International Law & Treaties — UNCLOS, ICJ, Extradition, Humanitarian Law & Space Law

Sources of International Law

International law governs relations between sovereign states and international organisations. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is the authoritative statement on the sources of international law.

Primary Sources (Article 38, ICJ Statute)

Secondary (Subsidiary) Sources

For Mains: Article 38(1) is not an exhaustive list. Resolutions of the UN General Assembly, acts of international organisations, and unilateral declarations by states can also create binding obligations. The ICJ has increasingly relied on customary international law alongside treaties.

Treaty Law in Practice — Adoption, Entry into Force, Suspension and Withdrawal

A treaty passes through distinct stages, and confusing them is a standing Prelims trap: adoption of the text, opening for signature, signature, ratification (or accession), and entry into force once a stated threshold of ratifications is met. A state that has signed but not ratified is not bound, though it must not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Withdrawal runs on the clock the treaty itself sets. Suspension or termination outside those terms has to be justified under the law of treaties, on grounds such as material breach, a fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus), impossibility of performance, or countermeasures, each carrying a high threshold.

Where the Live Instruments Stand

A presidential memorandum of 7 January 2026 directed US departments to begin withdrawing from 31 UN agencies, entities, conventions and treaties, including UNFPA, the UNFCCC, the UN Democracy Fund and four of the five UN regional commissions. The UN Spokesperson replied that assessed contributions to the regular and peacekeeping budgets "are a legal obligation under the UN Charter for all Member States, including the United States"; the UNFCCC Executive Secretary called the move "a colossal own goal".

Suspension and Termination — The Indus Waters Treaty Dispute

India decided on 23 April 2025 to hold the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) "in abeyance" after the Pahalgam terrorist attack, invoking Pakistan's material breach of bilateral obligations through cross-border terrorism, and changed circumstances, as grounds. