BharatNotes Look East to Act East — Policy Evolution
India's engagement with Southeast and East Asia has evolved over three decades from a reactive foreign policy stance to a proactive strategic doctrine.
| Phase | Name | Year | Key Features |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 | Look East Policy | 1992 (P.V. Narasimha Rao) | Economic integration with ASEAN; dialogue partner status; trade and investment focus |
| Phase 2 | Look East — Deeper | 2000s | Expanded to East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Australia); FTA negotiations; maritime dimension added |
| Phase 3 | Act East Policy | 2014 (Narendra Modi, East Asia Summit, Nay Pyi Taw) | More active, strategic, and defence-oriented; Northeast India as gateway; Indo-Pacific framing; people-to-people connectivity |
Key distinctions between Look East and Act East:
- Look East was primarily economic; Act East adds security, culture, and connectivity dimensions
- Act East explicitly includes Northeast India as a bridge to Southeast Asia
- Act East coincides with India's emerging Indo-Pacific strategy and Quad membership
- Act East recognises ASEAN's centrality in the regional architecture
ASEAN — Overview
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Full name | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| Founded | 8 August 1967 (Bangkok Declaration) |
| Members | 11 — Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Timor-Leste (joined 26 October 2025) |
| Headquarters | Jakarta, Indonesia |
| ASEAN Charter | Adopted October 2007 (came into force December 2008) — gave ASEAN legal personality |
| ASEAN Centrality | The principle that ASEAN must remain the core of Indo-Pacific regional architecture; central to all ASEAN-led mechanisms (ADMM+, ARF, EAS) |
| Decision-making | Consensus-based; non-interference in internal affairs |
| GDP | ~$3.6 trillion combined (one of world's largest economies) |
ASEAN-led mechanisms where India participates:
- East Asia Summit (EAS) — India a founding member, 2005
- ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
- ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+)
- ASEAN+1 meetings with India
India-ASEAN Relations — Milestones
| Year | Milestone |
|---|---|
| 1992 | India becomes ASEAN Dialogue Partner |
| 1995 | India joins ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) |
| 2002 | India-ASEAN Summit-level engagement established |
| 2005 | India joins East Asia Summit (founding member) |
| 2009 | ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) signed |
| 2010 | AITIGA comes into force |
| 2012 | India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership |
| 2022 (November) | India-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) — highest tier |
| 2022 | 30th anniversary of India-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership |
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), announced at the ASEAN-India Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2022, is the highest designation in the ASEAN relationship framework. India joined the US, China, and Australia as CSP-level partners.
ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA)
The ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement in Goods was signed in August 2009 and came into force in January 2010 (India-Singapore, then phased for others).
Trade Data
| Year | India Exports to ASEAN | India Imports from ASEAN | Trade Deficit |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY 2010–11 (base) | ~$26.6 billion | ~$30.6 billion | ~$4 billion |
| FY 2022–23 | ~$44 billion | ~$87.5 billion | ~$43.57 billion |
| FY 2024–25 | ~$38.96 billion | ~$84.16 billion | ~$45.2 billion |
India's trade deficit with ASEAN widened nearly 10-fold from AITIGA's implementation, leading to significant criticism.
Key Indian Concerns with AITIGA
- Rules of Origin violations: Goods (especially Chinese goods) re-routed through ASEAN countries to access India's lower FTA tariffs
- Tariff asymmetry: India gave deeper cuts in more sectors than ASEAN nations reciprocated
- Non-tariff barriers: ASEAN countries imposed NTBs on Indian agricultural products
- Trade deficit: From ~$4 billion to ~$45 billion in 15 years
AITIGA Review (2024–2025)
- Formal review process began in 2024 via a Joint Committee
- Ten rounds of negotiations completed as of late 2025
- India seeks: stricter rules of origin, product-specific rules (PSRs), enhanced market access, NTB reduction
- Target: conclude review by end of 2025 / early 2026
RCEP — India's Exit (2019)
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a 15-nation mega free trade agreement signed in November 2020, covering ASEAN-10 + China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand.
India walked out of RCEP negotiations on 4 November 2019 at the Bangkok Summit.
Reasons for India's Exit
| Concern | Details |
|---|---|
| Trade deficit fears | Fear of Chinese goods flooding India via ASEAN route; India already had large deficits with China and ASEAN |
| Agriculture and dairy | New Zealand dairy exports would devastate Indian dairy farmers; Australian agricultural exports a threat |
| Ratchet clause | A one-way liberalisation trap — once tariffs are lowered, they cannot be raised |
| Base year | RCEP used 2014 as base year; India wanted 2019; the difference meant deeper cuts for India |
| Services market access | India wanted liberal mode 4 (movement of professionals) access — denied |
| Auto-trigger mechanism | India sought safeguard clauses if imports surge past thresholds — not accepted |
Current RCEP status: RCEP came into force on 1 January 2022 for 12 of 15 countries. India remains outside RCEP but has been left open an invitation to rejoin. India has not rejoined as of 2026.
