India's Nuclear Diplomacy, NSG & Strategic Autonomy

Overview

India's nuclear journey — from a peaceful programme under Nehru to a declared nuclear weapons state — reflects both security compulsions and the quest for strategic autonomy. Understanding India's nuclear doctrine, its outside-NPT position, and its successful navigation of export control regimes is essential for GS2 (International Relations, bilateral agreements).

India's Nuclear History: Timeline

Pokhran-I: Operation Smiling Buddha (1974)

• Date: 18 May 1974
• Location: Pokhran test range, Rajasthan
• Under PM Indira Gandhi
• Scientists involved: Raja Ramanna, P.K. Iyengar
• India called it a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)" — deliberately ambiguous designation
• Used plutonium from CIRUS reactor (originally Canadian-supplied, with US heavy water)
• Yield: ~8 kilotons (fission device)

Fallout: US imposed sanctions; Canada cut off nuclear supplies; led to formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1974–75 precisely to prevent technology leakage to states like India.

Pokhran-II: Operation Shakti (1998)

• Dates: 11 May 1998 (3 tests) and 13 May 1998 (2 tests) — total 5 tests
• Under PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee
• Key scientists: Dr APJ Abdul Kalam (missile), Dr R. Chidambaram (atomic energy chairman), Dr K. Santhanam

Tests:

Declaration: India declared itself a nuclear weapons state following the tests.

US Sanctions: Under the Glenn Amendment, US imposed economic sanctions — suspended US assistance and opposed loans from international financial institutions.

Pakistan's Response: Pakistan conducted its own tests (Chagai-I, 28 May 1998) two weeks later.

India's Nuclear Doctrine (2003)

The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) released India's official nuclear doctrine in January 2003. Key pillars:

1. No-First-Use (NFU)

India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. India pledges NFU against nuclear-weapon states. However, India reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical weapon attacks (a significant caveat).

2. Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD)

India will maintain sufficient and survivable nuclear forces to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor, but will not engage in an arms race. The force must be operationally prepared at all times.

3. Massive Retaliation

Response to nuclear attack will be massive — designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. This is India's declaratory posture.

4. Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)

Structure:

• Political Council: PM chairs the CCS — the only body authorised to order a nuclear strike
• Executive Council: National Security Advisor chairs — recommends options to Political Council
• Strategic Forces Command (SFC): Operational command of nuclear delivery systems

Significance: Strict civilian supremacy over nuclear weapons — military cannot order nuclear use independently.

5. No Nuclear Use Against Non-Nuclear States

India will not use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear weapons (negative security assurance).

NFU Debate

Several Indian defence analysts and former officials have questioned the wisdom of a rigid NFU posture, particularly given Pakistan's battlefield tactical nuclear weapons and China's growing nuclear arsenal. Former defence minister Manohar Parrikar (2016) and former national security advisor Shivshankar Menon have suggested India might consider flexible responses. The doctrine, however, officially remains NFU.

The debate sharpened after Operation Sindoor (May 2025). Two ministerial statements from that fortnight are worth distinguishing carefully, because they are frequently conflated. On 12 May 2025, PM Modi said India would strike at terrorist hideouts across the border again if there were new attacks and would not be deterred by what he called Islamabad's "nuclear blackmail." On 15 May 2025, speaking to soldiers at Badami Bagh Cantonment in Srinagar, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said: "I believe that Pakistan's nuclear weapons should be taken under the supervision of IAEA," asking whether nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of "such an irresponsible and rogue nation." Some strategic analysts read India's 2025 posture as implying a softening; India's official position remained NFU, unchanged.

The Rajnath Singh remark is a ready-made Mains counterpoint. India is demanding international custody of another state's arsenal while itself remaining outside the NPT and placing only its declared civilian facilities under safeguards — a tension an examiner will expect a candidate to name rather than dodge. India's defence is that the two cases differ in kind: India's record on non-transfer is unblemished, while Pakistan's is the A.Q. Khan network. The episode also underlined how much rests on nuclear credibility and on the command-and-control structure, the Nuclear Command Authority chaired by the Prime Minister, in managing escalation from a sub-conventional conflict.

The posture itself may be shifting quietly. SIPRI assessed in June 2026 that India "again slightly expanded" its arsenal during 2025 and that "China and India may now occasionally deploy a small number of warheads mounted on missiles during peacetime", a departure from India's long-standing practice of keeping warheads de-mated from delivery systems, which has been one of the strongest structural guarantees behind no-first-use. SIPRI also notes that India's modernisation is "increasingly focused on developing long-range weapons capable of reaching targets throughout China."

India's Nuclear Triad

A credible nuclear deterrent requires survivable second-strike capability — necessitating a nuclear triad: land, sea, and air delivery systems.

The FAS Nuclear Notebook of 9 September 2026 counts nine nuclear-capable systems in service — two aircraft, six land-based ballistic missiles and one sea-based ballistic missile, able to deliver over 160 warheads, with at least two more systems nearing fielding.

INS Arihant: India's first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), commissioned by PM Modi in August 2016, completing India's nuclear triad. It carries 12 K-15 SLBMs with a range of ~700 km (or 4 K-4 SLBMs with ~3500 km range). A second SSBN, INS Arighaat, was commissioned in August 2024.

INS Aridhaman (3 April 2026): India's third Arihant-class SSBN was commissioned on 3 April 2026. The commissioning was never formally announced by the Government; Indian media reported it on the basis of defence-establishment sources, and the only public official trace that day was Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's social-media post in Hindi, "It's not words but power, 'Aridhaman'!" (Arms Control Today, July 2026). Aridhaman has eight vertical launch tubes, twice as many as the first two boats of the class, and is designed to carry the 3,500-km K-4 SLBM once that missile completes testing. Three boats is the threshold at which a continuous at-sea deterrent becomes feasible (one on patrol while the others are in maintenance or transit), which makes this the most consequential change to the sea leg since 2024. A fourth Arihant-class submarine has been launched and is expected to be commissioned in 2027.

The opacity around Aridhaman is itself examinable. The FAS Nuclear Notebook (9 September 2026) notes that India added the Strategic Forces Command to the list of organisations exempt from the Right to Information Act in 2016; deliberate ambiguity about the arsenal is treated in India as a component of deterrence rather than an accident of record-keeping.

India-USA Civil Nuclear Agreement

Background

In the India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, PM Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush announced that the US would work to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India — despite India not being an NPT signatory.

Hyde Act 2006

The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act was signed by President Bush on 18 December 2006. It modified Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act to permit civilian nuclear cooperation with India — the US domestic legal basis for the deal.

123 Agreement (October 2008)

The actual bilateral agreement was signed on 10 October 2008 — "Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy." It is called the 123 Agreement as it fulfils the requirements of Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act.

India's Obligations under the Separation Plan (2008 baseline):

• India placed 14 of its then-22 reactors under IAEA safeguards as civilian reactors (as declared in 2008)
• Remaining 8 reactors remain outside safeguards (strategic/military designation)
• All future civilian thermal and breeder reactors to be placed under IAEA safeguards permanently
• Note: By 2026, India operates 24 reactors; new reactors added to the civilian list as per the original separation plan; the 8 military reactors remain outside safeguards

India's Gains:

• Access to civilian nuclear technology and fuel from the US and NSG countries
• India is the only country with nuclear weapons outside the NPT permitted to conduct nuclear commerce
• NSG granted India a special exemption from its guidelines in September 2008

IAEA India-Specific Safeguards Agreement (2009) and the Additional Protocol (2014)

India's India-specific safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/754), covering its declared civilian facilities, entered into force on 11 May 2009. Its Additional Protocol was signed in 2009 but entered into force only on 25 July 2014 — two separate dates that Prelims questions exploit.

India's Additional Protocol is not the Model Additional Protocol that non-nuclear-weapon states accept. It is a limited instrument attached to an INFCIRC/66-type (facility-specific) safeguards agreement, and it does not give the IAEA the complementary-access powers it enjoys in NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. The IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Report for 2025 records that, as of 31 December 2025, safeguards were implemented at facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan under agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, and that "India has an AP in force to its INFCIRC/754 safeguards agreement."

India's Nuclear Law: From the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 to the SHANTI Act, 2025

For six decades India's nuclear sector rested on the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which reserved atomic energy to the State, and on the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA), whose Section 17(b) gave the operator a right of recourse against a supplier whose equipment or material carried patent or latent defects. That supplier-liability clause is the principal reason the 123 Agreement produced almost no reactors for seventeen years: foreign vendors would not accept open-ended exposure, and Indian law would not insure them out of it.

Both Acts are now repealed. The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025 replaced them.

Passage and status

Source: The SHANTI Act, 2025, Gazette text (Act No. 39 of 2025); DAE public-consultation notice, August 2026.

Section 91(1) repeals the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLND Act, 2010. Section 1(2) provides that the Act comes into force on such date as the Central Government notifies, with different dates possible for different provisions. As of 22 September 2026 the Act was enacted and gazetted but its implementing rules and regulations were still in draft, so the statute was law without yet being fully operative — the passed, notified and operational distinction that Prelims sets traps around.

What the Act changes

• Graded operator liability replaces the flat cap. The Second Schedule fixes the operator's liability by the thermal power of the facility: ₹3,000 crore above 3,600 MWt; ₹1,500 crore for 1,500–3,600 MWt; ₹750 crore for 750–1,500 MWt; ₹300 crore for 150–750 MWt; and ₹100 crore up to 150 MWt, for fuel-cycle facilities other than spent-fuel reprocessing plants, and for the transport of nuclear materials.
• A three-tier compensation structure. The Government told the Lok Sabha (written reply, 1 April 2026) that liability is now aligned with the international regime: prompt payment by the operator on a strict, no-fault basis up to the Second Schedule amount; Government of India liability up to 300 million SDR; and above that, recourse to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC), to which India is a party. The Act's own Section 13(1) frames the 300 million SDR as the maximum liability in respect of each nuclear incident, with the operator's Second Schedule figure as a sub-limit.
• The supplier-liability ground is gone. Section 16 allows the operator a right of recourse only where it is expressly provided for in a written contract, or where the incident resulted from an act or omission of an individual intended to cause nuclear damage. The CLNDA's Section 17(b) defect-based ground does not appear anywhere in the Act.
• Insurance is mandatory for non-government operators. Section 15 requires every operator other than one owned by the Central Government to carry insurance or other financial security covering the Second Schedule amount.
• AERB gets statutory status. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, until now constituted by government order under Section 27 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 rather than by a statute of its own, is deemed constituted under the Act (Section 17). Under the Act the AERB must recommend notification of a nuclear incident within 15 days of its occurrence.
• Private licensing, but not foreign companies. Licences may be issued to companies, but Section 2(9) expressly excludes "a company incorporated outside India" from the definition of "company" — foreign vendors may supply and partner, not own and operate.
• New redressal machinery. Section 47 establishes an Atomic Energy Redressal Advisory Council; Section 56 separately establishes a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission. These are two distinct bodies with distinct functions, and should not be conflated.
• "Nuclear damage" extends to environmental harm. The costs of measures taken to restore an impaired environment, and loss of income from an economic interest in the use or enjoyment of the environment, are compensable heads under Section 2(21), once notified by the Central Government.
• Strategic control stays with government. Uranium mining beyond specified thresholds, custody of spent fuel, and strategic materials remain with the Central Government — the Act liberalises power generation, not the fuel cycle or the weapons complex.

Why it matters for the diplomacy

The February 2025 India-US Joint Leaders' Statement had asked for exactly this: both sides "welcomed the recent Budget announcement by Government of India to take up amendments to the Atomic Energy Act and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act" and decided to establish bilateral arrangements to address civil liability. The SHANTI Act delivered the legislative half of that bargain within ten months. When a Nuclear Energy Institute and US-India Strategic Partnership Forum delegation met Dr Jitendra Singh on 18 May 2026, he described the Act as facilitating greater private participation "including foreign participation" and said the implementation framework under it was being finalised. President Macron, in the India-France joint statement of 17 February 2026, "lauded… India's recent reforms of its nuclear sector, including the allowing of private investment in this sector."

UPSC angle: SHANTI Act, 2025 — Act No. 39 of 2025, assent 20 December 2025, repeals the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLNDA, 2010; graded operator liability ₹100 crore to ₹3,000 crore; right of recourse narrowed to contract or intentional act; AERB given statutory status; Indian-incorporated private companies licensable, foreign-incorporated companies not.

India's Civil Nuclear Power Programme

Installed capacity and the road to 100 GW

The Union Budget 2025-26 turned India's nuclear ambition into a funded programme. It announced a "Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat" with a target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047, allocated ₹20,000 crore for research and development on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) with at least five indigenously designed SMRs to be operational by 2033, and committed the Government to taking up amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLNDA in Parliament so that private capital could enter the sector (PIB backgrounder, 3 February 2025). The same release put India's nuclear capacity at 8,180 MW as on 30 January 2025, projected to reach 22,480 MW by 2031-32, and recorded in-principle approval for a 6 x 1,208 MW project at Kovvada.

The capacity figures have since moved. RAPS-7 at Rawatbhata (700 MWe indigenous PHWR) entered commercial operation on 15 April 2025, the third of the 700 MWe class after KAPS-3 (2023) and KAPS-4 (2024), taking NPCIL's total to 8,780 MWe across 24 units at 7 sites in 6 states (NPCIL plant table, as of 22 September 2026). Dr Jitendra Singh told the Rajya Sabha on 18 December 2025 that India had reached "nearly 9 GW" and set out the staged roadmap: 22 GW by 2032, 47 GW by 2037, 67 GW by 2042 and 100 GW by 2047, at which point nuclear would meet close to 10 per cent of India's energy needs. Speaking to a visiting US nuclear industry delegation on 18 May 2026, he put the same trajectory as 8.8 GW today to 100 GW by 2047. A Lok Sabha written reply of 5 August 2026 confirmed 8,780 MW rising to 22,480 MW by 2031-32, including the 500 MW PFBR being implemented by BHAVINI.

Reactors under construction

Counting reactors under construction is where sources diverge, and the divergence is itself a Prelims trap. The Government's August-2026 answer describes a first fleet of ten indigenous 700 MWe PHWRs totalling 7,000 MW at various stages of implementation, on top of the Kudankulam units; the World Nuclear Association counted only six reactors (4,768 MW) under construction in December 2025, because it excludes units where the first concrete has not been poured, and a further ten units (about 7 GW) at pre-project stages. Construction of the fleet's first project, Kaiga Units 5 and 6, began with the First Pour of Concrete on 1 March 2026. Mahi Banswara Units 1-4 in Rajasthan are being built by ASHVINI, an NPCIL subsidiary and NPCIL-NTPC joint venture, with excavation under way at Units 1 and 2 after AERB approval.

Stage II begins: the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

The 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam attained first criticality at 20:25 on 6 April 2026 after AERB clearance — designed by IGCAR, built and commissioned by BHAVINI, with nearly 90 per cent domestic manufacturing. It runs on uranium-plutonium MOX fuel with a Uranium-238 blanket that breeds Plutonium-239, and is designed eventually to carry a Thorium-232 blanket breeding Uranium-233 for Stage III. The Government describes the PFBR as "the forerunner for the second stage" of the three-stage programme and "the first commercial fast reactor in India." For a programme whose second stage had been promised since Bhabha set out the three-stage plan in the 1950s, this is a long-deferred milestone, and the highest-probability Prelims fact of 2026 on India's nuclear programme.

The projects built with foreign partners

Russia — Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu. Kudankulam Units 1 and 2 (2 x 1,000 MW VVER) are operational; Units 3-6 are all under construction with Russian technical cooperation under the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Agreement, not under the 123 framework. NPCIL's own project document for Units 5 and 6 states that "civil construction works and tendering/procurement/manufacturing and progressive delivery of various equipment and components are in progress" — these units are being built, not designed. The first delivery of nuclear fuel for the initial loading of Unit 3 took place in the first week of December 2025. NPCIL recorded a further Unit-3 milestone on 19 May 2026 and the erection of the reactor pressure vessel at Unit 5 on 16 June 2026. No official source gives a commissioning date for any of Units 3 to 6. The 23rd Annual Summit joint statement (5 December 2025) commits both sides to broaden nuclear-energy cooperation across the fuel cycle and life-cycle support for Kudankulam, records that "the Indian Side will strive to finalize formal allotment of the second site" for a Russian-designed plant, and, in paragraph 26, agrees to accelerate technical and commercial discussion on Russian-design VVERs, localisation, and the joint manufacture of equipment and fuel assemblies.

United States — Kovvada. The 6 x 1,208 MW project approved in principle at Kovvada is to use the Westinghouse AP1000 design. The enabling technology transfer began on 26 March 2025, when the US Department of Energy granted Holtec International a specific authorisation under 10 CFR 810 (the US regulation governing transfers of nuclear technology abroad), IN-2023-001, permitting Holtec to share unclassified SMR-300 technology with three Indian entities: Larsen & Toubro (Mumbai), Tata Consulting Engineers (Mumbai) and Holtec Asia (Pune). Adding government-owned entities (NPCIL, DAE, AERB and NTPC) to the eligible list was deferred pending resolution of assurances sought by the US from India. The India-US Joint Leaders' Statement of 13 February 2025 set the frame, committing both sides to "fully realize" the 123 Agreement by building US-designed reactors in India "through large scale localization and possible technology transfer," and to establish bilateral arrangements addressing civil liability; the same visit launched the US-India COMPACT and the TRUST initiative. By 18 May 2026, with the SHANTI Act in place, a Nuclear Energy Institute and US-India Strategic Partnership Forum delegation was reviewing with Dr Jitendra Singh the proposed Westinghouse AP1000 project at Kovvada, cooperation under the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group (CNEWG), micro-reactors and AI-enabled nuclear safety systems.

