Global Security & Arms Control — NPT, CTBT, Peacekeeping & Disarmament

Why Global Security & Arms Control Matter

The architecture of global security rests on a framework of treaties, regimes, and institutions designed to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), regulate conventional arms, and maintain international peace. For India -- a nuclear-armed state that is not a signatory to the NPT or CTBT -- navigating this landscape requires balancing national security imperatives with responsible global citizenship.

For UPSC, this topic spans GS-2 (International Relations, International Organisations) and is a favourite in both Prelims (treaty-specific factual questions) and Mains (essays on India's disarmament stance, UNSC reform).

UN Collective Security System

The United Nations Charter establishes a collective security system under which member states commit to resolving disputes peacefully and to acting collectively against threats to international peace.

Chapter VI vs Chapter VII

Chapter VII Mechanism

1. Article 39 -- The Security Council determines the existence of a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression
2. Article 40 -- Provisional measures (ceasefire calls) to prevent escalation
3. Article 41 -- Non-military measures: economic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, interruption of communications
4. Article 42 -- Military measures: if Article 41 measures prove inadequate, the UNSC may authorise air, sea, or land operations
5. Article 51 -- Preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence until the Security Council takes action

The authorisation model was first used during the Korean War (1950) and revived with UNSC Resolution 678 (November 1990), which authorised "all necessary means" to ensure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

For Prelims: Chapter VII resolutions are binding on all UN member states. Chapter VI resolutions are recommendatory. The veto power of the P5 applies to both.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT, opened for signature in 1968 and entering into force in 1970, is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It has near-universal membership, with 191 states parties (UN, 11th Review Conference, May 2026).

Three Pillars of the NPT

Five Recognised Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS)

The NPT recognises five states that tested nuclear weapons before 1 January 1967: the United States, Russia (successor to the USSR), United Kingdom, France, and China. These are also the five permanent members of the UNSC (P5).

Non-Signatories

Only four UN member states remain outside the NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Sudan. North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985 but withdrew in 2003.

Withdrawal under Article X

A state party may withdraw on three months' notice to all other parties and to the Security Council, the route North Korea took in 2003. Iranian lawmakers have submitted a triple-urgency bill on NPT withdrawal to the Presiding Board of the Majlis, but the bill still needs the Speaker's permission to be introduced in open session and has not been passed: Iran remains a party to the NPT as of 22 September 2026.

Review Conferences

The treaty is reviewed every five years. The 11th Review Conference met at UN Headquarters, New York, from 27 April to 22 May 2026 under President Ambassador Do Hung Viet (Viet Nam) and closed without a consensus outcome document, the third consecutive Review Conference to fail after 2015 and 2022. The last consensus final document dates from 2010. The President circulated four successive drafts, culminating in NPT/CONF.2026/CRP.2/Rev.4, but did not put the text forward for adoption. None of the three Preparatory Committee sessions (2023, 2024, and 2025, the last held 28 April -- 9 May 2025 under Ambassador Harold Agyeman of Ghana) had agreed on substantive recommendations either. The next Review Conference will be held in 2031 in New York (UN Press DC/3912, 22 May 2026). India, a non-party, attends as an observer.

India's Position on the NPT

India has consistently refused to join the NPT, calling it a discriminatory treaty that creates a two-tier system of "nuclear haves" and "nuclear have-nots." India's key arguments:

• The NPT freezes the nuclear status quo as of 1967 and does not provide a pathway for states that tested later to be recognised as NWS
• The NWS have failed to fulfil their Article VI obligations on disarmament -- nuclear arsenals remain large decades after the treaty entered into force
• India seeks universal, non-discriminatory, and verifiable nuclear disarmament, not a regime that legitimises possession by five states while denying it to others
• Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security and will remain so pending global disarmament

For Mains: India's NPT stance is not anti-non-proliferation but anti-discrimination. India has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998 and has a clean non-proliferation record -- it has never exported nuclear weapons or technology to any state.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

The TPNW was adopted at the United Nations on 7 July 2017, by 122 votes in favour with one against and one abstention, opened for signature on 20 September 2017 and has been in force since 22 January 2021. It is the first treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons outright: states parties undertake not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, and the treaty also prohibits stationing nuclear weapons on national territory and assisting any state in a prohibited activity (UNODA). No state that possesses nuclear weapons has signed or ratified it (UN Treaty Collection participant list, read 23 September 2026), and it sits outside the NPT architecture rather than inside it.

India has not signed the TPNW and does not attend its meetings even as an observer. Its position is the one it takes on the NPT: disarmament must be universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions -- whether for military or peaceful purposes -- in all environments. It was adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 1996 but has not entered into force because it requires ratification by all 44 states listed in Annex 2 (states possessing nuclear reactors at the time).

CTBT Status

Membership figures are from the CTBTO's status table as read on 22 September 2026. Russia belongs on the holdout list because it withdrew its ratification in November 2023; it remains a signatory (signature dated 24 September 1996) with the ratification column now blank, which raised the number of Annex 2 states yet to ratify from eight to nine.

The Testing Moratorium Under Strain

Because the CTBT has not entered into force, what actually restrains testing is a de facto global moratorium. It came under rhetorical pressure in late 2025, and three categories have to be kept apart when reading that pressure.

India's voluntary moratorium since Pokhran-II (May 1998) is unaffected by any of this, but a breach of the de facto global moratorium by any state would put India under immediate pressure.

India's Position

India has not signed the CTBT. During negotiations in 1996, India objected on two grounds:

1. Entry-into-force provision -- The requirement that India must ratify for the treaty to enter into force was seen as an unprecedented coercive mechanism contrary to customary international law
2. No time-bound disarmament commitment -- The treaty bans testing but does not obligate NWS to eliminate nuclear weapons within a defined timeframe

India maintains a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing since the Pokhran-II tests of May 1998, effectively observing the spirit of the CTBT without being bound by it.

New START and the Strategic Arms Ceiling

New START was the last instrument placing legally binding limits on the two largest nuclear arsenals. It is a bilateral US-Russia treaty, not a multilateral regime, and India was never a party, but its lapse removes the ceiling under which every other nuclear calculation has been made since the Cold War.

Figures and dates: UN News, 4 February 2026; Arms Control Today, March 2026.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres marked the lapse by warning that "for the first time in more than half a century, we face a world without any binding limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals" (UN News, 4 February 2026).

For Prelims: the distinction being tested is between a lapsed treaty obligation, which is verifiable and reciprocal in law, and a conditional unilateral moratorium, which either side may end without breaching anything.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The CWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. It was opened for signature in January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997.

India and the CWC

India was among the first signatories on 14 January 1993 and ratified the CWC on 2 September 1996. India declared possession of a limited quantity of chemical weapons and production facilities, which were completely destroyed under OPCW verification by March 2009 -- ahead of the international deadline. India established the National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC) in 2005 and enacted the Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000 for domestic implementation.

Syria and the OPCW (2026)

Syria is the CWC's hardest case, and 2026 produced two contrasting developments.

An OPCW expert team deployed from early May 2026 to the Hama-Homs-Latakia triangle found dozens of chemical munitions never declared to the Organisation, including aerial bombs of the type used at Ltamenah (March 2017) and Khan Shaykhun (April 2017) and rockets of the type used in the Ghouta attack (August 2013), along with separately stored chemicals, equipment and thousands of pages of documents. Director-General Fernando Arias said the find "confirms the Secretariat's repeated assessment since 2014 that the former Syrian regime withheld information and unsuccessfully attempted to mislead the Secretariat and the international community" (OPCW, 27 May 2026). Beyond the 26 declared sites, the Technical Secretariat has identified more than 100 further sites that may have been involved.

Weeks later, at its 112th session on 9 July 2026, the OPCW Executive Council adopted by consensus a decision co-sponsored by 67 States Parties reinstating Syria's rights and privileges, suspended since 2021, acting under authority delegated by the 30th Conference of the States Parties (opened 24 November 2025). The Council also approved a verification plan for destroying Category 3 chemical weapons at Al Qutayfah and facility agreements for the Al Qutayfah and Homs storage sites. The OPCW has 193 Member States, and 72,304 metric tonnes of declared chemical agents have been verifiably destroyed (OPCW, as read 22 September 2026; verification of declared stockpiles completed in 2023).

For Mains: The Syria file is the cleanest illustration of the CWC's central lesson -- verification is powerful where a state cooperates and blind where it does not. Undeclared munitions sat undiscovered for more than twelve years despite the CWC's extensive on-site inspection powers. Contrast this with the BWC, which has no verification machinery at all.

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

The BWC prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. It was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.

The absence of a verification regime remains the BWC's most significant limitation. Efforts to negotiate a verification protocol have been stalled since the US rejected a draft protocol in 2001.

Multilateral Export Control Regimes

These regimes are voluntary groupings that regulate the transfer of sensitive materials and technologies to prevent WMD proliferation and destabilising accumulation of conventional arms.

India's Membership Status

Why NSG Membership Eludes India

The NSG is a group of 48 participating governments (NSG, as read 22 September 2026) and takes all its decisions by consensus, so a single member can block a new entrant. China has consistently opposed India's membership on the grounds that India is a non-signatory to the NPT. China insists on a "criteria-based approach" for admitting non-NPT states rather than a "country-specific" exception for India.

India received a special NSG waiver in 2008 (Vienna, 6 September 2008, following the India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement) that allowed it to engage in civilian nuclear commerce despite not being an NPT signatory. China has blocked consensus on India's 2016 application ever since, and full membership remains elusive. Pakistan simultaneously seeks membership, which India and most NSG members oppose.

The 34th NSG Plenary was hosted by South Africa at Cape Town, 21--25 July 2025, chaired by Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo, and coincided with the Group's 50th anniversary; it focused on modernising NSG guidelines for emerging nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors and advanced fuel technologies. The chairmanship has since passed to Argentina (Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen).

