India-Southeast Asia — ASEAN, Act East Policy & East Asian Relations

Look East to Act East — Policy Evolution

India's engagement with Southeast and East Asia has evolved over three decades from a reactive foreign policy stance to a proactive strategic doctrine.

Key distinctions between Look East and Act East:

• Look East was primarily economic; Act East adds security, culture, and connectivity dimensions
• Act East explicitly includes Northeast India as a bridge to Southeast Asia
• Act East coincides with India's emerging Indo-Pacific strategy and Quad membership
• Act East recognises ASEAN's centrality in the regional architecture

ASEAN — Overview

ASEAN-led mechanisms where India participates:

• East Asia Summit (EAS) — India a founding member, 2005
• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
• ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+)
• ASEAN+1 meetings with India

India-ASEAN Relations — Milestones

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), announced at the ASEAN-India Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2022, is the highest designation in the ASEAN relationship framework. India joined the US, China, and Australia as CSP-level partners.

The Last Two Summits

The 21st ASEAN-India Summit (Vientiane, Laos, 10–11 October 2024) was held as India marked ten years of the Act East Policy (launched November 2014). PM Modi set out ten deliverables for the next phase, among them the designation of 2025 as the ASEAN-India Year of Tourism (India committing USD 5 million), an annual Women Scientists' Conclave, a doubling of ASEAN students at Nalanda University and a push on the AITIGA review; the joint statement emphasised maritime cooperation and emerging technologies including AI.

The 22nd ASEAN-India Summit (Kuala Lumpur, 26 October 2025) was chaired by Malaysian PM Anwar Ibrahim as ASEAN Chair, with PM Modi taking part virtually (his 12th ASEAN-India Summit). He designated 2026 the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation and backed the ASEAN-India Plan of Action (2026–2030), which operationalises the 2022 CSP; the leaders adopted a Joint Leaders' Statement on Sustainable Tourism. India's announcements included a proposed Second ASEAN-India Defence Ministers' Meeting and Second ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise, training for 400 renewable-energy professionals for the ASEAN Power Grid, Quick Impact Projects for Timor-Leste, a proposed Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Nalanda University, and an EAS Maritime Heritage Festival at Lothal. EAM S. Jaishankar, not the PM, delivered India's National Statement at the 20th East Asia Summit the next day (27 October 2025).

ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA)

The ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement in Goods was signed in August 2009 and came into force in January 2010 (India-Singapore, then phased for others).

Trade Data

Source for FY 2025–26: PIB, 13th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting (8 Jul 2026).

India's trade deficit with ASEAN widened nearly 10-fold from AITIGA's implementation, leading to significant criticism.

Key Indian Concerns with AITIGA

• Rules of Origin violations: Goods (especially Chinese goods) re-routed through ASEAN countries to access India's lower FTA tariffs
• Tariff asymmetry: India gave deeper cuts in more sectors than ASEAN nations reciprocated
• Non-tariff barriers: ASEAN countries imposed NTBs on Indian agricultural products
• Trade deficit: From ~$4 billion to ~$45 billion in 15 years

AITIGA Review (2022–2026)

• Formal Joint Committee review process began in 2022 (accelerated from 2024)
• 10th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting: New Delhi, 10–14 August 2025
• India seeks: stricter rules of origin, product-specific rules (PSRs), NTB reduction
• India and Thailand aimed for a "substantial conclusion" of the review in 2025 (Joint Declaration, April 2025), and ASEAN expressed confidence it would be "substantially concluded by end-2025" (MITI Malaysia, October 2025); however, the review was not concluded by end-2025
• 13th AITIGA Joint Committee and related meetings: New Delhi, 6–10 July 2026, the most recent Joint Committee meeting hosted by India. The Joint Committee urged the Sub-Committees to expedite the outstanding chapters and set them time-bound deliverables
• A 14th Joint Committee meeting was scheduled for 7–8 September 2026 (virtual)
• Status: the review had not concluded — at the 23rd AEM-India Consultation in Manila the ministers discussed the progress made and the efforts to advance the AITIGA review (ASEAN release, 22 September 2026)

RCEP — India's Exit (2019)

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a 15-nation mega free trade agreement signed in November 2020, covering ASEAN-10 + China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand.