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)
Launched in May 2022 by the US, IPEF has 14 members including India. India joined three of four pillars but opted out of the Trade Pillar (Pillar 1) citing sensitivity of market access commitments.
| Pillar | Subject | India |
|---|---|---|
| Pillar 1 — Trade | Market access, digital trade, labour, environment | Not participating |
| Pillar 2 — Supply Chains | Resilient supply chains | Participating |
| Pillar 3 — Clean Economy | Clean energy, decarbonisation | Participating |
| Pillar 4 — Fair Economy | Anti-corruption, tax | Participating |
India-Japan Relations
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Partnership status | Special Strategic and Global Partnership (upgraded September 2014 under PM Modi and PM Abe) |
| ODA | Japan is India's largest bilateral ODA donor — cumulative commitments exceeding ¥5 trillion; financing DMIC, freight corridors, metro systems, Northeast connectivity |
| Defence cooperation | 2+2 Dialogue (since 2019); ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, 2020); GSOMIA-equivalent; joint exercises Dharma Guardian (Army), JIMEX (Navy), Sheen Yudh (Air Force) |
| Technology | Joint production of US-2 amphibious aircraft; Bullet Train (Mumbai-Ahmedabad) financed by Japan ODA |
| Quad | India-Japan both founding Quad members; close alignment on Indo-Pacific maritime security |
| Nuclear | Civil nuclear cooperation agreement signed 2016 (India-Japan) |
| Semiconductors | Japan is key partner in India Semiconductor Mission (2021) |
"Special" — reflects depth of trust and absence of historical conflict. "Strategic" — defence, maritime, nuclear cooperation. "Global" — UNSC reform, climate, Indo-Pacific coordination.
India-South Korea Relations
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Partnership status | Special Strategic Partnership (2015) |
| CEPA | Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed 2009, came into force 1 January 2010 |
| Trade | ~$25 billion bilateral trade (2024) |
| Defence | K9 Vajra self-propelled howitzers (Artillery modernisation); submarine technology cooperation; Samsung, LG, Hyundai investments in India |
| Korean investments | Hyundai, Kia, Samsung, LG — significant manufacturing investments in India |
| CEPA review | CEPA modernisation negotiations ongoing; India seeks enhanced services market access |
India-Vietnam Relations
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Partnership | Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (upgraded October 2016) |
| Defence | India extended $500 million Line of Credit for defence procurement; BrahMos missiles under discussion; joint naval patrols in South China Sea |
| South China Sea | Common interest in freedom of navigation; Vietnam supports India's UNSC bid |
| Trade | ~$15 billion bilateral trade (2024) |
| Culture | Vietnam's Cham community has historical Hindu ties; Mỹ Sơn temple complex (UNESCO) |
Vietnam is India's most important strategic partner within ASEAN, particularly given shared maritime security concerns with China.
India-Australia Relations
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Partnership | Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (June 2020) |
| ECTA | Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) signed 2 April 2022; India's first bilateral FTA with a developed country in over a decade |
| Critical minerals | Australia-India Critical Minerals Investment Partnership; lithium, cobalt, rare earths |
| Quad | Australia and India both in the Quad framework |
| Defence | AUSINDEX naval exercises; +1 format; MLSA (Mutual Logistics Support Agreement, 2020) |
Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC)
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Launched | 2000 (Vientiane, Laos) |
| Members | 6 — India + 5 Mekong countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam) |
| Focus areas | Tourism, culture, education, transport and communications |
| Significance | India's direct engagement with the Mekong sub-region; cultural-civilisational links (Buddhism, Ramayana) |
BIMSTEC
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Full name | Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation |
| Members | 7 — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand |
| Founded | 1997 (Bangkok Declaration) |
| Charter | Came into force May 2024 (ratified at the 5th BIMSTEC Summit, Colombo 2022) |
| India's push | As an alternative to the deadlocked SAARC; circumvents Pakistan problem |
| 6th Summit | 2025 — India hosted the 2nd BIMSTEC Foreign Ministers' Retreat in July 2024 |
| Significance | Connects South Asia and Southeast Asia; Bay of Bengal maritime space |
Previous Year Questions (PYQs)
Prelims
With reference to BIMSTEC, which of the following statements is correct? (a) It is a sub-regional grouping for Bay of Bengal countries (b) It has 10 member states (c) Its headquarters is in Dhaka (d) It was founded in 2000 (UPSC CSP 2018 — adapted)
India signed its Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with which of the following countries? (a) South Korea and UAE (b) ASEAN and Japan (c) Australia and China (d) Vietnam and Thailand (UPSC CSP 2022 — adapted)
Which of the following was the first region India adopted its "Look East Policy" towards? (a) Central Asia (b) East Africa (c) Southeast Asia (ASEAN) (d) Japan and South Korea (UPSC CSP 2015 — adapted)
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) came into force in January 2022. India is not a member. Which of the following was NOT a reason for India's decision to exit RCEP negotiations in 2019? (a) Concerns about the trade deficit with China widening (b) Lack of safeguard mechanisms against import surges (c) Failure to get adequate services market access (d) India's desire to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership instead (UPSC CSP 2023 — adapted)
Mains
"India's Act East Policy is more than a rebranding of the Look East Policy — it reflects a fundamental shift in India's strategic calculus." Critically examine. (UPSC GS2 2016)
ASEAN is the cornerstone of India's Act East Policy. Examine India's engagement with ASEAN and the challenges in deepening the relationship, particularly in the context of trade imbalances. (UPSC GS2 2020)
What is the significance of the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) for India? How does it complement India's ASEAN engagement? (UPSC GS2 2019)
Recent Developments (2024–2026)
21st ASEAN-India Summit — Act East Policy Decade (October 2024)
The 21st ASEAN-India Summit was held in Vientiane, Laos on 10–11 October 2024. The summit was especially significant as India marked 10 years of the Act East Policy (launched November 2014). PM Modi outlined ten deliverables for the next phase of ASEAN-India partnership, including: declaring 2025 as the ASEAN-India Year of Tourism (with India committing USD 5 million); an annual Women Scientists' Conclave; doubling ASEAN students at Nalanda University; and advancing AITIGA review. The joint statement emphasised maritime cooperation and emerging technologies including AI.