For Prelims: India is a member of three of the four major export control regimes -- MTCR (2016), Wassenaar (2017), and Australia Group (2018). The NSG is the only one where India is not a member. Distinguish the 2008 waiver, which allows civilian nuclear commerce, from full membership, which is still pending.

India's Defence Production and Exports

Export controls now matter to India as a supplier and not only as a recipient. India's defence exports reached a record Rs 38,424 crore in FY 2025-26, up Rs 14,802 crore or 62.66 per cent over FY 2024-25's Rs 23,622 crore (PIB, 2 April 2026). DPSUs contributed Rs 21,071 crore and the private sector Rs 17,353 crore; the number of exporters rose from 128 to 145; and India exported to more than 80 countries, BrahMos systems to the Philippines among them. Defence production touched a record Rs 1.78 lakh crore in FY 2025-26, 15.6 per cent above the previous year.

India's Domestic Nuclear Law: the SHANTI Act, 2025

The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025 began as a Bill introduced in Lok Sabha on 15 December 2025, was passed by the Lok Sabha on 17 December and the Rajya Sabha on 18 December, and received the President's assent on 20 December 2025 as Act No. 39 of 2025. It replaces both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.

The last of these is what connects the Act to this chapter. India obtained its NSG waiver in 2008, but it was supplier-liability recourse under the 2010 Act, not the waiver, that kept foreign vendors out of Indian civil nuclear commerce thereafter.

India's Nuclear Doctrine

India's nuclear doctrine was formally articulated on 4 January 2003 through a press release by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Its core tenets have remained unchanged.

Key Principles

Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)

The NCA comprises two bodies:

• Political Council -- Chaired by the Prime Minister; the sole body authorised to order a nuclear strike
• Executive Council -- Chaired by the National Security Advisor; provides inputs and executes directives of the Political Council

Nuclear Triad

India has developed a nuclear triad -- land-based missiles (Agni series), air-delivered weapons, and sea-based platforms (INS Arihant-class SSBNs) -- ensuring second-strike capability. Two tests have strengthened the land leg:

• Rail-based launch, 24 September 2025. DRDO, with the Strategic Forces Command, launched the intermediate-range Agni-Prime (range up to 2,000 km) from a rail-based mobile launcher under a full operational scenario, a first for India. The launcher can move on the rail network without pre-conditions, giving cross-country mobility, a short reaction time and reduced visibility, all of which raise the survivability of the land leg against a counterforce strike (PIB, 25 September 2025).
• Second MIRV test, 8 May 2026. DRDO flight-tested an advanced Agni missile with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, carrying multiple payloads against different targets across the Indian Ocean region, tracked by ground- and ship-based systems. It was the second Indian MIRV test after Mission Divyastra (11 March 2024), and SIPRI's January 2026 assessment credits the Agni-V with up to three warheads per launcher. There are no authentic public details of an Agni-VI programme and no such missile has been tested (MP-IDSA, 11 May 2026).

On the sea leg, SIPRI's January 2026 estimate credits India with 12 deployed warheads, the first time it has recorded any Indian warheads as deployed. SIPRI's own wording is cautious: India "may have started occasionally deploying a small number of its warheads (c. 12) on 1 of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), but this assessment comes with considerable uncertainty", and it describes that boat as conducting occasional deterrence patrols. It is evidence of movement towards a continuously available sea-based deterrent, not evidence that one exists (SIPRI Yearbook 2026).

For Mains: India's NFU doctrine has faced periodic calls for revision. Proponents of revision argue that a preemptive strike capability against Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons (Nasr missiles) may be necessary. Defenders of NFU contend that it provides strategic stability, enhances India's moral standing, and avoids destabilising first-strike postures.

Global Nuclear Forces and Military Spending

Arsenals are growing again, and the numbers an aspirant quotes should come from SIPRI, whose two datasets are separate and published at different times of year.

SIPRI's January 2026 estimates put the world inventory at 12,187 warheads, of which about 9,745 were in military stockpiles and 4,012 deployed. Russia (5,420 total, 4,400 stockpile) and the United States (5,042 total, 3,700 stockpile) hold the overwhelming majority. China rose to 620 warheads from 600 a year earlier, with 34 deployed. India is estimated at 190 (up from 180 in January 2025), of which 12 are deployed and 178 stored, and Pakistan at 170 (unchanged from January 2025). Both field delivery systems covering the other's major cities (SIPRI Yearbook 2026).

On expenditure, SIPRI's April 2026 fact sheet records world military spending rising 2.9 per cent in real terms to $2,887 billion in 2025, the eleventh consecutive year of growth and the highest level SIPRI has recorded, equal to 2.5 per cent of global GDP. India remained the fifth-largest spender at $92.1 billion, 3.2 per cent of the world total, behind the United States ($954 billion, down 7.5 per cent), China ($336 billion), Russia ($190 billion, or 7.5 per cent of its GDP) and Germany ($114 billion). Those five accounted for 58 per cent of world spending; Pakistan ranked 31st.

For Prelims: date-stamp warhead figures as "SIPRI Yearbook 2026, January 2026 estimate" and spending figures as "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2026". Mixing the two is the commonest error.

