India–Central Asia & Pacific Island Relations — Connect Central Asia, FIPIC

Introduction

India's foreign policy engagement extends well beyond its immediate neighbourhood and major powers. Two distinctive arenas — Central Asia (the five former Soviet republics) and the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) — represent India's efforts to diversify its diplomatic footprint, secure strategic interests, and project soft power. Both regions are increasingly contested geopolitically — Central Asia is a theatre of Sino-Russian-Indian competition, while the Pacific Islands have emerged as a flashpoint of China-USA-India strategic rivalry. For UPSC GS-2, these are high-yield, less-studied topics that frequently appear in Mains answers on India's foreign policy.

Part A — India and Central Asia

The Five Central Asian Republics (CARs)

The five Central Asian Republics are former Soviet states that gained independence with the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991:

India established diplomatic relations with all five CARs in 1992, shortly after their independence. However, the relationship remained underdeveloped for decades due to geographic barriers (no direct land border), Pakistan's blocking of overland routes, and India's limited connectivity options.

India's Interests in Central Asia

1. Energy Security:

• Kazakhstan is a major oil producer (member of OPEC+).
• Turkmenistan has the 4th largest natural gas reserves in the world.
• India has invested in Kazakh oil fields (ONGC Videsh).
• The dream of a TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) — economically logical but blocked by Afghanistan's security situation.
• Uranium from Uzbekistan: at the State Visit of 29–30 August 2026 PM Modi "appreciated the progress made in the long-term arrangement for supply of Uranium from Uzbekistan to India" (India-Uzbekistan joint statement, 30 August 2026); Indian officials told Business Standard that the mining agreement signed during the visit would pave the way for it.

2. Strategic/Geopolitical:

• Central Asia borders Afghanistan — stability in the CARs is critical for India's Afghanistan strategy.
• Countering China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which has invested heavily in Central Asian infrastructure.
• Countering Pakistan's influence in Central Asian Muslim communities.

3. Counter-terrorism:

• Central Asia has been a source of radicalization; some CARs host terrorist training grounds.
• India and CARs share concerns about Taliban-linked terror networks emanating from Afghanistan.
• SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) headquartered in Tashkent provides a framework for cooperation.

4. Historical and Cultural Ties:

• The ancient Silk Road connected India to Central Asia for millennia.
• Sanskrit and the Avestan language (Zoroastrian scriptural language) share common Indo-Iranian roots.
• Buddhist heritage: Taxila, Gandhara (in present-day Pakistan/Afghanistan) were gateways between India and Central Asia; Buddhist monasteries existed across Central Asia.
• Sufism: Many Central Asian Sufi saints have venerated connections to India (the Chishti order's origins trace to Central Asia).
• Mughal connections: The Mughal dynasty (Babur) came from the Fergana Valley (Uzbekistan); Indian courts had Persian/Turk-Mongol cultural influences.
• Live cultural projects (2026): the August 2026 State Visit to Uzbekistan produced a Letter of Intent on restoring the Buddhist sites of Fayaz Tepa and Kara Tepa, an MoU for an ICCR Sanskrit Chair in Tashkent, a Lal Bahadur Shastri Scholarship for Hindi for Uzbek students, and MoUs on culture, higher education, archives, tourism, traditional medicine and sister-state ties (joint statement, 30 August 2026).

5. Trade:

• Bilateral trade is very low relative to potential. India–Uzbekistan trade, for example, was USD 980.4 million in 2024 (Uzbek statistics, cited in the MEA country brief of January 2026); at the August 2026 State Visit PM Modi said it had crossed USD 1 billion, and the two sides set a target of USD 5 billion by 2030.
• Central Asia could be a major market for Indian pharmaceuticals, IT services, and agricultural products.

6. Critical Minerals and Rare Earths:

• India and the five CARs have expressed interest in joint exploration of rare earths and critical minerals, the newest strand of the relationship and the one most directly tied to India's energy transition.
• The first India-Central Asia Rare Earth Forum was held in New Delhi in September 2024; the 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue (6 June 2025) called for its second meeting.

7. Digital and Financial Connectivity:

• The 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue agreed to set up an India-Central Asia Digital Partnership Forum, whose first meeting is to be hosted by Uzbekistan, and proposed a Joint Working Group on banking and financial connectivity — an attempt to fix the payments problem that keeps bilateral trade low.

Connect Central Asia Policy (2012)

India launched its "Connect Central Asia" policy in 2012 (announced at the India-Central Asia Dialogue in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan) to systematically expand engagement.

