three batches had crossed to the Tibetan trading centre at Taklakot, with goods now moving — the third batch carried consignments worth ₹23.63 lakh (The Northern Gazette, 21 Sep 2026).

Political upheaval and a new government (2025–2026): Youth-led "Gen Z" protests against corruption and a social media ban forced PM K.P. Sharma Oli to resign on 9 September 2025. Former Chief Justice Sushila Karki became Nepal's first woman Prime Minister on 12 September 2025 to lead an interim government and hold elections; MEA welcomed it the same day. In the election of 5 March 2026, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) won 182 of 275 House seats, and its leader Balendra (Balen) Shah was sworn in as Prime Minister on 27 March 2026. PM Modi has invited him to India; no date for the visit had been fixed as of April 2026 (Kathmandu Post, 11 Apr 2026).

Mahakali Treaty (1996): A landmark water-sharing treaty on the Mahakali river (Sharada/Mahakali); implementation remains incomplete.

BBIN MVA: The BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement was signed on 15 June 2015 in Thimphu. Bangladesh, India, and Nepal have ratified it. Bhutan's upper house rejected ratification in November 2016 owing to domestic environmental concerns.

Hydropower: Nepal has vast hydropower potential (~83,000 MW). India imports Nepali hydro power and is a major investor in projects like Upper Karnali and Arun-III.

India-Sri Lanka

Historical backdrop: The ethnic Tamil issue — involving the rights of Sri Lankan Tamils (including the Indian-origin Tamil community) — has been a persistent sensitivity in bilateral ties. India's intervention via the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the 1987–1990 period left complex legacies.

Economic crisis 2022: Sri Lanka suffered a catastrophic sovereign default in 2022 — its worst economic crisis since independence — triggered by forex reserve depletion, fuel shortages, and food insecurity. India responded swiftly: approximately USD 4 billion was extended through lines of credit for petroleum, food, and medicines.

Hambantota Port: China's growing influence in Sri Lanka, symbolised by the Hambantota Port (handed to China Merchants Port on a 99-year lease in 2017 after Sri Lanka struggled with Chinese loan repayments), remains a strategic concern for India.

Fishermen's dispute: Tamil Nadu fishermen regularly stray into Sri Lankan territorial waters; arrests by Sri Lanka's navy are a recurring bilateral irritant.

2024 Sri Lanka presidential elections: Sri Lanka elected Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) — leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) / National People's Power coalition — as President on September 21, 2024; the first JVP-affiliated leader to win the presidency. Despite AKD's historically anti-India left-wing roots, he made India his first foreign visit as President (December 2024), signalling pragmatic engagement; both sides discussed the continuation of India's investment in Sri Lanka's energy sector, port development (Trincomalee), and economic recovery.

PM Modi's Sri Lanka visit (4–6 April 2025): Straight after the 6th BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok, PM Modi visited Sri Lanka, his first visit under President Dissanayake. Seven MoUs were exchanged, among them the first India-Sri Lanka MoU on Defence Cooperation, an MoU on HVDC interconnection for power trade, and a trilateral India-Sri Lanka-UAE MoU on developing Trincomalee as an energy hub. The two leaders marked the groundbreaking of the Sampur solar project and the upgraded Maho-Omanthai railway line; the conclusion of the Bilateral Amendatory Agreements on debt restructuring was announced, along with capacity-building training for 700 Sri Lankans a year (MEA, List of Outcomes, 5 Apr 2025). The defence MoU is the headline: it gives formal shape to security ties with a government whose party once opposed Indian influence, in a country where China holds Hambantota.

Recovery and India's role: AKD's government has maintained the IMF reform programme begun under his predecessor, and India concluded its bilateral debt-restructuring amendatory agreements with Sri Lanka in April 2025. India's role in the 2022 crisis ($4 billion emergency package) positioned New Delhi as a key partner in Sri Lanka's recovery — India was the first country to extend support while international institutions took longer to mobilise.