UPSC angle: 21st ASEAN-India Summit (Vientiane, October 2024), 10-year Act East anniversary, and Modi's 10-point deliverables are high-probability Prelims and Mains items.
AITIGA Renegotiation — Addressing India's Trade Deficit
The ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), in force since 2010, has been under formal review since 2022, with a Joint Committee conducting negotiations. By November 2024, six rounds of negotiations had been held. The review aims to address India's significant trade deficit with ASEAN (approximately USD 43.57 billion in FY 2022–23) — a result of tariff liberalisation benefitting ASEAN exporters more than India. Key Indian demands include Rules of Origin tightening (to prevent Chinese goods being re-routed through ASEAN), improved market access for Indian services and professionals, and a rebalancing of goods tariff schedules. Both sides have targeted conclusion of the review by 2025.
UPSC angle: AITIGA review is a critical GS-II and GS-III topic. The trade deficit issue, China re-routing concern, and India's services export ambitions are the key analytical threads.
India-Japan Strategic Partnership — Deepening in 2024–2025
India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership continued to deepen. The India-Japan 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (Foreign + Defence Ministers) was held in 2024, with both sides advancing cooperation on: the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail (Bullet Train Project — under construction); defence equipment co-development; Quad partnership; and semiconductor supply chains. Japan is India's largest source of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Both countries held joint military exercises (Dharma Guardian for Army, Jimex for Navy, Shinyuu Maitri for Air Force) in 2024.
UPSC angle: India-Japan partnership — Special Strategic and Global Partnership (2014), 2+2 dialogue, bullet train project, Quad membership, ODA relationships — are standard UPSC topics.
India-South Korea — CEPA Upgrade and Semiconductor Cooperation
India-South Korea relations advanced in 2024 with both sides working to upgrade the CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, 2010). South Korea's semiconductor companies (Samsung, SK Hynix) are exploring India as a manufacturing location under India's semiconductor incentive scheme (India Semiconductor Mission, 2022). India-South Korea bilateral trade reached approximately USD 21 billion in 2023–24. India and South Korea also cooperated on defence — the K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzer is being manufactured in India under the Make in India programme.
UPSC angle: India-South Korea CEPA, semiconductor cooperation, and K9 Vajra (Thunder) howitzer manufacturing in India are important specific details for UPSC questions on India's strategic and trade partnerships.
Exam Strategy
For Prelims:
- ASEAN: 11 members (Timor-Leste joined 26 October 2025); founded 1967; headquarters Jakarta
- India-ASEAN: Dialogue Partner 1992 → Summit-level 2002 → Strategic Partner 2012 → Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 2022
- AITIGA: signed 2009, came into force 2010
- RCEP: India exited November 2019; RCEP entered force January 2022
- BIMSTEC: 7 members (India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand)
- India-Japan: Special Strategic and Global Partnership (2014)
- India-South Korea: CEPA from 2010
For Mains:
- The Look East → Act East evolution is a reliable essay entry point; emphasise the qualitative shift from economics to security
- India's RCEP exit shows the tension between trade liberalisation and protecting domestic industry (dairy, manufacturing, agriculture)
- ASEAN Centrality: India accepts ASEAN as the fulcrum of Indo-Pacific architecture — this is important for contrast with US-led groupings
- BIMSTEC vs SAARC: India's preference for BIMSTEC reflects Pakistan's blocking role in SAARC
- Trade deficit data (AITIGA): imports surged 186% vs exports only 65% — powerful statistic for analysis
- Link IPEF partial participation to India's consistent stance on protecting policy space in trade negotiations