France — Jaitapur, Maharashtra. Jaitapur (9.6 GWe, six EPRs with EDF/Framatome technology) remains under discussion rather than under construction; France is nevertheless India's principal Western partner for large-scale nuclear energy. India and France signed a Declaration of Intent on a partnership on Advanced Modular Reactors and Small Modular Reactors on 12 February 2025, during PM Modi's visit to Paris (10-12 February 2025), one of ten outcomes of that visit; the same visit renewed the DAE-CEA memorandum on the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) and concluded an implementing agreement between GCNEP (India) and INSTN (France). President Macron's visit of 17-19 February 2026, which coincided with the AI Impact Summit 2026 in India, elevated the relationship to a "Special Global Strategic Partnership" but added no new reactor agreement: paragraph 31 of the joint statement notes the regular meetings of the Special Task Force on civil nuclear energy, "including the evolving discussions on the Jaitapur Nuclear Power Plant Project"; paragraph 32 calls for renewed DAE-CEA cooperation and agrees to explore cooperation between the two nuclear regulators; and paragraph 33 recalls the SMR/AMR Declaration of Intent "signed in 2025" and agrees to explore CEA-DAE research and development cooperation within it.

UPSC angle: Nuclear Energy Mission (Budget 2025-26), ₹20,000 crore for SMRs, five SMRs by 2033, 100 GW by 2047; 8,780 MWe / 24 reactors (NPCIL, 2026); PFBR first criticality 6 April 2026 (IGCAR designed, BHAVINI built); ASHVINI = NPCIL-NTPC JV for Mahi Banswara; Kudankulam = Russian VVER under the IGA; Kovvada = Westinghouse AP1000; Jaitapur = French EPRs, still in discussion; 10 CFR 810 = the US regulation on transfer of nuclear technology abroad.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Membership Bid

NSG: A group of 48 nuclear supplier countries that controls exports of nuclear technology and materials to prevent proliferation. Established in 1974–75 (directly triggered by India's Pokhran-I test).

India's Bid: India formally applied for NSG membership in May 2016 ahead of the Seoul Plenary (June 2016).

China's Opposition:

• China argued India's membership requires signing the NPT — a universal criteria principle
• China also linked India's entry to Pakistan's admission (creating an India-Pakistan dual entry condition)
• China's argument: admitting one non-NPT state would "discriminate" unless all such states were treated equally

Seoul Plenary (June 2016): Ended in impasse — no consensus on India's admission.

Current Status (as of 22 September 2026): India is still not a Participating Government. The NSG's own background document circulated to the IAEA, INFCIRC/539/Rev.9 (issued 7 May 2026, transmitting a note verbale of 15 April 2026 from the Permanent Mission of Argentina, which chairs the NSG for 2025-26), lists the Participating Governments in its Annex; India does not appear there. India appears instead in a separate table of "Non-NSG Participating Governments declarations of adherence to the NSG Guidelines," with a letter dated 9 May 2016, alongside Israel (2004), Pakistan (18 May 2016), Namibia (2016), Jordan (2017) and the UAE (2022).

That is the precise status a Prelims question turns on: India unilaterally adheres to the NSG Guidelines but is not a member of the group. Adherence is a declaration India makes about its own export conduct; membership would give India a seat and a veto in the group's consensus decisions.

The 34th Plenary (Cape Town, 21-25 July 2025): The Chair's Statement issued by South Africa records that the NSG "brings together 48 Participating Governments with the European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participating as permanent observers," and that the plenary coincided with the 50th anniversary of the group's establishment. The statement makes no reference to India's membership application or to any expansion decision, and it records no member-by-member positions.

India's Response: India argues that its record on non-proliferation is exemplary; unlike Pakistan, India has never transferred nuclear technology to other states; the NSG exception (2008) already recognises India's responsible behaviour.

India's Position on NPT and CTBT

NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968)

India has not signed the NPT and has consistently called it discriminatory ("nuclear apartheid") because:

• It creates a permanent hierarchy between the 5 "legitimate" nuclear weapon states (P5 nations) and the rest
• India was not invited to negotiate the treaty; it was presented as a fait accompli
• India developed its nuclear weapons for legitimate security reasons (China's 1964 test, 1962 war)
• India's position: global disarmament (including by P5) must be the goal, not preventing new states from acquiring deterrence

The treaty's own review machinery has recently strengthened India's argument. The 11th NPT Review Conference (New York, 27 April - 22 May 2026) closed without a consensus outcome document — the third consecutive failure. Its President, Do Hung Viet of Viet Nam, tabled four successive drafts but never put the final text to adoption; language on the urgency of disarmament, no first use, a New START successor, low-yield and subcritical testing and fissile-material moratoriums was dropped or weakened, and disagreement over Iran derailed last-minute efforts. Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, urged states parties to take the three consecutive failures "very seriously." The next Review Conference is due in 2031.

CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996)

India has not signed the CTBT for the following reasons:

• Entry into force requirement: the CTBT requires ratification by 44 specific countries (Annex 2 states), including India — India's refusal prevents the treaty from entering into force. On the CTBTO's status list, nine of the 44 Annex 2 states have still not ratified (as of 22 September 2026): India, Pakistan and North Korea, which have not even signed, and China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, the United States and the Russian Federation, which signed in 1996 but have not ratified. Russia joined that list by revoking its ratification in November 2023, a point the older "eight holdouts" formulation misses.
• Overall status: 196 total States, 188 signatures and 179 ratifications; the most recent ratifying state is Tonga (7 July 2026), per the CTBTO's own list.
• India's concerns: The CTBT does not link to broader disarmament; allows laboratory simulations; does not address China's nuclear modernisation
• India maintains it has a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998

The moratorium is no longer a settled norm. On the night of 29 October 2025 President Trump posted that, "because of other countries testing programs," he had "instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis" — the first such US directive since the 1992 moratorium. His announcement did not make clear whether he meant an explosive test or a delivery-system test, and no US explosive test has been recorded; the last was Divider, on 23 September 1992. China urged the US to honour its CTBT obligations and its testing moratorium, and the Kremlin said Russia would "act accordingly" if anyone departed from the moratorium. India's voluntary moratorium rests on the durability of that de facto global restraint, which is now openly contested.

TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2017/2021)

The TPNW — also called the Nuclear Ban Treaty — was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 7 July 2017 and entered into force on 22 January 2021. It is the first multilateral treaty to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons.

India's position: India did not participate in the negotiations and has not signed the TPNW. India's stated reason: the treaty does not address existing nuclear states' arsenals in a verifiable manner; does not resolve the security dilemma that drove India's nuclear programme; and disarmament must be universal, phased, and verifiable. India also notes that the TPNW entered into force without any of the 9 nuclear-weapons states joining.

UPSC angle: TPNW entered into force 22 January 2021; India did not sign or ratify; India's position distinguishes TPNW from its constructive disarmament posture — India supports Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations and universal nuclear disarmament, but not a treaty that leaves existing nuclear states' arsenals intact.

Attacks on Nuclear Facilities and the Safeguards Regime

The 2026 Iran war put the physical security of nuclear installations, rather than proliferation, at the centre of nuclear diplomacy.

Strikes on Iran began on 28 February 2026, two days after a round of US-Iran talks on enrichment ended in Geneva without a breakthrough. Israel designated its campaign Operation Lion's Roar; the US operation was named Epic Fury. Iran retaliated against US-allied Gulf states. India's MEA issued a statement the same day: "India is deeply concerned at the recent developments in Iran and the Gulf region… We urge all sides to exercise restraint, avoid escalation, and prioritise the safety of civilians. Dialogue and diplomacy should be pursued… Sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states must be respected." The Cabinet Committee on Security met on 1 March 2026 under the Prime Minister. In his suo motu statement to the Rajya Sabha on 9 March 2026, EAM Jaishankar framed India's response around three concerns — peace and diplomacy, the Indian community (about one crore Indian citizens live and work in the Gulf), and national interest including energy security and trade flows. The statement makes no reference to nuclear facilities, safeguards or the IAEA: India's nuclear-specific comment came only later, after Barakah.

On 3 March 2026 the IAEA confirmed damage to entrance buildings of the underground Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, a safeguarded facility, with "no radiological consequence expected." Iran's envoy to the Agency, Reza Najafi, said "they attacked Iran's peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities." Grossi told NBC that the Agency had not identified "elements of a systematic and structured programme to manufacture nuclear weapons" in Iran, while confirming enrichment to 60 per cent and warning that Iran's stockpile and its refusal of full inspector access were a serious concern. Natanz had already been severely damaged in the 12-day war of June 2025.

On 17 May 2026 a drone carrying an explosive payload struck an electrical generator outside the inner security perimeter of the Barakah nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi's Al Dhafra region. The fire cut off-site power to Unit 3 for about 24 hours, with emergency diesel generators carrying the load until external supply was restored; radiation levels remained normal and no injuries were reported. UAE defence officials said the drones had originated in Iraq. India issued a stand-alone statement on 18 May 2026: "India is deeply concerned at the attack targeting the Barakah nuclear facility in the UAE. Such actions are unacceptable and represent a dangerous escalation. We urgently call for restraint and a return to dialogue and diplomacy." It is India's most explicit position in the window on attacks against peaceful nuclear installations, and it is consistent with India's own 1988 bilateral agreement with Pakistan prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations.

The UN Security Council, in a press statement issued by its President Fu Cong of China on 26 May 2026, condemned the attack "in the strongest terms" as "a flagrant violation of international law with grave risks for civilian lives, infrastructure and the environment," demanded the immediate and permanent cessation of attacks and threats of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, and called on states to refrain from any action endangering nuclear safety and security. The Council had convened an emergency meeting on 19 May at which Grossi warned that a direct hit could cause "a very high release of radioactivity to the environment."

Grossi drew the three incidents together in his introductory statement to the IAEA Board on 5 June 2026: "On 17 May an explosion and an impact shocked Barakah. Last weekend a drone caused a hole and penetrated the Unit 6 turbine hall at the Zaporizhzhya NPP. And earlier in the year, Bushehr… was hit." He insisted there were "no double or triple standards here for the IAEA," reiterated the seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security during armed conflict, and warned that a direct hit on an operating plant could require evacuation, sheltering, stable iodine and food restrictions over distances of several hundred kilometres. Barakah was not an isolated first: Zaporizhzhia has repeatedly lost off-site power to military action since its complete disconnection from Ukraine's grid in August 2022.

The proliferation track then moved separately. On 9 September 2026 the 35-nation IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran to the UN Security Council for non-compliance, the first such referral in twenty years, by 23 votes to 3 (Russia, China and Niger), with 8 abstentions, on a text proposed by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The Agency has not been allowed to inspect Iran's three enrichment facilities since the attacks of June 2025.

UPSC angle: IAEA's seven indispensable pillars; attacks on safeguarded facilities and international law; UNSC press statement of 26 May 2026; IAEA Board referral of Iran, 9 September 2026 (23-3-8). India's formula throughout: restraint, de-escalation, dialogue and diplomacy, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Export Control Regime Memberships

India's successful entry into the three major export control regimes (apart from NSG) represents a significant diplomatic achievement:

NSG remains the outstanding membership — crucial for full access to nuclear technology supply chains.

Pakistan's Nuclear Programme and Implications

Key Facts:

• Pakistan tested nuclear weapons on 28 May 1998 (Chagai-I) — in response to India's Pokhran-II
• Pakistan and India have comparable but now diverging nuclear arsenals. SIPRI Yearbook 2026 (published 8 June 2026, data as of January 2026) puts India's military stockpile at 190 warheads — 12 deployed and 178 stored — with SIPRI's own caveat that the estimate carries considerable uncertainty. Pakistan's stockpile is assessed at a broadly comparable size (SIPRI Yearbook 2025 estimate: about 170 warheads as of January 2025). The FAS Nuclear Notebook of 9 September 2026 independently estimates that India has produced enough military plutonium for 140 to 225 warheads and may have assembled up to 190
• Pakistan follows a First Use doctrine — explicitly threatens nuclear use in response to conventional military superiority
• Pakistan has developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) — Nasr (Hatf-IX) with 60 km range — specifically to deter Indian conventional strikes (Nasr is a counter to India's Cold Start Doctrine)

China-Pakistan Nexus:

• China supplied Pakistan with the design of a nuclear weapon (acknowledged by A.Q. Khan)
• China transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan
• China has consistently blocked international action against Pakistan's nuclear programme
• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) — a strategic concern

India's Response: India maintains that its nuclear doctrine is Pakistan-neutral — NFU applies universally, but the triad ensures survivable second strike capability even if one or two legs are destroyed.

Strategic Autonomy

India's foreign policy rests on strategic autonomy — the ability to pursue independent foreign policy without being tied to any great power bloc.