Missile Defence and the Offence-Defence Link

Missile defence has never been a purely defensive question. Defences that look protective to their owner read as first-strike enablers to the other side, which responds by building more warheads and better penetration aids: that is the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms which underpinned the 1972 ABM Treaty.

President Trump announced the Golden Dome homeland missile-defence architecture on 20 May 2025, combining land, sea and space-based sensors and interceptors, costed by the administration at $175 billion and targeted to be operational within three years. Independent costing runs far higher: the Congressional Budget Office estimated on 5 May 2025 that a system of space-based interceptors alone would cost between $161 billion and $542 billion over 20 years.

China's foreign ministry said the plan "heightens the risk of turning the space into a war zone", and in their joint statement of 8 May 2025 China and Russia argued that it rejects the offence-defence interrelationship altogether. For India, which is developing its own ballistic missile defence, this is the same dilemma in miniature.

UN Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping operations deploy military, police, and civilian personnel to help countries transition from conflict to peace. They operate under Chapter VI (consent-based) or Chapter VII (enforcement) mandates.

India's Peacekeeping Contribution

India is among the largest contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping, with a legacy stretching back to the very first UN peacekeeping mission.

The 2025-26 Funding Squeeze

UN peacekeeping is being cut for financial rather than political reasons. The Secretary-General directed all missions to identify savings equal to 15 per cent of their annual budgets, which because of the compressed timetable translates into a roughly 25 per cent reduction in uniformed and civilian personnel -- patrols scaled back, field offices closed and thousands of blue helmets repatriated. UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix set this out at a peacekeeping conference in New Delhi on 16 October 2025. The General Assembly had approved a $5.38 billion peacekeeping budget for 2025-26 in July 2025, down from $5.6 billion the year before. Missions in the DRC, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Lebanon and the Golan are affected.

India's February 2026 deployment figure should be read against this background of a system-wide drawdown.

UNMOGIP

The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), established in January 1949, supervises the ceasefire along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. It is one of the oldest UN missions still in operation.

• India's position: the UNMOGIP mandate lapsed after the 1972 Simla Agreement, which established the LoC and stipulated bilateral resolution of the Kashmir dispute
• Pakistan's position: UNMOGIP remains relevant and its mandate continues
• The mission continues to operate with a small complement of military observers, though India does not permit UNMOGIP operations on its side of the LoC

India's Bid for a Permanent UNSC Seat

India has long advocated for reform of the UN Security Council to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities rather than the post-World War II power structure.

G4 Nations

India is part of the G4 grouping -- comprising Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan -- which supports each other's bids for permanent seats on an expanded UNSC.

Support and Opposition

India's Case

• Population: India represents roughly one-sixth of humanity
• Economy: 5th largest economy by nominal GDP
• Peacekeeping: Among the largest troop contributors to UN operations
• Democratic credentials: World's largest democracy
• Financial contribution: A growing contributor to the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets

For Mains: UNSC reform requires an amendment to the UN Charter (Article 108), which needs a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all five current permanent members. This gives each P5 member an effective veto over reform -- making expansion politically difficult despite broad support.

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The ATT, adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and entering into force in December 2014, regulates the international trade in conventional arms -- from small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft, and warships.

India abstained on the grounds that the treaty does not adequately address the concerns of importing states, focuses disproportionately on exporters' obligations, and does not sufficiently address illicit trafficking and diversion -- India's primary concerns.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

The UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) on small arms and light weapons, adopted in 2001, is the primary international framework addressing illicit SALW trafficking. It requires states to improve national regulations, strengthen stockpile management, ensure proper marking of weapons, and enhance cooperation in weapons tracing.

India faces SALW proliferation challenges particularly in:

• Northeast India -- Insurgent groups procure weapons from Myanmar and through maritime routes
• J&K -- Cross-border smuggling of arms from Pakistan
• Naxal-affected areas -- Maoist groups manufacture improvised weapons and procure small arms through illicit channels

Cyber Security Norms and the UN Process

Two distinct UN tracks now govern cyberspace: a norms track in the First Committee on responsible state behaviour, and a criminal-law track that has produced the first global cybercrime treaty.

From the OEWG to the Global Mechanism

The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (2021--2025) held its eleventh and final substantive session on 7--11 July 2025 and adopted its final report by consensus -- a notable outcome in a forum that had deadlocked repeatedly. States decided to create the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible State behaviour, a permanent, single-track institutional dialogue that replaces the earlier alternating OEWG and Group of Governmental Experts arrangement. The Global Mechanism was established by a General Assembly resolution in November 2025, held its organizational session on 30--31 March 2026 in New York, and convened its first substantive plenary on 20--24 July 2026.

UN Convention against Cybercrime (the Hanoi Convention)

The first global treaty on cybercrime opened for signature at a ceremony in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025, where 71 States and the European Union signed. It remains open for signature at UN Headquarters in New York until 31 December 2026 and enters into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification is deposited (Article 65). India took part in the drafting but did not sign, citing concerns over privacy, data sovereignty and governance.