India walked out of RCEP negotiations on 4 November 2019 at the Bangkok Summit.

Reasons for India's Exit

Current RCEP status: RCEP came into force on 1 January 2022 for 12 of 15 countries. India remains outside RCEP but has been left open an invitation to rejoin. India has not rejoined as of 2026.

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)

Launched in May 2022 by the US, IPEF has 14 members including India. India joined three of four pillars but opted out of the Trade Pillar (Pillar 1) citing sensitivity of market access commitments.

India-Japan Relations

"Special" — reflects depth of trust and absence of historical conflict. "Strategic" — defence, maritime, nuclear cooperation. "Global" — UNSC reform, climate, Indo-Pacific coordination.

India-South Korea Relations

India-Vietnam Relations

Vietnam is India's most important strategic partner within ASEAN, particularly given shared maritime security concerns with China.

India and Other Key ASEAN Partners

India-Australia Relations

Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC)

BIMSTEC

Previous Year Questions (PYQs)

Prelims

1. With reference to BIMSTEC, which of the following statements is correct? (a) It is a sub-regional grouping for Bay of Bengal countries (b) It has 10 member states (c) Its headquarters is in Dhaka (d) It was founded in 2000 (UPSC CSP 2018 — adapted)

2. India signed its Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with which of the following countries? (a) South Korea and UAE (b) ASEAN and Japan (c) Australia and China (d) Vietnam and Thailand (UPSC CSP 2022 — adapted)

3. Which of the following was the first region India adopted its "Look East Policy" towards? (a) Central Asia (b) East Africa (c) Southeast Asia (ASEAN) (d) Japan and South Korea (UPSC CSP 2015 — adapted)

4. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) came into force in January 2022. India is not a member. Which of the following was NOT a reason for India's decision to exit RCEP negotiations in 2019? (a) Concerns about the trade deficit with China widening (b) Lack of safeguard mechanisms against import surges (c) Failure to get adequate services market access (d) India's desire to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership instead (UPSC CSP 2023 — adapted)

Mains

1. "India's Act East Policy is more than a rebranding of the Look East Policy — it reflects a fundamental shift in India's strategic calculus." Critically examine. (UPSC GS2 2016)

2. ASEAN is the cornerstone of India's Act East Policy. Examine India's engagement with ASEAN and the challenges in deepening the relationship, particularly in the context of trade imbalances. (UPSC GS2 2020)

3. What is the significance of the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) for India? How does it complement India's ASEAN engagement? (UPSC GS2 2019)

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 (primary) — Act East Policy; ASEAN centrality; India-ASEAN trade imbalance; Japan (Quad partner); South Korea; Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF); 21st (2024) and 22nd (2025) ASEAN-India Summits; South China Sea positions
• GS3 — Trade with ASEAN; manufacturing supply chains; semiconductor partnerships (Japan, South Korea); shipbuilding; defence exports (BrahMos); energy and critical-minerals cooperation
• GS4 (Ethics) — Balancing economic relations with authoritarian regimes (Myanmar, Cambodia); maritime rule of law vs. power politics in South China Sea
• Essay — "India's Act East Policy: a decade on"; "ASEAN centrality and India's Indo-Pacific vision"

What Changed in 2024–26

ASEAN summitry turned maritime

The two most recent ASEAN-India Summits read very differently. Vientiane (October 2024) was a stock-taking summit, held as India marked a decade of the Act East Policy, and its deliverables were largely people-to-people: tourism, students, women scientists. Kuala Lumpur (26 October 2025) shifted the axis. Designating 2026 the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation, endorsing the Plan of Action (2026–2030) that gives the 2022 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership an operational calendar, and proposing a second defence ministers' meeting, a second maritime exercise and a maritime heritage festival at Lothal, India steered the agenda towards the sea rather than towards trade, where the relationship is stuck.