Key pillars:

• Political engagement: Regular high-level visits and summits.
• Economic connectivity: Trade through alternative routes (Iran, INSTC).
• Cultural diplomacy: Indian Cultural Centres (ICCR), scholarships, yoga, Hindi teaching.
• Security cooperation: Counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing.
• Development partnership: Indian grants for capacity building, IT, education. Uzbekistan illustrates the scale: more than 2,700 Uzbek nationals have taken part in ITEC courses over the years (India-Uzbekistan joint statement, 30 August 2026), with more than 100 selected in 2024-25 (MEA country brief, January 2026). India also announced a USD 1 million grant for ecological rehabilitation of the Aral Sea region during the August 2026 State Visit. Indian training courses have covered Central Asian drug-law enforcement officers (December 2024) and countering terror financing (April 2025).

Limitation of the policy: Without a direct land route (Pakistan corridor is unavailable), India cannot build overland connectivity economically. The policy remained aspirational until the focus shifted to maritime and Iran-based routes.

Connectivity Challenges and Alternatives

The Pakistan Problem:

• India has no direct land border with Central Asia.
• The most economical land route passes through Pakistan — closed due to political relations.
• Alternative overland route: India → Iran → Afghanistan → Central Asia — disrupted by Afghan instability.

Chabahar Port (Iran) — The Key Enabler:

• India has invested in developing Chabahar port on Iran's southeastern coast.
• Phase I operational since 2018.
• Chabahar provides India a sea route to Iran, and from there, road/rail connectivity to Afghanistan and onward to Central Asia — bypassing Pakistan entirely.
• The 10-year contract: India and Iran signed a 10-year agreement in May 2024 (the IPGL–Ports and Maritime Organisation contract of 13 May 2024) for the operation and development of the Shahid Beheshti Terminal, India's first long-term overseas port management deal. India committed ~USD 120 million in investment along with a USD 250 million credit window for infrastructure upgrades, and completed that commitment with a final tranche paid in August 2025. Consistent with this, the MEA budget estimates for 2026-27 carry no provision under the Chabahar Port head, against Rs 400 crore in the 2025-26 revised estimates (Union Budget 2026-27).
• Sanctions status (as of 22 September 2026): India had a US sanctions exemption for Chabahar since 2018 under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA). In September 2025 the US State Department announced that it would revoke that exception with effect from 29 September 2025; the US then granted India a six-month conditional waiver effective 29 October 2025 (announced by the MEA on 30 October 2025), valid until 26 April 2026. The waiver ended on 26 April 2026 and no renewal had been reported as of September 2026. The government has neither announced an exit nor a transfer of its stake.
• Chabahar–Zahedan railway: the inland extension of the corridor had passed 84% physical progress as of 25 October 2025 (Iran's Ministry of Roads and Urban Development, via Tehran Times).
• Challenge: US sanctions on Iran complicate Chabahar development and financing.

INSTC — International North-South Transport Corridor:

• A multi-modal transport corridor linking India (Mumbai) → Iran (Bandar Abbas/Chabahar) → Azerbaijan or Caspian Sea → Russia → Central Asia/Europe.
• Agreement signed by India, Iran, and Russia in 2000 (St. Petersburg).
• Chabahar's inclusion in INSTC was formally welcomed at the First India-Central Asia Summit (January 2022).
• Significantly reduces transit time and cost compared to traditional Europe-Asia routes via the Suez Canal.

INSTC and Central Asia: current position (2025–2026):

• At the 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue (New Delhi, 6 June 2025), India and the five CARs stressed optimum use of the INSTC, supported the INSTC membership of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and welcomed Central Asian interest in using the Shahid Beheshti Terminal at Chabahar.
• The end of the US sanctions waiver for Chabahar (26 April 2026) is now the main constraint on the Chabahar arm of the corridor, which is the route that matters most for Central Asian access to Indian markets.

First India-Central Asia Summit — January 2022 and Second Summit Status

The First India-Central Asia Virtual Summit was held on 27 January 2022, hosted by PM Narendra Modi. Attended by the Presidents of all five CARs (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Coincided with the 30th anniversary of India-Central Asia diplomatic relations.

Key outcomes of the First Summit:

• Agreed to establish a Summit mechanism meeting every 2 years.
• Welcomed inclusion of Chabahar Port in INSTC.
• Joint Working Groups set up on Afghanistan and Chabahar Port use.
• Connectivity, trade, culture, and counter-terrorism identified as priority areas.
• Turkmenistan offered inclusion of Turkmenbashi port in INSTC framework.