For Prelims: Distinguish the two tracks. The Global Mechanism (First Committee, security of ICTs, successor to the OEWG) deals with state behaviour in cyberspace; the Hanoi Convention deals with criminal law enforcement and mutual legal assistance. India did not sign the Hanoi Convention; the Global Mechanism is open to all UN member states.

Autonomous Weapons, AI and Outer Space at the UN

The newest arms control arguments are being had in the UN General Assembly's First Committee, and they are about software and space rather than warheads. The First Committee package adopted on 1 December 2025 is the reference point.

Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS)

UNGA resolution 79/62 on LAWS was adopted on 2 December 2024 not by consensus but by a recorded vote of 166 to 3, with 15 abstentions (against: Belarus, North Korea, Russia), and India was among the abstainers. A year later, on 1 December 2025, the Assembly adopted A/C.1/80/L.41 "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems" by 164 to 6, with 7 abstentions: against were Belarus, Burundi, North Korea, Israel, Russia and the United States; abstaining were Argentina, China, Iran, Nicaragua, Poland, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. India switched from abstention in 2024 to a vote in favour in 2025, while its substantive position stayed as it was: meaningful human control over life-and-death decisions, with technology augmenting rather than replacing human judgement.

The text calls on CCW High Contracting Parties to work towards completing the set of elements for an instrument "with a view to future negotiations". At the September 2025 session of the Group of Governmental Experts, 42 states said in a joint statement delivered by Brazil that the rolling text was ready for formal negotiation. The GGE, whose 2026 sessions were held on 2--6 March and 31 August -- 4 September 2026, reports to the Seventh CCW Review Conference (16--20 November 2026, Palais des Nations, Geneva), whose Preparatory Committee met in Geneva on 7--9 September 2026.

AI in nuclear command and control

On the same day the Assembly adopted its first ever resolution on the risks of integrating AI into nuclear command, control and communications (A/C.1/80/L.56), by 118 to 9, with 44 abstentions, demanding that "human control and oversight is maintained over command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons, including those that integrate artificial intelligence technology". Three of the P5, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, voted against, alongside Argentina, Burundi, the Central African Republic, North Korea, Israel and Russia. A companion text on AI in the military domain (A/C.1/80/L.46) passed 167 to 5, with 5 abstentions, and set up informal exchanges in Geneva.

Outer space

"Prevention of an arms race in outer space" (A/C.1/80/L.3) was adopted 177 to 2, with 1 abstention (against: Israel and the United States; abstaining: Ukraine), reiterating that the Conference on Disarmament has the primary role in negotiating a PAROS agreement and inviting it to establish a working group. Transparency and confidence-building measures in space (L.36) passed 173 to 3, with 1 abstention. The Russia-China backed texts fared far worse: "No first placement of weapons in outer space" (L.37) passed only 123 to 52, with 5 abstentions, and "Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space" (L.38) only 121 to 50, with 7 abstentions. The gap between the near-unanimous PAROS vote and these two is the reason there is still no binding space arms control treaty.

For Prelims: the CCW is the negotiating forum for LAWS, and the GGE reports to the Seventh CCW Review Conference in November 2026. Note India's 2024 abstention and 2025 vote in favour, and that three P5 states opposed the AI-in-nuclear-command-and-control resolution.

Nuclear Security Summits

Four Nuclear Security Summits were held between 2010 and 2016, initiated by US President Barack Obama to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.

India participated in all four summits and established the GCNEP as a state-of-the-art facility for international cooperation on nuclear safety, with MOUs signed with France, Russia, the US, and the IAEA.

Key Comparison Table: Major Arms Control Treaties

Key Terms for Prelims

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 (primary) — NPT, CTBT, CWC, BWC; UNSC and arms control; India's position on disarmament; MTCR, Wassenaar, Australia Group; cyber security norms; outer space weapons
• GS3 — Defence industry; defence production and arms exports; cybersecurity threats; dual-use technology
• GS4 (Ethics) — Ethics of arms trade; civilian harm from cluster munitions; nuclear deterrence and moral philosophy; state responsibility in cybersecurity
• Essay — "Disarmament in the 21st century: dream or necessity?"; "Nuclear deterrence: a necessary evil or an ethical failure?"

What Changed in 2025–26

Legal limits gave way to conditional restraint

For the first time in more than half a century there is no treaty capping the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. New START's expiry in February 2026 was not a surprise, since Russia had suspended its participation three years earlier, but nothing was built to replace it. President Putin's offer of 22 September 2025, that both sides keep to the central limits informally for a year, went unanswered in Washington, as Russia's foreign ministry noted on 4 February 2026; talks in Abu Dhabi around 5 February 2026 on a possible six-month informal understanding produced no agreement; and President Trump has said he wants a "new, improved, and modernized Treaty" without one being tabled.