Two things frame that summit. The 47th ASEAN Summit admitted Timor-Leste the same day, ASEAN's first expansion since 1999, which is why India's Quick Impact Projects for the new member count for more than their scale suggests: they buy standing with the newest capital before other partners arrive. And the level of Indian representation fell at both events, with the PM joining the ASEAN-India Summit virtually and the EAM, not the PM, delivering India's National Statement at the 20th East Asia Summit the next day. The substance is still being delivered, but increasingly through bilateral visits rather than through the ASEAN summit calendar.

Watch: whether the Year of Maritime Cooperation produces the second ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise and the second Defence Ministers' Meeting as actual events in 2026, and whether India returns to the summit table in person under the Philippines' chairmanship.

AITIGA: the deadline passed, the review did not close

Both India and ASEAN pointed to a "substantial conclusion" of the review by end-2025. It did not happen. The 10th Joint Committee (New Delhi, August 2025) gave way to the 13th (New Delhi, July 2026), which had to hand the Sub-Committees time-bound deliverables for chapters still outstanding; a 14th was scheduled virtually for September 2026; and the 23rd AEM-India Consultation in Manila could record only progress and effort (ASEAN release, 22 September 2026). Malaysia's joint statement with India in February 2026 endorsed the process without accelerating it.

The deadlock matters because the two curves diverge. Trade keeps growing, and the deficit grows with it, so every year without stricter Rules of Origin is another year in which Chinese goods can reach India through ASEAN at FTA tariffs, which is the single concern driving India's negotiating position. US tariff pressure through 2025 sharpened India's urgency while making consensus harder on the ASEAN side, where several members were negotiating with Washington at the same time. This is the clearest case in the chapter of an economic agreement lagging a political one: the partnership was upgraded to its highest tier in 2022, while the trade agreement has not been revised since it came into force in 2010.

Watch: whether the time-bound deliverables set in July 2026 hold, and whether Rules of Origin and product-specific rules survive into the final text or are traded away for closure.

Maritime Southeast Asia upgraded, almost country by country

Between January 2025 and July 2026 India raised or deepened nearly every significant tie in maritime Southeast Asia: Thailand to a Strategic Partnership (April 2025, alongside the BIMSTEC Summit), the Philippines to a Strategic Partnership (August 2025), Singapore to a Roadmap for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (September 2025), Malaysia to a Digital Council and an inaugural Security Dialogue (February 2026), and Vietnam to an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (May 2026). Indonesia bracketed the whole period, with President Prabowo as Republic Day Chief Guest in January 2025 and PM Modi's return State Visit in July 2026.

The labels matter less than the language inside them. The Philippines Declaration calls the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award final and binding; the Vietnam statement presses non-militarisation and a Code of Conduct that does not prejudice the rights of non-parties; and the first India-Philippines joint sail was conducted inside the Philippine EEZ in the South China Sea (August 2025). India has moved from generic support for UNCLOS to endorsing a specific award that Beijing rejects. BrahMos is the material expression of the same shift: one export customer in the Philippines (first battery delivered April 2024), a Vietnamese contract confirmed publicly by the Defence Secretary on 30 May 2026, and an Indonesian contract signed on 7 July 2026. Defence export has become an instrument of Act East rather than a by-product of it.

Watch: whether the Vietnam 2+2 Strategic Diplomacy-Defence Dialogue convenes, and whether more ASEAN states follow Manila in naming the arbitral award in bilateral documents with India.

Japan: from infrastructure finance to economic security

The 15th Annual Summit (Tokyo, 29–30 August 2025) was the last held with PM Shigeru Ishiba and closed out the older agenda: a joint vision for the next decade, a fresh private-investment target, and a new Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation replacing the 2008 text. Japanese politics then turned over, with the Diet electing Sanae Takaichi on 21 October 2025 after Komeito left the LDP coalition and the Japan Innovation Party replaced it, and continuity held. Her Official Visit of 1–3 July 2026 produced the 16th Annual Summit and a distinctly different set of outcomes: a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation, joint statements on energy resilience and on AI, mutual support for each other's non-permanent UNSC candidatures, and Japanese backing for India's IEA membership. The centre of gravity has moved from ODA-financed infrastructure to supply chains, energy and technology, which gives India a second technology partnership in Asia alongside the Quad.