Second India-Central Asia Summit — Status (as of 22 September 2026): PM Modi extended an invitation to all five CAR leaders for the Second India-Central Asia Summit to be held in India in 2024 (the agreed 2-year cycle). However, the summit was not held in 2024. The 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue of foreign ministers (New Delhi, 6 June 2025) then set out to "prepare ground" for the second summit "at a mutually convenient date in 2025", but it was not held in 2025 either. On 30 August 2026, during his State Visit to Uzbekistan, PM Modi announced that New Delhi would host the India-Central Asia Summit in 2027 (Business Standard, 30 Aug 2026; the official joint statement records only a commitment to the Central Asia–India format at the level of Heads of State). Until it is held, the only leaders-level summit remains the virtual one of January 2022, and the working track is the foreign ministers' Dialogue, whose next meeting is due in 2026.

SCO — India and Central Asia in a Multilateral Framework

India became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2017 (along with Pakistan) at the Astana Summit. As of July 2024, the SCO has 10 full members: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Belarus (Belarus became the 10th full member on 4 July 2024 at the Astana Summit).

SCO relevance for India-Central Asia relations:

• Provides institutional framework for India-CAR engagement.
• Key SCO bodies relevant to India: Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent; SCO Business Council; SCO Interbank Consortium.
• India hosted the SCO Summit in 2023 — as Chair, PM Modi hosted all SCO leaders (virtually).
• The 24th Summit (Astana, Kazakhstan, 3–4 July 2024) adopted the Astana Declaration, covering 25 strategic agreements on energy, security, trade and information security. PM Modi did not attend; EAM S. Jaishankar represented India.
• The two most recent summits were held in Tianjin, China (25th, 31 August–1 September 2025, which adopted the Tianjin Declaration) and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (26th, 31 August–1 September 2026, the SCO's 25th anniversary), which PM Modi attended. The Bishkek Declaration included items India had pressed for, such as English as an official SCO language; India is to host the first SCO Civilisation Dialogue Forum later in 2026.
• However, India-Pakistan tensions within SCO remain a friction point. Pakistan, as SCO chair, will host the 2027 summit; Indian officials said the level of India's participation would be decided "at the appropriate time" (Business Standard, 30 Aug 2026).

Afghanistan Factor

Afghanistan is the critical missing link in India-Central Asia connectivity:

• A stable Afghanistan with Indian influence would open a land corridor from India (via Pakistan or Iran) to Central Asia.
• The Taliban takeover in August 2021 disrupted Indian projects in Afghanistan (Salma Dam, Kandahar Consulate, Parliament building in Kabul).
• India has cautiously re-engaged with the Taliban without formally recognising its government. It sent a technical team to Kabul in 2022; after the visit of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India (9–16 October 2025), the MEA restored the Technical Mission in Kabul to the status of Embassy of India with immediate effect (October 2025). In January 2026, Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor, a Taliban appointee, took charge as Chargé d'Affaires at the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi.
• Central Asian countries are also concerned about Taliban-linked instability and drug trafficking from Afghanistan.

Part B — India and Pacific Island Countries

The Pacific Island Countries (PICs)

The Pacific Islands are scattered across the vast Pacific Ocean, divided into three broad groupings:

• Melanesia: Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji
• Micronesia: FSM, Palau, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru
• Polynesia: Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Cook Islands, Niue

Their defining characteristics:

• Very small populations (some have only a few thousand people).
• Vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) — disproportionate to land area.
• Extreme vulnerability to climate change and sea level rise (Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Kiribati may become uninhabitable within decades).
• Strong sense of "Blue Pacific" identity — the ocean is their continent.
• Collectively control a significant share of the world's fishing grounds and potentially large seabed mineral resources.

Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC)

FIPIC is the institutional framework for India's engagement with Pacific Island Countries.

Launch:

• Proposed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to Fiji in November 2014.
• The First FIPIC Summit was held in Suva, Fiji, November 2014 — Modi's historic visit was the first by an Indian Prime Minister to Fiji in 33 years.

Membership:

• India + 14 Pacific Island Countries: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

FIPIC Summits:

3rd FIPIC Summit (May 2023) — Key Highlights:

• Co-chaired by PM Modi and Papua New Guinea PM James Marape in Port Moresby on 22 May 2023.
• First visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Papua New Guinea.
• India announced a 12-step action plan covering: healthcare, renewable energy, cyber security, digital connectivity, skill development, capacity building, and climate resilience.
• Commitment to establish a 100-bed regional super-specialty hospital in Fiji. The MoU for this hospital in Suva was signed in August 2025, and the India-Fiji joint statement calls it the largest project India has undertaken under its Grant-in-Aid programme in the Pacific.
• Setting up a regional IT and cyber security training hub in PNG.