Nor has a wider process filled the gap. At the NPT Review Conference on 29 April 2026 the US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Christopher Yeaw, said Washington had "provided detailed proposals to Russia and China, and among the P5, on possible initial steps, including on transparency, risk reduction, and nuclear testing", though diplomats told Arms Control Today they could not confirm that a written proposal had been delivered. President Trump said on 15 May 2026 that he had raised "denuclearization" with Xi Jinping during his 14-15 May state visit to Beijing; the Chinese side spoke only of "a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability" and made no mention of arms control. India's position is unchanged: disarmament must be universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable, pursued through a time-bound, phased framework, and India has supported the resumption of a US-Russia strategic stability dialogue.

The NPT bargain frayed in the drafting room

The failure of the 11th Review Conference in May 2026 matters less for the missing outcome document, which has now happened three times running, than for what the successive drafts dropped on the way there. Compared with the opening text, the President's final revision deleted or weakened references to the urgency of nuclear disarmament; the principle that indefinite extension of the treaty does not imply indefinite possession of nuclear weapons; criticism of arsenal modernisation and expansion; no first use; a New START successor; low-yield and subcritical testing; and fissile-material production moratoriums. Stronger formulations on legally binding negative security assurances were weakened, and references to maintaining human control over nuclear weapons and to emerging-technology risks were dropped. What survived leaned instead towards dialogue, transparency, confidence-building measures, crisis communications and military-to-military engagement, which is process in place of obligation. Consensus finally broke over a single bracketed paragraph on Iran containing the line that "Iran can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons". For Mains, that list of deletions maps the exact fault line running through the Article VI bargain.

Testing was announced, not resumed

Late 2025 produced the loudest nuclear testing rhetoric since the Cold War and not a single nuclear explosive test. Russia moved first, with the Burevestnik and Poseidon tests of late October 2025, which are nuclear-powered rather than nuclear explosive and fall outside every existing treaty. On 30 October 2025, minutes before meeting Xi Jinping in South Korea, President Trump announced that he had instructed the Department of War to begin testing US nuclear weapons "on an equal basis" with China and Russia; Energy Secretary Chris Wright narrowed the scope three days later to system and non-critical tests. On 5 November 2025 President Putin directed the foreign and defence ministries, the special services and civilian agencies to submit coordinated proposals on possible first steps towards preparations for nuclear weapons tests, with the caveat that Russia would act only if another CTBT signatory tested first; Defence Minister Andrei Belousov said the Novaya Zemlya site could host a test within a short timeframe. In April 2026 Senator Jacky Rosen visited the Nevada National Security Site to argue against a return to explosive testing. Nothing has been detonated, which makes this a textbook "announced is not happened" case, and the three categories are where Prelims questions will sit.

Iran moved from snapback to war to the edge of the NPT

France, Germany and the United Kingdom invoked the snapback mechanism of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) on 28 August 2025. The 30-day clock ran out and the pre-JCPOA UN sanctions on Iran were automatically reimposed at midnight GMT on 28 September 2025 (late on 27 September in New York), with the EU Council reimposing its own restrictive measures on 29 September 2025. China, Iran and Russia contested the E3's standing to trigger the mechanism, arguing that the three had themselves "ceased to perform" their JCPOA commitments and had not exhausted the dispute-resolution procedure.

The United States and Israel then began a second offensive against Iran on 28 February 2026, less than eight months after the 12-day war of June 2025, striking nuclear and missile targets including the yellowcake facility at Yazd and the Khondab heavy water complex near Arak, with projectiles landing in the vicinity of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Iran had already suspended cooperation with the IAEA under a law of July 2025. At the Review Conference Iran's representative said that two possessors of nuclear weapons had attacked a state with no nuclear weapons activity, and that 168 students were killed on 28 February; the US representative replied that Iran had "stockpiled uranium enrichment to levels with no civilian purpose". Iranian lawmakers have pressed since for withdrawal from the NPT, 130 of them signing a statement on 20-21 September 2026 calling for the legal process to begin, but the bill has not been passed. The file is what broke consensus at the 2026 Review Conference, and it puts three things in front of an examiner: the snapback mechanism, military action against safeguarded nuclear facilities, and the difference between a tabled withdrawal bill and a deposited Article X notice.

Deterrence was tested in South Asia

Operation Sindoor in May 2025 and the India-Pakistan confrontation that followed raised acute concerns about escalation between two nuclear-armed states that both sit outside the NPT. Firing and military action ceased on 10 May 2025 after Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations contacted his Indian counterpart. The Government of India has maintained that the understanding was reached directly between the two DGMOs with no third-party mediation, a position External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar restated publicly on 22 May 2025; US officials have described their own role differently.

Pakistan's nuclear signalling ran to form. On the morning of 10 May 2025 Pakistani media reported that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had convened the National Command Authority, the country's nuclear command body, and within hours Defence Minister Khawaja Asif denied it, saying no meeting of the National Command Authority had taken place and none was scheduled. The episode is best read as reported-then-denied signalling rather than a confirmed meeting, which is itself the point: ambiguity is the instrument. During the same night a Pakistani ballistic missile, reported as a Fatah-II, was intercepted over Sirsa, Haryana; reporting has described it as having been aimed towards Delhi, while the Ministry of Defence's contemporaneous briefings identified Indian Air Force bases and military installations as the targets and did not publicly name New Delhi.