Cyclone Ditwah (November–December 2025): When Cyclone Ditwah hit Sri Lanka, India launched Operation Sagar Bandhu on 28 November 2025, sending NDRF search-and-rescue teams and IAF and Navy helicopters, including from INS Vikrant; 53 tons of relief had been handed over by 1 December (MEA, 1 Dec 2025). On 23 December 2025, EAM S. Jaishankar, visiting Colombo as the Prime Minister's special envoy, announced a USD 450 million reconstruction package: USD 350 million in concessional lines of credit and USD 100 million in grants (AIR, 23 Dec 2025).

India-Bhutan

Special friendship: India and Bhutan share a uniquely close partnership. Their 1949 Treaty of Friendship was renegotiated in 2007 — the new treaty replaced a provision requiring Bhutan to seek India's guidance on foreign policy with a broader sovereignty clause, while maintaining close consultations on security and defence matters.

Economic integration: India is Bhutan's largest trading partner and primary source of development aid. The hydropower partnership is central: India imports Bhutanese hydro power, financed through Indian project grants and loans.

PM Modi's state visit (11–12 November 2025): The King of Bhutan and PM Modi jointly inaugurated the 1,020 MW Punatsangchhu-II hydroelectric project on 11 November 2025, and work on the main dam of the 1,200 MW Punatsangchhu-I project is to resume. India announced a concessional Line of Credit of INR 40 billion for energy projects in Bhutan and an Immigration Check Post at Hatisar (Assam) to serve the Gelephu Mindfulness City. Both sides welcomed the September 2025 MoU on cross-border rail links, Gelephu–Kokrajhar and Samtse–Banarhat, and signed MoUs on renewable energy, health, and a PEMA-NIMHANS partnership on mental health (MEA, 12 Nov 2025). Hydropower remains the core, but rail links and Gelephu point to a partnership that is widening into connectivity and investment.

Bhutan-China border talks: China and Bhutan have no diplomatic relations but have held over 24 rounds of boundary negotiations since 1984. The unresolved boundary — particularly around Doklam — has direct implications for India. The 2017 Doklam standoff arose when Chinese forces began building a road in territory claimed by Bhutan that India views as strategically vital to protect the Siliguri Corridor ("Chicken's Neck"). Any Bhutan-China settlement that concedes strategic heights without India's awareness would fundamentally alter the security calculus.

India-Maldives

Historically close: India has been the traditional security provider and first responder for the Maldives — from foiling the 1988 coup attempt (Operation Cactus) to providing disaster relief post-2004 tsunami.

"India Out" campaign and Muizzu: Mohamed Muizzu, running on an explicit "India Out" platform, won the Maldivian presidential election in 2023. He requested India to withdraw approximately 89 military personnel managing two Indian helicopters and a Dornier aircraft gifted to the Maldives.

Troops withdrawal 2024: India agreed to complete the troop withdrawal by 10 May 2024. Muizzu made his first state visit to China in January 2024 (within days of taking office), signing several cooperation agreements. Lakshadweep was promoted as an alternative tourism destination during the diplomatic row that followed.

China factor: China's strategic interest in the Maldives as a potential Indian Ocean node is well-documented; Muizzu's pivot towards Beijing is a direct expression of the "String of Pearls" dynamic.

Reset (2024–2025): Economic distress pushed Muizzu back towards India. He attended PM Modi's swearing-in ceremony in June 2024 and made a state visit to India in October 2024, where both sides signed a comprehensive Vision Document for bilateral cooperation. India rolled over a USD 50 million treasury bill due in May 2024 and signed bilateral currency swap agreements amounting to USD 760 million.

PM Modi's state visit (25–26 July 2025): Modi was Guest of Honour at the Maldives' 60th Independence Day on 26 July (PIB, 26 Jul 2025). India extended a new Line of Credit of INR 4,850 crore (about USD 550 million), and an Amendatory Agreement cut the Maldives' annual repayment obligations on Government of India-funded LoCs by 40 per cent, from USD 51 million to USD 29 million — critical fiscal relief for a country facing potential sovereign default on roughly USD 600 million in Sukuk bonds. The two sides exchanged the Terms of Reference for an India-Maldives Free Trade Agreement, signed MoUs on fisheries, meteorology, digital public infrastructure and the Indian Pharmacopoeia, and concluded an NIPL-MMA agreement to bring UPI to the Maldives. India handed over 3,300 social housing units in Hulhumalé, 72 vehicles, two BHISHM health cubes and the new Ministry of Defence building in Malé, and six High Impact Community Development Projects were inaugurated across the country (MEA, 25 Jul 2025).

India-Myanmar

2021 coup: Myanmar's military (Tatmadaw) seized power on 1 February 2021, detaining elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The subsequent civil war has destabilised Myanmar's border regions adjoining India's northeastern states (Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh).

Free Movement Regime (FMR): The FMR, in place since 1968, allowed residents within 16 km of the India-Myanmar border to cross without a visa — recognising that colonial-era borders split ethnic communities. India suspended the FMR in February 2024, citing cross-border infiltration of armed groups and drug trafficking. Plans to fence the entire 1,643-km border are underway.

Kaladan Multimodal Project and connectivity: India's connectivity projects through Myanmar (to Sittwe port and onward) face uncertainty because of the civil war and the junta's loss of territorial control. At the June 2026 summit both governments recommitted to completing Kaladan and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway; the Joint Statement placed Myanmar at the confluence of India's Neighbourhood First, Act East and MAHASAGAR policies, raised Mekong Ganga ICCR scholarships from 36 to 100, noted the Rupee-Kyat settlement mechanism operational since May 2024, and recorded Myanmar's assurance that its territory would not be used against India (MEA, 1 Jun 2026).

Earthquake relief — Operation Brahma (2025): After a major earthquake struck Myanmar on 28 March 2025, India launched Operation Brahma; the first C-130J left on 29 March. By 1 April 2025, six aircraft and five naval ships had carried 625 MT of relief material, including 442 MT of food aid on INS Gharial, and a 118-member Indian Army field hospital team was running a 200-bed facility in Mandalay (MEA, 1 Apr 2025).

From junta to a military-led "civilian" government (2025–2026): Myanmar held elections in three phases between 28 December 2025 and 25 January 2026, and the pro-military USDP won over 80% of contested seats. The new parliament elected junta chief Min Aung Hlaing President on 3 April 2026 (429 of 584 votes); he gave up the post of commander-in-chief to Ye Win Oo and was inaugurated on 10 April 2026. Critics called the transition window dressing for continued military rule (Al Jazeera, 3 Apr 2026). He paid his first official visit to India from 30 May to 3 June 2026, with talks with PM Modi on 1 June. India's public line on the elections themselves had been careful: MEA said on 16 January 2026 that India wants "inclusive, fair elections in which all stakeholders participate", and that Indians who travelled to Myanmar did so in a private capacity, not as official observers (Tribune, 16 Jan 2026).

India-Afghanistan

Strategic assets: India invested over USD 3 billion in Afghan infrastructure — including the Salma Dam, the Afghan Parliament building in Kabul, and the Zaranj–Delaram highway — under the elected Afghan governments.

Taliban takeover — August 2021: India withdrew its diplomatic personnel after the Taliban's return to power in August 2021 and later maintained only a "technical team" in Kabul. Dealings since have been with what is commonly called Taliban 2.0, the movement's second period in power.

Engagement without recognition (2025–2026): Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited India from 9–16 October 2025, the first in-person ministerial engagement between the two sides since 2021. The Joint Statement issued after his talks with EAM Jaishankar on 10 October recorded the Afghan side's commitment not to allow any group or individual to use Afghan territory against India, and its condemnation of the Pahalgam attack. India announced health projects — a 30-bed hospital in Bagrami, oncology and trauma centres, and five maternity clinics — gifted 20 ambulances, and was acknowledged as first responder to the earthquake in Kunar and Nangarhar; both sides welcomed the India-Afghanistan Air Freight Corridor and agreed to cooperate on hydroelectric projects (MEA, 10 Oct 2025). On 21 October 2025 the Technical Mission in Kabul was restored to the status of Embassy of India "with immediate effect" (MEA, 21 Oct 2025). The move was reciprocated when a Taliban-appointed diplomat, Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor, took charge as Chargé d'Affaires of the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi in January 2026 (AIR, 10 Jan 2026). India has not formally recognised the Taliban government.

Chabahar — alternative route: Since the land route through Pakistan is blocked, India uses Iran's Chabahar Port linked to the Zaranj–Delaram Highway as an alternative trade corridor to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan entirely. An India-Afghanistan Air Freight Corridor, welcomed in the October 2025 Joint Statement, offers a second route that avoids Pakistan.

Sub-Regional Groupings

Challenges: Trust Deficit and China's Expanding Footprint

String of Pearls: China's strategy of developing strategic port infrastructure across the Indian Ocean littoral — Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Kyaukpyu (Myanmar), Chittagong (Bangladesh), and growing interest in the Maldives — creates potential military-use nodes encircling India.

China's BRI in the neighbourhood: Almost all of India's neighbours have signed on to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India remains the only major regional power to formally reject BRI, citing sovereignty concerns over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.

China's minilateral diplomacy: The first China-Pakistan-Bangladesh trilateral at Kunming (19 June 2025) and Pakistan's call in December 2025 to replicate such formats show Beijing and Islamabad experimenting with regional groupings that exclude India.

Political churn in the neighbourhood: Between August 2024 and April 2026, governments changed in Bangladesh (August 2024 and February 2026), Nepal (September 2025 and March 2026) and, formally, Myanmar (April 2026). Each change forces India to rebuild working relationships, often with actors who campaigned against Indian influence.

Trust deficit drivers:

• Water disputes (Teesta, Mahakali, Feni) unresolved for decades
• Kalapani boundary dispute with Nepal straining an otherwise close relationship, revived in 2025 by the India-China decision to resume Lipulekh trade
• Perception of India as a "big brother" interfering in smaller neighbours' politics
• India's sometimes slow or reactive diplomacy compared with China's proactive chequebook diplomacy

Way Forward

1. Revive SAARC selectively — pursue functional SAARC cooperation on non-contentious issues (disaster management, health) while maintaining the political boycott of Pakistan-hosted summits
2. Deepen BIMSTEC — operationalise the 2024 Charter; push for a BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement and the BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection
3. Settle water disputes — sign the Teesta accord with Bangladesh; implement the Mahakali Treaty with Nepal
4. Resolve Kalapani diplomatically — re-engage Nepal through joint technical committees; avoid unilateral road-building provocations
5. Connectivity as diplomacy — accelerate BBIN MVA, Agartala–Akhaura rail, Raxaul–Kathmandu railway, and Chabahar-linked corridors
6. Development finance — scale up the Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) to compete with Chinese BRI offers
7. People-to-people ties — expand ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation) training scholarships; liberalise visa regimes for students and professionals

Quick-Reference Tables

SAARC Members

BIMSTEC Members

Key Bilateral Facts — Exam Ready

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 (primary) — Neighbourhood First Policy; SAARC (paralysed); BIMSTEC Charter 2024; Gujral Doctrine; BBIN; regional connectivity; China's encirclement through neighbours
• GS3 — Cross-border connectivity: BBIN MVA, trade corridors; energy cooperation; regional economic integration; disaster management (HADR operations Brahma and Sagar Bandhu)
• GS4 (Ethics) — Non-reciprocity as diplomatic virtue; India's responsibility as regional power; aid vs conditionality ethics
• Essay — "Is India losing its neighbourhood?"; "SAARC vs BIMSTEC: the future of South Asian regionalism"

What Changed in 2024–2026

Between August 2024 and mid-2026 the Neighbourhood First policy was tested less by China than by the ballot box and the street. Governments changed in Bangladesh twice, in Nepal twice and, formally, in Myanmar, and each time India had to rebuild a working relationship with people who had not been its interlocutors. The policy survived, but the way India practises it has shifted: less reliance on a friendly incumbent, more on institutions, infrastructure and finance that outlast any one leader.

A hard security edge. The Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025 and Operation Sindoor on 6–7 May 2025 were the sharpest break. The move from the coercive signalling of Balakot (2019) to strikes at the heart of terrorist infrastructure inside Pakistan, together with the Cabinet Committee on Security's decisions of 23 April 2025, established that Neighbourhood First carries a punitive security component alongside its connectivity agenda. It also settled the SAARC question for the foreseeable future: with the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, the Attari check post shut and the SAARC visa scheme closed to Pakistani nationals, a revival of the grouping is not a live prospect. What to watch is whether India's willingness to suspend a treaty that survived three wars becomes a template for other bilateral instruments.

Bangladesh: rupture, then an elected counterpart. Sheikh Hasina's fall on 5 August 2024 removed the partner around whom a decade of Indian policy had been built. Under Muhammad Yunus, friction came from Hasina's presence in India, attacks on Hindu minorities and Yunus's remarks in China in March 2025 describing India's northeastern states as landlocked and Bangladesh as the region's guardian of the ocean. The International Crimes Tribunal's verdict of 17 November 2025 and Dhaka's extradition request then set India's legal obligations against its political ties to the Awami League, and there is no comfortable answer. The BNP's win on 12 February 2026 and Tarique Rahman's swearing-in on 17 February 2026 at least restore a counterpart with a mandate; India's decision to send the Lok Sabha Speaker and the Foreign Secretary to the ceremony signalled that it will work with whoever governs. An elected partner is easier to negotiate with on Teesta, connectivity and border management than a caretaker administration, but the BNP's past record with India and the unresolved extradition will test the reset.

Nepal: new leadership, an older dispute made live. The Gen Z protests of September 2025, Oli's resignation and Sushila Karki's interim premiership, followed by the Rastriya Swatantra Party's victory on 5 March 2026 and Balendra Shah's swearing-in on 27 March 2026, have replaced the party leaderships India had dealt with for decades. India's response was deliberately low key, welcoming each transition without comment on its politics. The boundary question sharpened in parallel. Once trade through Lipulekh resumed on 1 August 2026, Kalapani stopped being a map dispute and became a working trade route across territory Kathmandu claims. Any Nepali government will face domestic pressure to raise it, and a leadership with no history of managing the issue quietly makes that more likely, not less.

Sri Lanka and the Maldives: from crisis lending to structural ties. Both relationships moved from emergency support to durable arrangements. With Colombo, PM Modi's April 2025 visit produced the first formal defence cooperation framework, an energy agenda that brings in a third partner at Trincomalee, and an interconnection MoU pointing to grid-level power trade — ties of a kind China's presence at Hambantota cannot match — while Cyclone Ditwah let India act first as relief provider through Operation Sagar Bandhu from 28 November 2025 and then as reconstruction financier that December, the two roles that give MAHASAGAR practical content. With Malé, President Muizzu's "India Out" platform gave way to recalibration once economic distress bit: the troop withdrawal addressed his core demand, and the state visit of 25–26 July 2025 converted India's financial leverage into debt relief, a free trade negotiation and payments integration. The Maldives is the sharper case study, showing both how exposed India's partnerships are to a neighbour's electoral politics and how quickly economic indispensability reverses them. Whether that is effective economic statecraft or dependency-building is the live Mains argument.

Afghanistan and Myanmar: dealing with governments India does not endorse. Amir Khan Muttaqi's visit in October 2025, the restoration of the Kabul mission to embassy status on 21 October 2025 and the arrival of a Taliban-appointed Chargé d'Affaires in New Delhi in January 2026 add up to full working channels without recognition. Myanmar follows the same logic: India kept its distance from the phased elections held between December 2025 and January 2026, yet received Min Aung Hlaing on his first official visit from 30 May to 3 June 2026. In both cases the reasoning is that border security, the northeast's insurgencies and India's connectivity projects run through territory these governments control, and that abstention would leave the field to China. The cost is the engagement-versus-legitimisation dilemma, which India manages by separating diplomatic presence from formal endorsement.

Bhutan: the one relationship without churn. PM Modi's state visit of 11–12 November 2025 did what the others could not, deepening an existing partnership instead of repairing one. Hydropower remains the core, but the Hatisar immigration check post and the September 2025 MoU on the Gelephu–Kokrajhar and Samtse–Banarhat rail links tie Bhutan's planned Gelephu Mindfulness City into India's road and rail network. As Thimphu continues boundary talks with China, economic integration of that depth is the strongest guarantee India has.

Regionalism itself is being contested. BIMSTEC delivered at Bangkok on 4 April 2025 — the first in-person leaders' meeting in seven years, a first Vision Document, a maritime transport agreement and a set of institutional rules — and its working level has kept moving under Bangladesh's chairmanship, with the National Security Chiefs' maritime HADR guidelines of July 2026 giving practical form to the security pillar India leads. No 7th Summit is on record as of 22 September 2026, so the political level has been quieter than the machinery. Meanwhile the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh trilateral at Kunming on 19 June 2025, and Ishaq Dar's call in December 2025 to expand and duplicate such formats, show what SAARC's paralysis costs India: room for South Asian groupings that leave it out. BIMSTEC is the answer only for as long as Dhaka stays engaged and the connectivity projects are actually built.

Key Terms

BBIN Initiative

• Definition: The BBIN Initiative is a sub-regional cooperation framework among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal for connectivity in transport, energy, water resources and infrastructure in eastern South Asia, best known for the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) signed at Thimphu on 15 June 2015 to allow seamless cross-border movement of passenger, personal and cargo vehicles.
• Context: The BBIN grouping gained momentum after Pakistan blocked a SAARC-wide Motor Vehicles Agreement at the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu (November 2014), prompting the four willing eastern South Asian neighbours to pursue connectivity on a "SAARC-minus" sub-regional basis. The flagship BBIN MVA was signed in Thimphu on 15 June 2015. However, Bhutan's National Council (upper house) declined to ratify the agreement in November 2016, citing environmental and cultural concerns, so the pact has moved forward on a trilateral basis among Bangladesh, India and Nepal with Bhutan's consent.
• UPSC Relevance: BBIN is a foundational GS2 International Relations concept under "India and its neighbourhood" and "regional and sub-regional groupings." Prelims questions typically test factual recall — member countries (note: it does not include Myanmar or Sri Lanka, distinguishing it from BIMSTEC), the year and venue of the MVA, and its origin in SAARC's deadlock. Mains answers use BBIN to illustrate India's pivot from a stalled SAARC towards flexible sub-regionalism, the "neighbourhood first" policy, and the trade-offs between connectivity and a small state's (Bhutan's) sovereignty and ecological priorities. It is a high-value comparison point against SAARC and BIMSTEC.

Neighbourhood First Policy

• Definition: India's foreign policy framework that prioritises relations with immediate neighbours (Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan) through enhanced connectivity, trade, and people-to-people ties.
• Origin: Articulated as a priority under PM Vajpayee; explicitly named and emphasised since 2014; operationalised through SAARC summits, Gujral Doctrine, and bilateral agreements.
• UPSC: Gujral Doctrine (1996) — non-reciprocity with smaller neighbours; Neighbourhood First vs Act East; distinction from SAARC (multilateral) vs bilateral ties; challenges: China's influence, CPEC. Official statements now pair it with Act East and MAHASAGAR (e.g. India-Myanmar Joint Statement, 1 Jun 2026).

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)

• Definition: A regional intergovernmental organisation of eight South Asian nations (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) established to promote economic cooperation, cultural development, and regional peace.
• Origin: Established Dhaka Charter signed 8 December 1985; headquartered in Kathmandu; last (18th) Summit held Kathmandu November 2014; 19th Summit (scheduled Islamabad, November 2016) cancelled after India boycotted following Uri attack; no summit held as of April 2026 — over a decade gap.
• UPSC: 8 members (Afghanistan activities suspended post-Taliban takeover); SAFTA (2006); effectively defunct — no summit in 10+ years; India prefers BIMSTEC; Pakistani nationals barred from the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme (CCS, 23 Apr 2025); China-Pakistan-Bangladesh trilateral (Kunming, June 2025) floated by Pakistan as an alternative format (Dec 2025).

BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation)

• Definition: A regional organisation of seven countries bordering the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan) focused on trade, investment, energy, connectivity, and counter-terrorism cooperation.
• Origin: Established 6 June 1997 as BIST-EC; Myanmar joined December 1997 → BIMST-EC; Nepal and Bhutan joined 2004 → final name BIMSTEC adopted; Permanent Secretariat in Dhaka (2014); 6th Summit held 4 April 2025, Bangkok (Thailand hosted); PM Modi attended; adopted Bangkok Vision 2030 (first-ever BIMSTEC Vision Document); Agreement on Maritime Transport Cooperation signed; MoUs with IORA and UNODC signed; Centres of Excellence (4 areas) to be hosted in India; chairmanship transferred to Bangladesh; India announced BODHI and the first BIMSTEC Games (2027).
• UPSC: 7 members; India + 6 (no Pakistan); 7 pillars, India leads Security (sub-sectors: counter-terrorism, disaster management, energy security); Secretary General Indra Mani Pandey (since 4 Jan 2024); Chair Bangladesh (since Apr 2025); 6th Summit (Bangkok, 4 April 2025) — key recent exam fact; Bangkok Vision 2030 = BIMSTEC's first-ever Vision Document; Maritime Transport Cooperation Agreement signed; BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity (adopted 5th Summit 2022) — implementation reviewed at 6th Summit; maritime HADR guidelines adopted by National Security Chiefs (New Delhi, 16 Jul 2026); relevance to Act East Policy and Neighbourhood First.

Gujral Doctrine

• Definition: A foreign policy principle articulated by PM I.K. Gujral (1996) under which India would offer unilateral concessions to smaller neighbours without expecting reciprocity, premised on India's responsibility as the largest South Asian nation to build goodwill.
• Origin: Proposed by Gujral as External Affairs Minister (1996) and later as PM (1997–98); aimed at normalising relations with all SAARC neighbours simultaneously.
• UPSC: Five principles — non-interference, no group for bilateral interests, sovereign equality, peaceful dispute resolution, non-reciprocity; critiqued for being too generous; contrast with realist approach.

INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor)

• Definition: A multi-modal transport network of ships, rail, and road routes connecting India to Russia and Europe via Iran, reducing cargo transit time from Mumbai to Moscow compared to the Suez Canal route.
• Origin: Agreement signed by India, Iran, Russia in 2000; operationalised gradually; expanded to 13 member states; gained strategic importance after Russia-Ukraine war.
• UPSC: India-Iran-Russia trilateral; reduces Mumbai-Moscow time from 40 days (Suez) to ~25 days; Chabahar Port is India's key node; contrast with China's BRI.

Operation Brahma and Operation Sagar Bandhu

• Definition: India's humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations after the Myanmar earthquake of 28 March 2025 (Brahma) and Cyclone Ditwah in Sri Lanka (Sagar Bandhu, launched 28 November 2025).
• UPSC: HADR as a Neighbourhood First and MAHASAGAR tool; Sagar Bandhu was followed by a USD 450 million reconstruction package (23 Dec 2025).

Sources & Verification

Pakistan, SAARC and regional formats

• MEA special briefing on CCS decisions after Pahalgam (23 Apr 2025, mirrored transcript)
• ThePrint — Kartarpur corridor shut by India until further notice post Operation Sindoor (May 2025)
• AIR — Bangladesh joins tri-nation meeting with China, Pakistan in Kunming (22 Jun 2025)
• Al Jazeera — Pakistan seeks new South Asian bloc to cut India out (5 Dec 2025)

BIMSTEC

• MEA — Brief on India-BIMSTEC relations (Mar 2025, PDF)
• MEA — press release on the 6th BIMSTEC Summit (4 Apr 2025)
• BIMSTEC — Permanent Working Committee met in Dhaka (7–8 Apr 2026)
• BIMSTEC — 5th Meeting of the BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs, New Delhi (16 Jul 2026)

Bangladesh

• AIR — Bangladesh tribunal sentences Sheikh Hasina to death for crimes against humanity (17 Nov 2025)
• Al Jazeera — India examining Bangladesh extradition request for convicted ex-PM Hasina (26 Nov 2025)
• AIR — BNP chief Tarique Rahman sworn in as Prime Minister (17 Feb 2026)

Nepal

• Kathmandu Post — India rejects Nepal's claim over Lipulekh (21 Aug 2025)
• Kathmandu Post — India-China push to resume Lipulekh trade reignites Nepal's concerns (22 Mar 2026)
• ETV Bharat — India-China border trade via Lipulekh resumes after 6 years (30 Jul 2026)
• The Northern Gazette — Third batch of Indian traders enter Tibet (21 Sep 2026)
• MEA — press release welcoming Nepal's interim government (12 Sep 2025)
• UN News — report on Nepal's interim government (Sep 2025)
• AIR — Balendra Shah to take oath as Nepal Prime Minister (27 Mar 2026)
• Kathmandu Post — Modi has invited Balendra Shah to visit India (11 Apr 2026)

Sri Lanka

• MEA — List of Outcomes: Visit of Prime Minister to Sri Lanka (4–6 Apr 2025)
• MEA — Operation Sagar Bandhu (1 Dec 2025)
• AIR — India will provide USD 450 million package for Cyclone Ditwah reconstruction (23 Dec 2025)
• The Week — Jaishankar announces USD 450 million reconstruction package (23 Dec 2025)

Maldives

• MEA — press release on PM's state visit to the Maldives (25 Jul 2025)
• MEA — List of Outcomes: PM's state visit to the Maldives (25 Jul 2025)
• PIB — PM attends 60th anniversary celebrations of Maldives independence as Guest of Honour (26 Jul 2025)

Bhutan

• MEA — press release on PM's state visit to Bhutan (12 Nov 2025)

Myanmar

• MEA Press Brief on Operation Brahma (1 Apr 2025, mirrored)
• Tribune — India wants inclusive, fair elections in Myanmar: MEA (16 Jan 2026)
• Al Jazeera — Myanmar's coup leader elected president by pro-military parliament (3 Apr 2026)
• Mizzima — report on the presidential inauguration (10 Apr 2026)
• MEA — India-Myanmar Joint Statement (1 Jun 2026)

Afghanistan

• MEA — India-Afghanistan Joint Statement (10 Oct 2025)
• MEA — press release restoring the Kabul Technical Mission to Embassy status (21 Oct 2025)
• AIR — Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor takes charge at Afghanistan Embassy in India (10 Jan 2026)