Since FIPIC-III: No fourth FIPIC summit has been held (as of 22 September 2026). The latest FIPIC-format meeting was a FIPIC Foreign Ministers' Meeting hosted by EAM S. Jaishankar in New York on 24 September 2025, on the sidelines of UNGA80, to review the 12-point action plan. Fiji used that meeting to cite Indian support for the Suva hospital, pharmacopoeia recognition, prosthetic fitting, sea ambulances and cyber-security development.

India-Fiji bilateral track (August 2025): Fiji PM Sitiveni Rabuka's official visit to India (24–26 August 2025), his first in his current term, produced the "Veilomani Dosti" joint statement and delivered the flagship FIPIC-III promise, the MoU for the Suva hospital. Other outcomes: Fiji's first Quick Impact Project (groundwater for Tubalevu village), a defence wing in the Indian High Commission in Suva, a Cyber Security Training Cell, 12 agricultural drones and 2 mobile soil-testing labs, a Declaration of Intent on Migration and Mobility, and Fijian market access for Indian ghee.

India's Interests in the Pacific Islands

1. Climate Change Diplomacy:

• PICs are the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change.
• India, as a large developing nation with climate commitments (Paris Agreement, ISA — International Solar Alliance), finds natural solidarity with PICs on climate platforms.
• India supports PICs' demands for:
  • Ambitious global emission reduction targets.
  • Loss and Damage finance (the fund established at COP27, 2022 and operationalised at COP28, 2023).
  • Adaptation finance for island communities.
• PICs pressed at COP29 (Baku, November 2024) for a high climate finance goal, and India shares their position that developed nations must provide adequate finance.
• India's climate deliverables in the region are practical rather than declaratory: solar diplomacy through the International Solar Alliance and off-grid solar for PICs, telemedicine under e-ArogyaBharati, and scholarships under ITEC.

2. Ocean Governance and UNCLOS:

• PICs control vast EEZs — collectively one of the largest maritime zones in the world.
• India values their support in UNCLOS-based maritime governance positions.
• India and PICs share positions on freedom of navigation (implicitly against excessive Chinese maritime claims).

3. Critical Minerals:

• Pacific seabed contains vast deposits of polymetallic nodules (manganese, cobalt, nickel, copper) — essential for electric vehicle batteries and clean energy technology.
• As deep-sea mining regulation develops through the International Seabed Authority (ISA), India's partnership with PICs could be valuable.

4. Counter-balancing China:

• China has invested heavily in Pacific Island infrastructure under BRI.
• China–Solomon Islands Security Agreement (April 2022): A security pact allowing Chinese police and military forces to deploy in Solomon Islands — alarmed Australia, USA, and India.
• China's foreign minister Wang Yi visited 7 Pacific countries in May–June 2022 and attempted (unsuccessfully) to get a multilateral economic-security agreement signed.
• India's development cooperation approach — grants and capacity building, not debt — offers an alternative to China's model.

5. Vaccine Diplomacy and Health:

• During COVID-19, India supplied vaccines to several PICs under Vaccine Maitri initiative.
• India's health outreach — traditional medicine (AYUSH), telemedicine, affordable generic drugs — is valued by PICs with limited healthcare infrastructure.

6. Fisheries:

• Several PICs depend heavily on tuna fishing for revenue.
• Indian fishing industry and PICs have potential for cooperation in sustainable fisheries.

7. Disaster Relief — the First Responder Role:

• India positions itself as a first responder in the Pacific, using grants rather than loans.
• After the magnitude-7.4 earthquake of 17 December 2024 near Port Vila, India offered USD 500,000 to Vanuatu on 2 January 2025 for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

"Blue Pacific" Identity

Pacific Island leaders have articulated a "Blue Pacific" concept — the idea that the Pacific Ocean is not empty space between islands but rather constitutes the Pacific Islanders' homeland, resource base, and cultural identity.

Implications for diplomacy:

• PICs resist being treated as minor actors in others' great-power competition.
• They demand recognition as sovereign decision-makers on maritime governance, seabed resources, and climate finance.
• The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) — the main regional body (18 members including Australia and New Zealand) — articulates this Blue Pacific vision.
• India engages with PIF as a Dialogue Partner.