Doctrinally, Operation Sindoor challenged Pakistan's strategy of using its nuclear umbrella to deter Indian conventional retaliation for cross-border terrorism. India's willingness to conduct precision strikes despite that posture signals that it has carved out space for military action below the nuclear threshold, a significant shift in South Asian deterrence dynamics. The episode renewed calls for a bilateral nuclear risk reduction centre and for formalising communication channels between the two Directors-General of Military Operations beyond the existing hotline: the absence of crisis-management machinery of the US-Russia kind remains the live Mains theme.

Pakistan also converted its nuclear status into leverage further afield. The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement it signed with Saudi Arabia in Riyadh in September 2025, during Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's visit, provides that aggression against either shall be considered aggression against both. The nuclear dimension has to be stated carefully. The joint statement does not mention nuclear weapons; Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said on 18 September 2025 that Pakistan's nuclear capabilities "will be made available" to Saudi Arabia, then contradicted himself in a later interview, saying nuclear weapons were "not on the radar"; and the description of the pact as the first extended nuclear deterrence commitment by a nuclear-armed state outside the NPT is Arms Control Today's assessment, not the parties' own framing. For India the significance lies less in the text than in the direction of travel, in a region where India has deep energy, labour and security interests.

India built out the base of its own posture

Three Indian developments in this window belong together. The SHANTI Act of December 2025 removed the supplier-liability recourse that, rather than the absence of an NSG waiver, had kept foreign vendors out of Indian civil nuclear commerce since 2010. The rail-mobile Agni-Prime launch of 24 September 2025 and the second MIRV test of 8 May 2026 hardened and extended the land leg of the triad, while SIPRI's January 2026 assessment recorded Indian warheads as deployed at sea for the first time, cautiously and with considerable uncertainty. And record defence exports and production in FY 2025-26 move India from buyer towards supplier in exactly the technologies the export control regimes govern. The one gap that has not closed is NSG membership, where China's position is unchanged.

The next argument is about software and space

The First Committee package of 1 December 2025 shifted the centre of gravity of arms control. India, which had abstained on the General Assembly's first resolution on lethal autonomous weapons in December 2024, voted in favour of the successor text a year later while keeping its substantive position unchanged. The Assembly also adopted its first ever resolution on the risks of integrating AI into nuclear command, control and communications, opposed by three of the P5. On outer space the split is older and starker: near-unanimous support for the principle that an arms race in space should be prevented, far weaker support for the Russia-China texts that would give that principle content.

Missile defence sits at the junction of the old argument and the new. Golden Dome, announced in May 2025, drew the response from China and Russia that it rejects the inseparable link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, and it is the reason an offence-defence spiral is again a live prospect rather than a Cold War memory.

What to watch

The Seventh CCW Review Conference in Geneva in November 2026 receives the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons and will show whether the rolling text moves to formal negotiation. The First Review Conference of the TPNW follows in New York in December 2026 under South Africa's presidency. Both were still ahead as of 22 September 2026. The next NPT Review Conference is not until 2031, so the New START vacuum, the strained testing moratorium and the Iran file will be argued elsewhere in the meantime.

Exam Strategy

• Prelims: Expect factual questions on treaty years, India's membership status in export control regimes, CTBT Annex 2 requirements, and CWC/BWC differences. The comparison table above is high-yield.
• Mains: Be prepared to write balanced essays on India's NPT stance, the NFU debate, UNSC reform challenges, and the effectiveness of multilateral arms control in the 21st century. Always link to India's strategic autonomy doctrine.
• Essay: Topics like "Is nuclear disarmament achievable?" or "Can the UN collective security system deliver in a multipolar world?" draw directly from this chapter.

Key Terms

Wassenaar Arrangement

• Definition: The Wassenaar Arrangement is a voluntary, multilateral export control regime (established 1996, Secretariat in Vienna) through which participating states coordinate national controls on the export of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies to prevent destabilising accumulations and diversion to actors of concern.
• Context: It was the first global multilateral arrangement covering both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use items, succeeding the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which had targeted the Soviet bloc. The agreement to set it up was reached in December 1995 at Wassenaar, Netherlands, and it became operational with the adoption of its Initial Elements at the July 1996 Plenary. It maintains control lists that members apply through their own national laws, with all decisions taken by consensus. The Plenary of 6-7 December 2017 agreed to admit India, and India became the 42nd Participating State on 8 December 2017, when the procedural arrangements were completed.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a foundational concept for GS2 (international relations, India and global groupings) and frequently tested in Prelims through the family of multilateral export control regimes (MECRs) — Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group and Nuclear Suppliers Group. Aspirants must distinguish what each regime covers (Wassenaar: conventional arms + dual-use tech; MTCR: missiles; Australia Group: chemical/biological; NSG: nuclear) and recall India's membership status — India is a member of three of the four, with NSG full membership still pending. Mains GS2 angles include how these memberships strengthen India's non-proliferation credentials and improve access to high technology.

Sources & Verification

Documents behind the facts and figures added or corrected in the update of 22 September 2026.

New START and US-Russia strategic arms control

• UN News — New START expires, leaving no binding limits on strategic arsenals (4 Feb 2026)
• Arms Control Today — New START Expires; U.S. Urges "Modernized" Treaty (Mar 2026)
• Arms Control Today — Trump Claims to Have Discussed Arms Control With China (Jun 2026)

NPT Review Conference 2026

• UN Press DC/3912 — Eleventh NPT Review Conference concludes without consensus outcome (22 May 2026)

Nuclear testing

• Fortune/AP — Energy Secretary Chris Wright on "system tests" and "noncritical explosions" (2 Nov 2025)
• Al Jazeera — Putin says Russia to take "reciprocal measures" if US resumes nuclear tests (6 Nov 2025)
• US Senate — Senator Jacky Rosen visits the Nevada National Security Site (13 Apr 2026)
• Arms Control Today — Russia tests nuclear-powered cruise missile and torpedo (Nov 2025)

Treaty membership data

• CTBTO — Status of Signature and Ratification (read 22 Sep 2026)
• UNODA — Biological Weapons Convention (read 22 Sep 2026)
• Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat — Treaty status and Ecuador's ratification (read 22 Sep 2026)
• UNODA — Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (read 22 Sep 2026)
• UN Treaty Collection — Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: adoption on 7 July 2017, status and participant list (read 23 Sep 2026)

UN General Assembly, First Committee (1 Dec 2025)

• UN Press GA/12736 — LAWS, AI in nuclear command and control, PAROS, and TPNW membership figures (1 Dec 2025)
• UNODA — Seventh CCW Review Conference, 16-20 November 2026
• Reaching Critical Will — CCW Seventh Review Conference (2026)

Nuclear forces and military spending

• SIPRI Yearbook 2026, Chapter 8 — World Nuclear Forces (Jun 2026)
• SIPRI — Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025 (Apr 2026)

Missile defence and the Pakistan-Saudi pact

• Arms Control Today — China, Russia sharpen Golden Dome missile defence critique, with the CBO estimate of 5 May 2025 (Jun 2025)
• Arms Control Today — Pakistan extends nuclear deterrence to Saudi Arabia (Oct 2025)

Iran

• Council of the EU — Iran sanctions snapback: Council reimposes restrictive measures (29 Sep 2025)
• Congressional Research Service — UN sanctions snapback on Iran (IF11583)
• Al Jazeera — Lawmakers push NPT exit as US and Israel hit Iran's nuclear sites (28 Mar 2026)
• Tasnim — MPs push for Iran's withdrawal from the NPT (20 Sep 2026)
• Tehran Times — 130 lawmakers call for the legal process of NPT withdrawal (20 Sep 2026)

Chemical weapons and Syria

• OPCW — Expert team deployment in Syria finds undeclared chemical weapons (27 May 2026)
• OPCW — Executive Council reinstates the rights and privileges of Syria (9 Jul 2026)

Cyber security norms

• MP-IDSA — The UN Cyber OEWG ends after a five-year run (2025)
• UN Web TV — Organizational Session, Global Mechanism on ICTs in the Context of International Security (30-31 Mar 2026)
• UN Office of Legal Affairs — UN Convention against Cybercrime opens for signature in Hanoi (Oct 2025)

India — defence, strategic forces, and nuclear law

• PIB — Defence exports reach Rs 38,424 crore in FY 2025-26 (2 Apr 2026)
• PIB — Agni-Prime launched from a rail-based mobile launcher on 24 September 2025 (release posted 25 Sep 2025)
• MP-IDSA — India Tests Agni-5 with MIRV Capability (11 May 2026)
• PRS Legislative Research — The SHANTI Bill, 2025: introduced 15 December 2025, passed by Lok Sabha 17 December and Rajya Sabha 18 December
• The SHANTI Act, 2025 (Act No. 39 of 2025) — Gazette text, assent 20 December 2025, gazetted 21 December 2025
• Nuclear Suppliers Group — Chair's Corner (read 22 Sep 2026)
• DIRCO — Chair's Statement, NSG Plenary, Cape Town, 21-25 July 2025

UN peacekeeping

• UN News — Peacekeeping faces a roughly 25 per cent personnel reduction (16 Oct 2025)
• UN Peacekeeping — Uniformed Personnel Contributing Countries by Ranking (28 Feb 2026)
• UN Peacekeeping — Fatalities by Nationality and Mission, up to 31 Mar 2026

India-Pakistan, May 2025

• Reuters, via Malay Mail — Pakistan's defence minister rejects claims of nuclear discussions after military operation against India (10 May 2025)
• The News Minute, reporting Reuters — Pakistan denies reports on meeting top body overseeing nuclear arsenal (10 May 2025)
• India TV — Pakistan's Fatah-II ballistic missile intercepted over Sirsa, Haryana (10 May 2025)
• NewsOnAir — EAM Jaishankar: the cessation of firing was negotiated directly between India and Pakistan (22 May 2025)