The bullet train is where the old agenda and the new one meet, and where delivery is tested. Japan's careful formulation that it "fully understands" India's target for opening priority sections in 2027, rather than endorsing that target, is the diplomatic tell; with land acquisition and utility shifting finished by March 2026, the remaining risk is construction and rolling stock rather than politics.

The 2+2 is the laggard. The third Foreign and Defence Ministerial (New Delhi, 20 August 2024) commissioned the upgraded security declaration that was duly adopted in August 2025, and ministers agreed the fourth round would be held in Tokyo. The 16th Annual Summit had to direct that it happen by the end of 2026, and no meeting had been announced as of 22 September 2026. For a mechanism that parallels India's 2+2 formats with the USA, Australia and Russia, a gap of more than two years is the visible seam in an otherwise accelerating relationship.

Watch: the fourth 2+2 in Tokyo before end-2026, and whether the priority sections open in 2027 as targeted.

Korea: the imbalance became the agenda

President Lee Jae Myung's State Visit of 19–21 April 2026, the first by a Korean President in eight years, was built around correcting the relationship rather than celebrating it. The Joint Strategic Vision was the frame; the substance was the decision to resume negotiations to upgrade CEPA after eleven earlier rounds had stalled, an India-Korea Digital Bridge to institutionalise technology cooperation, and a shipbuilding, shipping and maritime logistics framework that points Korean yards towards a greenfield shipyard in southern India. South Korea also joined the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and the International Solar Alliance, aligning itself with Indian-led platforms and not only with the Indian market.

The logic is the same as with ASEAN, one tier down: a trade relationship skewed heavily in the partner's favour, a political partnership that has outrun it, and a stalled agreement as the only real lever. Shipbuilding is the interesting departure, because it offers Korea a stake in Indian industrial capacity rather than an export market, which is the kind of arrangement that survives a tariff cycle.

Watch: whether the CEPA upgrade rounds actually reconvene, and whether the shipyard MoU converts from non-binding intent into a project.

The Quad met on ASEAN's sidelines

The Quad Foreign Ministers met in New Delhi on 26 May 2026, with S. Jaishankar, Marco Rubio, Toshimitsu Motegi and Penny Wong naming two deliverables that map onto India's own priorities: the Quad Critical Minerals Framework and the Quad Initiative on Indo-Pacific Energy Security. They welcomed India's operationalisation of the Indian Ocean programme of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness through the IFC-IOR at Gurugram, alongside the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration, and described the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award as a significant milestone, the same language India had used bilaterally with Manila.

Meeting again in Manila on 22 July 2026, on the sidelines of the ASEAN-related Foreign Ministers' Meetings hosted by the Philippines as ASEAN Chair, and issuing a Joint Press Release on Cooperation with ASEAN, the four answered the standing charge that the Quad undercuts ASEAN centrality, a position India has consistently defended inside the grouping. What the ministerials could not supply was leader-level weight: no Quad Leaders' Summit had been held as of 22 September 2026, and the Indian Express reported on 5 September 2026 that one on the margins of the G20 summit in the US (14–15 December 2026) was only being explored.

Watch: whether a Leaders' Summit is confirmed for December 2026, and whether the Critical Minerals Framework produces named projects rather than a standing agenda item.

Exam Strategy

For Prelims:

• ASEAN: 11 members (Timor-Leste joined 26 October 2025, at 47th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur — ASEAN's first expansion since 1999); founded 8 August 1967; headquarters Jakarta; 2026 Chair: Philippines
• India-ASEAN: dialogue relations 1992 → Summit-level 2002 → Strategic Partner 2012 → Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 2022
• 21st ASEAN-India Summit: Vientiane, October 2024 (Act East Policy 10-year anniversary)
• 22nd ASEAN-India Summit: Kuala Lumpur, 26 October 2025 (PM joined virtually); declared 2026 = ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation; support for ASEAN-India Plan of Action 2026–2030; 20th EAS (27 October 2025) attended by EAM Jaishankar
• AITIGA: signed August 2009, came into force January 2010; review: 10th Joint Committee August 2025; 13th Joint Committee New Delhi, 6–10 July 2026; 14th scheduled 7–8 September 2026 (virtual); still not concluded at the 23rd AEM-India Consultation, Manila (ASEAN release, 22 September 2026)
• RCEP: India exited November 2019; RCEP entered force January 2022; India remains outside as of 2026
• BIMSTEC: 7 members (India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand); Charter came into force May 2024; 6th Summit: Bangkok, April 2025
• India-Japan: Special Strategic and Global Partnership (2014); 15th Annual Summit: Tokyo, August 2025; Japan PM — Sanae Takaichi (from 21 October 2025), first woman PM; 16th Annual Summit: New Delhi, 1–3 July 2026 (Economic Security declaration); ¥10 trillion investment in India over a decade; bullet train priority sections targeted 2027; 3rd 2+2 meeting: New Delhi, August 2024; 4th 2+2 due in Tokyo by end-2026
• India-South Korea: CEPA from 2010; CEPA upgrade negotiations resumed (Joint Declaration, 20 April 2026); President Lee's State Visit, 19–21 April 2026 (Joint Strategic Vision, India-Korea Digital Bridge, shipbuilding framework); trade target USD 50B by 2030
• India-Vietnam: Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (May 2026); trade goal USD 25B by 2030
• New Strategic Partners: Thailand (April 2025), Philippines (August 2025); Republic Day 2025 Chief Guest: President Prabowo (Indonesia)
• BrahMos buyers in ASEAN: Philippines (2022), Vietnam (confirmed May 2026), Indonesia (July 2026)
• India-ASEAN bilateral trade: USD 128 billion (FY 2025-26); USD 123 billion (FY 2024-25)
• Quad FM Meetings: New Delhi, 26 May 2026 (Critical Minerals Framework; Energy Security initiative) and Manila, 22 July 2026; Leaders' Summit only being explored as of September 2026

For Mains:

• The Look East → Act East evolution is a reliable essay entry point; emphasise the qualitative shift from economics to security
• India's RCEP exit shows the tension between trade liberalisation and protecting domestic industry (dairy, manufacturing, agriculture)
• ASEAN Centrality: India accepts ASEAN as the fulcrum of Indo-Pacific architecture — this is important for contrast with US-led groupings
• BIMSTEC vs SAARC: India's preference for BIMSTEC reflects Pakistan's blocking role in SAARC
• Trade deficit data (AITIGA): imports surged 186% vs exports only 65% — powerful statistic for analysis
• Link IPEF partial participation to India's consistent stance on protecting policy space in trade negotiations
• South China Sea: use the 2025–26 statements (Philippines "final and binding" award; Vietnam on non-militarisation and a Code of Conduct) to show India's firmer maritime position

Key Terms

India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership

• Definition: The India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership is the highest tier of bilateral relations between the two nations, formalised in September 2014, encompassing strategic, defence, economic, technological and people-to-people cooperation underpinned by shared democratic values and a commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
• Context: Diplomatic ties between India and Japan have been progressively upgraded — to a "Global Partnership" (2000), a "Strategic and Global Partnership" (2006), and finally the "Special Strategic and Global Partnership" during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's first annual summit with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo in September 2014. The relationship is anchored by an institutionalised Annual Summit, a 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, and landmark agreements including the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (in force 2017). It is widely seen as a central pillar of India's "Act East" policy and a key Indo-Pacific balancing relationship, including through the Quad. The 16th Annual Summit (New Delhi, July 2026, with PM Sanae Takaichi) added a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a high-yield GS2 topic under "India and its neighbourhood / bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests." Prelims may test the year of elevation (2014), the Shinkansen-based Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail, the civil nuclear agreement (first with a non-NPT nuclear-armed state), and bilateral exercises (Dharma Guardian, JIMEX, Malabar). Mains questions typically probe the strategic logic of the partnership in the Indo-Pacific, its role in supply-chain resilience and economic security, and India-Japan convergence vis-a-vis China. Foundational concept — underpins questions on the Quad, Act East policy, and Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