Nuclear dimension of strategic autonomy:

• India has diversified its strategic partnership (US, Russia, France) — arms and technology from multiple sources
• India has not signed CTBT or NPT — retains the legal freedom to test if security environment demands
• India did not join any military alliance — remained non-aligned and now "multi-aligned"
• India-specific NSG waiver (2008) — demonstrates successful navigation without NPT membership

Challenges to Strategic Autonomy:

• Growing India-US defence convergence (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA) raises questions about alignment
• US sanctions (CAATSA) threat over India's S-400 purchase from Russia
• Balance between strategic autonomy and deep partnership with US in Indo-Pacific (QUAD)

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 (primary) — India's nuclear doctrine (No First Use); CTBT non-ratification; NSG membership blocked by China; US-India nuclear deal 123 Agreement; strategic autonomy; MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement
• GS3 — Nuclear energy for power generation (India's 3-stage nuclear programme); civil nuclear cooperation; space-nuclear dual use
• GS4 (Ethics) — Ethics of nuclear deterrence; No First Use pledge: a moral commitment or strategic liability?; accountability for nuclear weapons states
• Essay — "India's nuclear doctrine: credibility vs. responsibility"; "NSG membership: India's nuclear diplomacy challenge"

What Changed in 2025–26

The obstacle was domestic law, and it has gone

For seventeen years the binding constraint on India's civil nuclear diplomacy was Indian law, not foreign consent. The 2008 waiver had already opened nuclear commerce; what kept reactors off the ground was the supplier's right of recourse under the CLNDA, which no foreign vendor would accept. The February 2025 India-US Joint Leaders' Statement asked for the amendment, the Budget of the same month funded a Nuclear Energy Mission around it, and the SHANTI Act delivered it in December 2025, repealing both the 1962 and 2010 statutes at once and giving the AERB statutory status for the first time.

The caution for an answer is that enactment is not commencement. The Act comes into force on dates the Central Government notifies, and through the consultation that closed in September 2026 the Rules and the AERB regulations were still in draft. Every project that depends on the new liability regime therefore depends on a notification that had not been issued. The second caution is that liberalisation stops at the reactor gate: mining, spent fuel and strategic materials stay with the Government, and foreign-incorporated companies may supply and partner but not own and operate.

Three supply relationships moving at three speeds

The American track finally produced something concrete in March 2025, when the US Department of Energy authorised Holtec to share small modular reactor technology with three private Indian firms. The limit is as instructive as the licence: extending it to NPCIL, DAE, AERB and NTPC was deferred pending assurances India has not yet given, so the state-owned builders of India's reactors remain outside the arrangement. With the liability question answered, the May 2026 review of Kovvada and the CNEWG agenda put the 123 Agreement back where it was meant to be in 2008.

France consolidated rather than expanded. Macron's visit of February 2026 raised the relationship to a Special Global Strategic Partnership and praised India's nuclear reforms, but signed no new reactor agreement; Jaitapur is still a Task Force agenda item, and the SMR partnership dates from February 2025, not 2026 — a distinction worth getting right. Russia is the one partner building rather than negotiating, and that this cooperation ran unbroken through Western sanctions is the clearest operational illustration of strategic autonomy in the nuclear domain.

The NSG bid stalled, and the order around it frayed

Nothing moved on membership. The 34th Plenary at Cape Town in July 2025 coincided with the group's fiftieth anniversary and said nothing about India's application; the NSG's own circular to the IAEA in May 2026 still lists India among states that adhere to the Guidelines rather than among those that write them. The record of great-power endorsement is also thinner than it is usually presented: the February 2025 India-US statement does not mention the NSG at all, and the only in-window reaffirmation in a primary document is Russia's, at the December 2025 summit. The practical cost of exclusion has narrowed since the waiver; the political cost has not, because membership would convert a permission granted by others into a seat with a veto.

Meanwhile the architecture whose rules the NPT states ask India to accept came apart, three events inside eight months removing much of the scaffolding of the post-Cold War nuclear order. New START expired on 5 February 2026 with no successor, leaving the United States and Russia without any legally binding limits on strategic nuclear arms. Trump said the US would seek a "new, improved, and modernized Treaty"; Foreign Minister Lavrov told the Russian parliament on 11 February that Russia would continue to observe the central limits informally, but "only as long as the United States does not exceed the above limits"; and China's disarmament ambassador Shen Jian said on 6 February that China "will not take part in nuclear disarmament negotiations at this stage." Trump's testing directive of late October 2025 unsettled the de facto moratorium on which India's own voluntary moratorium quietly rests, and the 11th Review Conference closed in May 2026 without consensus for the third time running. For India the argument writes itself: the states insisting India accede as a non-nuclear-weapon state are not delivering Article VI. The counterpoint an examiner will expect is that a decaying arms-control order raises risk for everyone, and most of all for a state whose no-first-use doctrine depends on survivable retaliation rather than on speed.

Nuclear security displaced proliferation as the live issue

The Iran war and the drone strike on Barakah in May 2026 shifted the subject of nuclear diplomacy from who is building weapons to whether safeguarded civilian plants can be attacked at all. India's Barakah statement is its sharpest formulation in the window, and it sits consistently with the bilateral agreement India and Pakistan have observed since 1988. The Security Council's condemnation and Grossi's insistence on no double standards point towards a norm; the referral of Iran to the Council in September 2026 shows the proliferation track running on separately and unresolved.

Doctrine felt the pressure too. After Operation Sindoor the no-first-use pledge was argued over hard and left unchanged, but SIPRI's assessment that India may now occasionally mate warheads to missiles in peacetime matters more than the rhetoric: de-mated storage has been the structural guarantee behind the pledge, and it is eroding quietly.

What to watch: notification of the SHANTI Act and its Rules, without which the liability reform is a statute on paper; extension of the US authorisation to India's government-owned nuclear entities; the formal allotment of the second Russian site and any decision at Jaitapur; whether the first-fleet PHWRs move from sanction to first concrete at the pace the 2031-32 target assumes; and whether the norm against attacking nuclear installations survives the next conflict.