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and India

• India is a Dialogue Partner of the Pacific Islands Forum.
• India normally attends the Dialogue Partner session of the annual PIF Leaders Meeting. The exception was 2025: the 54th Leaders Meeting in Honiara, Solomon Islands (8–12 September 2025) excluded all 21 dialogue partners, India among them. Dialogue partners were readmitted at the 55th Leaders Meeting in Koror, Palau (September 2026), where MoS for External Affairs Pabitra Margherita represented India; the Forum now places its partners in two tiers.
• Addressing the Dialogue Partner Session at Koror, MoS Margherita said India is implementing Quick Impact Projects in all 14 Pacific Island Countries, one per country, as announced at the 2024 PIF summit in Tonga. At the same 2026 meeting India invited PICs to join the International Solar Alliance, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) and the Global Biofuels Alliance.
• The distinction between FIPIC (India-centric) and PIF (Pacific-led): PIF includes Australia and New Zealand as full members; FIPIC does not.
• India's engagement through PIF complements FIPIC engagement.

Key Differences: India–Central Asia vs. India–Pacific Islands

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 (primary) — India-Central Asia: Chabahar port (May 2024 agreement); INSTC; SCO connectivity; Afghanistan factor; India-Pacific Islands: Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC); SAGAR doctrine
• GS3 — Chabahar as trade gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan; INSTC trade route; energy resources in Central Asia
• GS4 (Ethics) — Development diplomacy and small state vulnerability; Pacific Islands and climate justice; responsible power behaviour
• Essay — "India's Connect Central Asia Policy: potential and limitations"; "India and Pacific Islands: climate diplomacy and strategic outreach"

What Changed in 2024–26

Chabahar lost its legal cover just as Central Asia began to use it

The Chabahar story of this window is not about construction but about permission. India signed the ten-year Shahid Beheshti contract in May 2024 with a United States sanctions exception in place, completed its financial commitment with the final tranche in August 2025, and then watched the exception go. Washington announced the revocation in September 2025, granted a six-month conditional waiver from 29 October 2025, and let it lapse on 26 April 2026 without renewal. India's budget documents tell the same story from the other end: having paid what it promised, the Ministry of External Affairs carries no Chabahar head at all in its 2026-27 estimates.

The government has chosen ambiguity over exit. MoS for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh told the Lok Sabha in July 2026 that the government "remains engaged with all concerned stakeholders to address the implications"; the MEA spokesperson said on 4 August 2026 that India was in contact with all partners; and in Bishkek, in a report dated 1 September 2026, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said the West Asia conflict and changes to the rules governing the port had affected cooperation, and that India was seeking "a sustainable way forward". Business Standard reported in April 2026 that India might hand operation of the port to an Iranian entity, which has not been officially confirmed.

The timing is what makes this costly. The 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue of June 2025 had just welcomed Central Asian interest in using the Shahid Beheshti Terminal, so the sanctions decision struck the one corridor built around their access to Indian markets at the moment the ministerial track was trying to operationalise it. For Mains, this is the cleanest available case of strategic autonomy running into third-party sanctions exposure: the investment is sunk, the legal cover is gone, and the choices are to absorb the risk, hand over operations, or wait. The sequence is easy to compress and worth keeping straight: contract in May 2024, revocation effective 29 September 2025, conditional waiver from 29 October 2025, lapse on 26 April 2026, no renewal on record.

The summit mechanism slipped again, and the ministerial track carried the relationship

The First India-Central Asia Summit of January 2022 set a two-year summit cycle, and no leaders' summit has followed it. The second was due in 2024 and was not held; the 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue of 6 June 2025 set out to prepare ground for it "at a mutually convenient date in 2025", which did not happen either; and on 30 August 2026, in Tashkent, PM Modi announced that New Delhi would host the summit in 2027. That announcement is the current state of play, not an event: the only leaders-level meeting on record remains the virtual one of January 2022.

What the slippage obscures is that the foreign ministers' track has been doing the substantive work. The June 2025 Dialogue pulled India's four priorities (connectivity, digital public infrastructure, critical minerals and counter-terrorism) into a single document, condemned the Pahalgam terror attack, and pushed the rare-earths strand that is the most forward-looking part of the relationship. Write the Dialogue, not the summit, as the operating mechanism of India-Central Asia relations, and never describe the 2027 summit as having taken place.

Uzbekistan became the test case for what India can actually offer

PM Modi's State Visit of 29–30 August 2026, his fourth to the country after July 2015, June 2016 and September 2022, elevated the Strategic Partnership of 2011 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, added a Foreign Ministers-led mechanism and raised the Inter-Governmental Commission to ministerial level. The substance behind the label matters more than the label. A long-term uranium supply arrangement, backed by the mining agreement signed during the visit, diversifies India's sources of nuclear fuel. The Buddhist-heritage restoration, the Sanskrit chair and the Hindi scholarship give India a cultural foothold that China's investment-led presence in the region does not have and cannot easily buy. The Dustlik exercise, last held at Namangan in April 2026, keeps a modest defence channel open, and the Tashkent Pharma Park connects to the one sector where Indian industry already has a Central Asian market.

Set against how small the bilateral commerce actually is, this is India's Central Asia policy in miniature: modest trade, real capacity building, and cultural depth doing the work that infrastructure money does for China.

The SCO gave India a stage, and will shortly give it a problem

Across three summits the SCO has served India as a venue rather than as an institution. At Astana in July 2024 PM Modi stayed away and EAM Jaishankar represented India, and the meeting that mattered was on the margins, where Jaishankar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi agreed to expedite disengagement along the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh, a precursor to the breakthrough of October 2024. At Tianjin in 2025 that thread became the story: Modi and Xi Jinping met on Chinese soil for the first time in seven years, called India and China "development partners and not rivals", and said their differences should not turn into disputes. At Bishkek in 2026 Modi attended in person and framed India's approach as Security, Connectivity and Opportunity, refused double standards on terrorism, tied Eurasian security to peace in Afghanistan, and insisted that connectivity respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is the CPEC objection restated in a Central Asian capital.

The problem arrives in 2027, when Pakistan chairs the SCO and hosts the summit. Indian officials have said the level of India's participation will be decided "at the appropriate time", which is the diplomatic formula for a decision not yet taken. For Mains, the SCO is the sharpest illustration of India using a China-led, Pakistan-inclusive platform to advance positions that both of them resist.

Kabul was upgraded without being recognised

Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi's visit from 9 to 16 October 2025 produced an upgrade India had withheld since the Taliban takeover: EAM Jaishankar announced during the visit that India would raise its mission, and the MEA restored the Technical Mission in Kabul to the status of Embassy of India with immediate effect, reported on 21 October 2025. Reciprocity followed on 10 January 2026, when Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor, who had been part of Muttaqi's delegation, arrived in New Delhi to take charge as Chargé d'Affaires at the Afghan Embassy.

India has still not recognised the Taliban government, and that distinction is the examinable point: full diplomatic presence, no recognition. Engagement without endorsement gives India a working channel for the Chabahar-Afghanistan leg of the corridor and for the counter-terrorism concerns it shares with the CARs, while conceding nothing on legitimacy. Whether the position survives contact with a government that wants recognition is the thing to watch.

The Pacific shut India out, then let it back in on new terms

The 54th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting at Honiara in September 2025 excluded every dialogue partner, India among them, as well as development partner Taiwan; CSIS assessed this as likely a compromise under Chinese pressure to disinvite Taiwan. Partners were readmitted at Koror, Palau, in September 2026, but sorted into two tiers. India's exclusion had nothing to do with India: it was collateral damage from a quarrel India is not party to, which is what makes it instructive about how great-power rivalry narrows the room available to partners in small-state groupings.

India's answer has been to make itself useful rather than to compete for influence. Grant-based, visible projects in every island country, a hospital in Suva that the two governments describe as the largest grant-in-aid project India has undertaken in the Pacific, prompt relief to Vanuatu after the December 2024 earthquake, and standing invitations into the International Solar Alliance, CDRI and the Global Biofuels Alliance are the deliverables; the contrast with loan-financed Chinese infrastructure is the argument. FIPIC's own summit cycle has stalled since May 2023, with the New York foreign ministers' meeting of 24 September 2025 standing in for a fourth summit, so the bilateral and PIF tracks are carrying the relationship in the meantime.

What to watch

Four questions are open as of 22 September 2026. There is no renewal of the Chabahar waiver and no official word on who will operate the port. The India-Central Asia Summit named for 2027 has been announced and nothing more, while the foreign ministers' Dialogue is due to meet again in 2026. Pakistan's 2027 SCO chairmanship will force India to decide the level at which it attends a summit in Islamabad. And the fourth FIPIC summit remains unscheduled.

Exam Strategy

For Prelims:

• FIPIC launched: November 2014, Suva, Fiji; 14 Pacific Island countries (not 15 — India is the 15th party).
• 3rd FIPIC Summit: Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 22 May 2023; PM Modi co-chaired.
• INSTC: India-Iran-Russia multi-modal corridor; originally 2000 (St. Petersburg); the 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue (6 June 2025) backed Turkmenistan's and Uzbekistan's INSTC membership.
• First India-Central Asia Summit: 27 January 2022; virtual; PM Modi hosted; 30th anniversary of ties. Second summit: not yet held as of September 2026; India announced on 30 August 2026 that it will host the summit in 2027.
• Chabahar Port: Phase I operational 2018; in Sistan-Baluchestan province, Iran; 10-year agreement signed 13 May 2024; USD 120 million commitment fulfilled (final tranche August 2025); nil allocation in MEA budget 2026-27; six-month US waiver (from 29 October 2025) ended 26 April 2026; government "engaged with all concerned stakeholders" (July–September 2026).
• SCO: India full member since 2017 (Astana Summit); SCO Tianjin Summit: 31 August–1 September 2025 (Modi-Xi meeting, Tianjin Declaration); SCO Bishkek Summit held 31 August–1 September 2026 (26th summit, SCO's 25th anniversary; Modi attended; Bishkek Declaration); Pakistan hosts in 2027.
• India-Uzbekistan: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (30 August 2026); trade target USD 5 billion by 2030.
• Afghanistan: India's Technical Mission in Kabul restored to Embassy (October 2025), without formal recognition of the Taliban.
• Solomon Islands-China security deal: April 2022.
• Pacific: Suva 100-bed hospital MoU (August 2025); FIPIC Foreign Ministers' Meeting, New York (24 September 2025); dialogue partners excluded from PIF Honiara (September 2025), readmitted at Koror (September 2026).
• RATS (SCO): Headquartered in Tashkent — counter-terrorism body.

For Mains GS-2:

• For Central Asia: Structure around — Historical ties → Strategic interests → Connectivity challenge → Solutions (Chabahar, INSTC) → SCO → Afghanistan factor → India-Central Asia Summit 2022 and the 2027 summit announcement.
• For Pacific Islands: Structure around — FIPIC → India's interests (climate, ocean, minerals, counter-China) → Blue Pacific concept → China's challenge → India's development model.
• Always demonstrate India's multi-faceted interests (not just counter-China) for a balanced answer.
• Connect Pacific Islands to India's broader Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific strategy.

Previous Year Questions (PYQs)

Prelims

• UPSC Prelims 2016: Consider the following about Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) — when launched, where held, how many member countries.
• UPSC Prelims 2020: With reference to the INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor), which of the following statements is/are correct?
• UPSC Prelims 2022: Consider the following statements about India's Central Asia policy...

Mains

• UPSC Mains GS-2 2018: "India's engagement with Central Asia has remained below its potential." Examine the opportunities and constraints in India-Central Asia relations.
• UPSC Mains GS-2 2020: Discuss India's connectivity initiatives with Central Asia. What role can Chabahar Port and INSTC play in India's strategic interests?
• UPSC Mains GS-2 2023: Examine India's engagement with Pacific Island Countries through FIPIC. How does this serve India's interests in the Indo-Pacific?
• UPSC Mains GS-2 2024: "The Pacific Islands are the new frontier of India's foreign policy." Comment in the context of India's Indo-Pacific strategy and FIPIC.

Key Terms

FIPIC (Pacific Islands)

• Definition: FIPIC (Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation) is a multilateral grouping launched by India in 2014 to deepen cooperation with 14 Pacific Island Countries across development, climate action, health, digital connectivity and trade.
• Context: FIPIC was initiated during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Suva, Fiji, in November 2014, where he co-hosted the inaugural summit with leaders of 14 Pacific Island Countries (PICs). It forms part of India's Act East Policy and its broader Indo-Pacific and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision, extending New Delhi's outreach to small island states far beyond its traditional Indian Ocean neighbourhood. Three summits have been held so far (as of September 2026): Suva (2014), Jaipur (2015) and Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea (2023).
• UPSC Relevance: FIPIC is a foundational current-affairs concept for GS2 (India and its neighbourhood / bilateral, regional and global groupings affecting India's interests) and connects to GS3 (climate vulnerability of small island states). In Prelims, the typical trap is mapping which countries are members (e.g., distinguishing Pacific Island Countries from ASEAN or Indian Ocean states) and matching the forum to its launch year and the Act East Policy. For Mains, it is best used as an example of India's South–South cooperation, climate diplomacy and competition with China for influence in the Pacific. No verified PYQ exists for this exact term; treat it as a foundational concept underpinning questions on India's Indo-Pacific strategy and regional groupings.

Connect Central Asia Policy

• Definition: The Connect Central Asia Policy is India's broad-based, proactive engagement framework towards the five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), articulated on 12 June 2012, spanning political, security, economic, connectivity and cultural cooperation.
• Context: The policy was unveiled by India's Minister of State for External Affairs, E. Ahamed, at the first India-Central Asia Dialogue held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in June 2012. It marked a conscious effort to revive India's historic Silk Route linkages with a resource-rich, strategically located region that had drifted after the Soviet collapse, while countering the growing footprint of China and Russia. The framework was later institutionally upgraded through the first virtual India-Central Asia Summit (27 January 2022) hosted by PM Narendra Modi, which agreed to hold the summit every two years and set up a Joint Working Group on Afghanistan.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a high-yield GS2 topic under "India and its neighbourhood" and "bilateral/regional groupings affecting India's interests." In Mains, it is tested through analytical questions on India's connectivity bottlenecks (landlocked region, Pakistan blocking overland access), the relevance of Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor, and India's contest with China's Belt and Road Initiative for influence. In Prelims it underpins factual questions on the five Central Asian Republics, the SCO, INSTC and Chabahar. Foundational concept — underpins the broader topic family of India's extended-neighbourhood and energy-security diplomacy.

International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

• Definition: The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a roughly 7,200-km multimodal network of ship, rail and road routes linking India to Russia, Iran, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe, initiated by India, Iran and Russia to move freight faster and cheaper than the traditional Suez Canal sea route.
• Context: The corridor was first conceived in September 2000 at a meeting in St. Petersburg, and the foundational inter-governmental agreement was signed by India, Iran and Russia on 16 May 2002. Membership has since expanded to 13 countries with Bulgaria as an observer. It connects India's western ports (notably Mumbai) via Iran's ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar northward through the Caspian region to Russia and onward to Europe, and is central to India's outreach to Central Asia, where India has no direct land access because of Pakistan.
• UPSC Relevance: This is a foundational GS2 (international relations) concept underpinning questions on India's connectivity diplomacy, India-Iran-Russia ties, and India's engagement with Central Asia and Eurasia. Prelims commonly tests factual recall of member countries, the route and the ports involved (often pairing INSTC with Chabahar, Bandar Abbas and the Ashgabat Agreement), so candidates must distinguish INSTC from China's BRI and from the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). For Mains, it is a strong analytical anchor for discussing India's strategic autonomy, the limits imposed by US/Western sanctions on Iran and Russia, and India's quest for alternative trade routes bypassing Pakistan.

Sources & Verification

India-Central Asia Dialogue and Summit

• Joint Statement, 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue, New Delhi (6 Jun 2025)
• Business Standard — India-Uzbekistan trade, defence ties hit high spots with 16 key outcomes (30 Aug 2026)

India-Uzbekistan

• PMO — PM holds official talks on his State Visit to Uzbekistan (30 Aug 2026)
• PMO — Joint Statement during the State Visit of PM Narendra Modi to Uzbekistan (30 Aug 2026)
• MEA — India-Uzbekistan bilateral brief (Jan 2026)

SCO

• PMO — PM participates in the 25th SCO Summit in Tianjin, China (1 Sep 2025)
• PMO — PM participates in the 26th SCO Summit in Bishkek (1 Sep 2026)

Chabahar

• All India Radio — US sanctions waiver for Chabahar to end effective 29 September (19 Sep 2025)
• All India Radio — MEA: India granted US sanctions waiver for Chabahar (30 Oct 2025)
• The Wire — Chabahar dropped from MEA budget as India says funding obligation is complete (1 Feb 2026)
• Business Standard — India likely to hand over Chabahar port reins to Iranian entity (24 Apr 2026)
• ANI — "We are in contact with all stakeholders" over Chabahar: MEA (4 Aug 2026)
• ANI — India in discussions with stakeholders for sustainable way forward on Chabahar: FS Misri (1 Sep 2026)
• Tehran Times — Chabahar-Zahedan railway project surpasses 84% progress (25 Oct 2025)

Afghanistan

• ThePrint — India reopens embassy in Kabul, sends technical team (2022)
• All India Radio — Government upgrades status of Technical Mission of India in Kabul to that of Embassy in Afghanistan (21 Oct 2025)
• All India Radio — Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor takes charge at Afghanistan Embassy in India (10 Jan 2026)

Pacific Island Countries

• ThePrint — India offers $500,000 in relief to quake-hit Vanuatu (3 Jan 2025)
• PIB — India-Fiji Joint Statement, visit of PM Sitiveni Rabuka (25 Aug 2025)
• CSIS — Pacific Islands Forum 2025: Navigating Great Power Rivalry (16 Sep 2025)
• All India Radio — EAM Jaishankar hosts FIPIC Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New York (25 Sep 2025)
• Fiji MFA — Fiji represented at the FIPIC meeting at UNGA80 (25 Sep 2025)
• DD India — India reaffirms commitment to deeper partnership with Pacific Island Countries (1 Sep 2026)
• Devpolicy — Pacific Islands Forum leaders in Koror (9 Sep 2026)