ASEAN-India Partnership

• Definition: The ASEAN-India Partnership is the multidimensional engagement between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in November 2022, spanning trade, connectivity, defence, maritime security and people-to-people ties, and forming the core of India's Act East Policy.
• Context: India's engagement with ASEAN grew out of the Look East Policy (1991), evolving through Sectoral Partner, full Dialogue Partner and Summit-level Partner (2002) status, and was reinforced by the Act East Policy launched in 2014. The relationship was upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership at the 19th ASEAN-India Summit in Phnom Penh on 12 November 2022, marking 30 years of dialogue relations. Economic ties rest on the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (signed 2009, operational 2010), whose review remained unfinished as of September 2026, and the services and investment agreements that entered into force in 2015. ASEAN expanded to 11 members when Timor-Leste was admitted at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 26 October 2025, and 2026 is the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a foundational GS2 International Relations concept under "India and its neighbourhood" and "bilateral, regional and global groupings involving India and/or affecting India's interests." UPSC Prelims tests factual recall (ASEAN founding, membership, dialogue-partner timeline, FTA names) while Mains examines India's Act East Policy, the Indo-Pacific balance, the widening trade deficit and the AITIGA review. It also feeds GS3 (external-sector trade, FTAs) and Essay themes on regionalism and India's global role. No verified PYQ exists for this exact term, but it underpins recurring questions on Act East Policy, the Indo-Pacific and India's regional groupings.

Sources & Verification

ASEAN summitry and membership

• PIB — PM's participation in the 22nd ASEAN-India Summit (26 Oct 2025)
• All India Radio News — Timor-Leste joins ASEAN as 11th member (26 Oct 2025)
• MEA — National Statement by EAM at the 20th East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur (27 Oct 2025)

AITIGA and India-ASEAN trade

• PIB — 10th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting and related meetings, New Delhi, 10–14 August 2025 (15 Aug 2025)
• PIB — 13th AITIGA Joint Committee meeting, New Delhi; India-ASEAN trade USD 128 bn in 2025-26 (8 Jul 2026)
• ASEAN Secretariat — Secretary-General of ASEAN participates in the 23rd AEM-India Consultation (22 Sep 2026)

Bilateral ties in Southeast Asia

• MEA special briefing on the State Visit of the President of Indonesia (mirror, 25 Jan 2025)
• PIB — India-Indonesia Joint Statement, PM's State Visit to Indonesia (Jul 2026)
• The Jakarta Post — Indonesia, India sign BrahMos missile deal (7 Jul 2026)
• PMO — Joint Declaration on the Establishment of India-Thailand Strategic Partnership (4 Apr 2025)
• PIB — India-Philippines Declaration on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership (5 Aug 2025)
• The Diplomat — Philippines, India wind up first joint naval exercise in South China Sea (5 Aug 2025)
• MFA Singapore — PM Wong's Official Visit to India (4 Sep 2025)
• PMO — India-Malaysia Joint Statement on the PM's official visit to Malaysia (8 Feb 2026)
• PMO — Joint Statement on the India-Vietnam Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (6 May 2026)
• ThePrint — Defence Secretary confirms BrahMos deal with Vietnam (30 May 2026)
• The Diplomat — India has signed BrahMos missile deal with Vietnam (Jun 2026)

India-Japan

• All India Radio News — Takaichi Sanae elected Japan's first female Prime Minister (21 Oct 2025)
• PMO — 16th India-Japan Annual Summit Joint Statement (2 Jul 2026)

India-South Korea

• PMO — List of Outcomes: State Visit of the President of the Republic of Korea to India (20 Apr 2026)
• PMO — India-ROK Comprehensive Framework for Partnership in Shipbuilding, Shipping and Maritime Logistics (20 Apr 2026)
• MEA special briefing on the State Visit of the President of the Republic of Korea (mirror, 20 Apr 2026)

Quad

• US State Department — Joint Statement from the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi (26 May 2026)
• MOFA Japan — Japan-Australia-India-US (Quad) Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Manila (22 Jul 2026)
• Indian Express — Quad summit on G20 margins in US being explored (5 Sep 2026)