Exam Strategy

For Prelims:

• Pokhran-I: 18 May 1974, "Smiling Buddha," peaceful nuclear explosion, PM Indira Gandhi
• Pokhran-II: 11–13 May 1998, Operation Shakti, 5 tests (thermonuclear + fission), PM Vajpayee
• Nuclear doctrine: NFU, CMD, massive retaliation, civilian control (NCA — PM chairs Political Council)
• 123 Agreement: October 2008; Hyde Act: December 2006
• MTCR: India joined June 2016; Wassenaar: December 2017; Australia Group: January 2018
• NSG: India not a member; China blocked (June 2016 Seoul Plenary); 48 Participating Governments; India an adherent to the Guidelines since 9 May 2016
• INS Arihant: commissioned August 2016; K-15 SLBMs; completes nuclear triad. INS Arighaat: August 2024. INS Aridhaman: 3 April 2026 (eight launch tubes)
• SHANTI Act, 2025: Act No. 39 of 2025, assent 20 December 2025; repeals the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLNDA, 2010; operator liability ₹100 crore to ₹3,000 crore; AERB made statutory
• PFBR Kalpakkam: 500 MWe, first criticality 6 April 2026, IGCAR designed, BHAVINI built — Stage II of the three-stage programme
• IAEA: India-specific safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/754) in force 11 May 2009; Additional Protocol in force 25 July 2014
• CTBT: nine of 44 Annex 2 states have not ratified (Russia included, after revoking ratification in 2023)

For Mains:

• Structure answer: history → doctrine → triad → diplomacy → NSG → strategic autonomy
• NFU debate: cite strategic reasons for and against — note India's official position has not changed
• Civil nuclear deal: both sides' perspectives — India's gains (nuclear commerce) vs critics (sovereignty, Hyde Act conditions)
• NSG: clearly explain China's NPT argument and India's rebuttal (non-proliferation track record, NSG waiver precedent)
• Strategic autonomy: how India balances relations with US, Russia, and China in nuclear context

Key Thinkers:

• K. Subrahmanyam (strategic culture, NFU advocacy)
• Raja Mohan (India's strategic autonomy debates)
• SIPRI Yearbook (nuclear warhead estimates)

Previous Year Questions (PYQs)

Prelims

1. (2021) With reference to India's nuclear doctrine, which of the following statements is/are correct?

   1. India follows a No-First-Use (NFU) policy with respect to nuclear weapons.
   2. Nuclear weapons can only be authorised for use by the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority.
   3. India has reserved the right to use nuclear weapons against biological and chemical weapon attacks. Select the correct answer: (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1, 2 and 3 (d) 1 and 3 only

2. (2018) The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established after which of the following events?

   • (a) India's 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran
   • (b) The 1968 NPT coming into force
   • (c) Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998
   • (d) The 2005 India-US nuclear deal announcement

3. (2017) With reference to India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, which of the following is/are correct?

   1. India placed 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards
   2. India signed the NPT as a condition for the agreement Select the correct answer: (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

4. (2020) With reference to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), consider the following:

   1. India became a member of MTCR in June 2016.
   2. MTCR restricts the export of missiles, drones, and related technologies. Select the correct answer: (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

Mains

1. (GS2 — 2021) India's nuclear doctrine is based on "No First Use" and "credible minimum deterrence." In what ways has India's doctrine evolved since 1998, and what are the strategic challenges to maintaining NFU in the current security environment?

2. (GS2 — 2018) "The India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2008 is a watershed in India's foreign policy." Critically examine the gains and constraints it placed on India's nuclear programme.

3. (GS2 — 2017) What is the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)? Why has China been opposing India's bid for NSG membership? What are the implications of India's exclusion from NSG?

4. (GS2 — 2015) India's strategic autonomy in foreign policy has been challenged by its deepening military and nuclear relationship with the United States. Do you agree? Analyse with reference to India's nuclear doctrine and defence partnerships.

Key Terms

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

• Definition: The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal, voluntary multilateral export-control grouping (established 1987) whose members coordinate national licensing rules to curb the proliferation of missiles, rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. It is not a treaty and imposes no legally binding obligations.
• Context: The MTCR was founded in April 1987 by the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US) to restrict the spread of nuclear-capable unmanned delivery systems, and later expanded its focus to delivery systems for all weapons of mass destruction. It works by harmonising export-control "guidelines" and a common control list (the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex) that members apply through their own national laws. India joined on 27 June 2016 as its 35th member — New Delhi's first entry into any of the four multilateral export-control regimes. China is not a member.
• UPSC Relevance: MTCR is a high-frequency GS2 (international relations) and Prelims static topic, often tested alongside the other three export-control regimes — the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Prelims questions typically probe factual details: founding year, number of members, whether it is a treaty, China's non-membership, and the Category I 300 km/500 kg threshold. Mains relevance lies in India's non-proliferation diplomacy, technology access for ISRO and DRDO, and the link between MTCR entry and BrahMos exports. This is a foundational concept that underpins questions on the global non-proliferation architecture and India's strategic-technology partnerships.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

• Definition: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a multilateral treaty, opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and in force since 5 March 1970, that seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote nuclear disarmament, and enable the peaceful use of nuclear energy under international safeguards.
• Context: The NPT emerged during the Cold War amid fears that nuclear weapons would spread rapidly beyond the existing powers. It rests on a "grand bargain": the five recognised nuclear-weapon states (those that detonated a device before 1 January 1967) pledge to pursue disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon states forgo acquiring weapons and accept IAEA safeguards, and all parties may access civil nuclear technology. With 191 states parties, it is the most widely adhered-to arms-control treaty; India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan have never joined, and North Korea announced withdrawal in 2003.
• UPSC Relevance: The NPT is a foundational GS2 International Relations concept underpinning questions on global nuclear governance, India's strategic autonomy, and disarmament diplomacy. Prelims tends to test factual recall (year, the three pillars, non-signatories, the 1 January 1967 cut-off, IAEA safeguards link), while Mains favours analytical framing of why India rejects the NPT as "discriminatory," and how this links to the CTBT, NSG membership bid, and the India-US civil nuclear deal. It is a recurring theme in the disarmament and India's foreign-policy segments of the syllabus.

SHANTI Act, 2025

• Definition: The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025 (Act No. 39 of 2025) is the statute that now governs India's atomic energy sector and its civil nuclear liability regime, having repealed and replaced both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
• Context: Introduced in the Lok Sabha on 15 December 2025, passed by both Houses on 17 and 18 December, and assented to on 20 December 2025, the Act opens nuclear power generation to Indian private companies, gives the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board statutory status, replaces the CLNDA's flat liability cap with a graded operator liability of ₹100 crore to ₹3,000 crore keyed to facility thermal power, and removes the supplier-defect ground of recourse that had kept foreign reactor vendors out of India since 2010. Government retains control of uranium mining beyond specified thresholds, spent fuel and strategic materials, and foreign-incorporated companies remain outside the definition of "company" for licensing. The Act commences on dates to be notified; draft Rules and AERB Regulations were out for public consultation until 4 September 2026.
• UPSC Relevance: This is the most examinable legislative change in India's nuclear sector in six decades and connects GS2 (nuclear diplomacy, the 123 Agreement's long stall over liability) with GS3 (energy security, the 100 GW-by-2047 target and private investment). Prelims will favour the hard identifiers: Act number, assent date, the two repealed Acts, the liability slabs, and the AERB's new statutory footing. Mains will favour the causal chain from Section 17(b) of the CLNDA to vendor reluctance to the February 2025 India-US commitment to the Act itself.

Sources & Verification

India's nuclear law — the SHANTI Act, 2025

• The SHANTI Act, 2025 (Act No. 39 of 2025), Gazette text via PRS India — assent 20 December 2025, gazetted 21 December 2025
• PIB — Rajya Sabha passes the SHANTI Bill; AERB given statutory status, capacity roadmap to 2047 (18 December 2025)
• PIB — Lok Sabha written reply on nuclear liability: operator, Government up to 300 million SDR, and the CSC (1 April 2026)
• DAE — Public consultation on the draft SHANTI Rules and draft SHANTI Regulations (August 2026, comments closed 4 September 2026)

Nuclear energy programme and capacity

• PIB — Nuclear Energy Mission, ₹20,000 crore for SMRs, 100 GW by 2047 (3 February 2025)
• NPCIL — All plants table: RAPS-7 commercial operation 15 April 2025; 8,780 MWe across 24 units (accessed 22 September 2026)
• PIB — Lok Sabha reply on the ten-reactor PHWR fleet, ASHVINI, Mahi Banswara and 22,480 MW by 2031-32 (5 August 2026)
• PIB Mumbai — First Pour of Concrete, Kaiga Units 5 and 6 (1 March 2026)
• DAE — Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, Kalpakkam attains first criticality (6 April 2026)
• NPCIL — Kudankulam Units 5 and 6 project document: construction and equipment delivery in progress
• World Nuclear News — first fuel delivered for Kudankulam Unit 3; 24 operable reactors, six under construction (8 December 2025)

NSG, safeguards and export controls

• NSG Chair's Statement, 34th Plenary Meeting, Cape Town, 21-25 July 2025 — 48 Participating Governments, 50th anniversary
• IAEA INFCIRC/539/Rev.9 — NSG background document circulated by Argentina as Chair; India listed as an adherent, not a Participating Government (7 May 2026)
• IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report for 2025 — India's Additional Protocol in force 25 July 2014

India-US civil nuclear track

• United States-India Joint Leaders' Statement (13 February 2025) — 123 Agreement, liability, COMPACT and TRUST
• Holtec International — 10 CFR 810 specific authorisation IN-2023-001 for SMR-300 technology transfer (26 March 2025)
• PIB — US nuclear industry delegation meets Dr Jitendra Singh; Kovvada AP1000 and CNEWG reviewed (18 May 2026)

India-France and India-Russia

• PIB — Outcomes of PM Modi's visit to France, including the SMR/AMR Declaration of Intent (12 February 2025)
• MEA — India-France Joint Statement (17 February 2026): Special Global Strategic Partnership, Jaitapur discussions continuing
• Joint Statement, 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit (5 December 2025) — para 52 on NSG support; second-site allotment

Arsenal estimates and doctrine

• SIPRI — Yearbook 2026 press release: 12,187 warheads in January 2026; India slightly expanded its arsenal (8 June 2026)
• SIPRI Yearbook 2026, Chapter 8: World Nuclear Forces — India 12 deployed, 178 stored, 190 total
• Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists — FAS Nuclear Notebook, "Indian nuclear weapons, 2026" (9 September 2026)
• Arms Control Today — India commissions its third ballistic missile submarine, INS Aridhaman (July 2026)
• Reuters — Rajnath Singh: Pakistan's nuclear weapons should be under IAEA supervision; Modi's "nuclear blackmail" remark (15 May 2025)

Testing, arms control and the NPT review

• BBC — Trump directs the Pentagon to resume nuclear weapons testing (30 October 2025)
• CTBTO — Status of signature and ratification: 196 States, 188 signed, 179 ratified; Russia's ratification column blank
• Arms Control Today — New START expires; US urges a modernised treaty (March 2026)
• UN Press DC/3912 — 11th NPT Review Conference ends without consensus; next conference 2031 (22 May 2026)

Attacks on nuclear facilities, 2026

• MEA — Statement on the evolving situation in West Asia (28 February 2026)
• Israel Hayom — Israel's campaign against Iran designated Operation Lion's Roar (28 February 2026)
• MEA — EAM Jaishankar's suo motu statement in the Rajya Sabha on West Asia (9 March 2026)
• Al Jazeera — IAEA confirms damage to Iran's Natanz enrichment plant; Grossi on the absence of a structured weapons programme (3 March 2026)
• MEA — India's statement on the attack targeting the Barakah nuclear facility (18 May 2026)
• UN Security Council press statement SC/16370 — condemnation of the Barakah attack (26 May 2026)
• IAEA — Director General's introductory statement to the Board of Governors (5 June 2026)
• Bellona — Zaporizhzhia NPP completely disconnected from Ukraine's grid after shelling (August 2022)
• Al Jazeera — IAEA Board resolves to report Iran to the Security Council (9 September 2026)
• US News / Reuters — vote breakdown: 23 in favour, 3 against, 8 abstentions (9 September 2026)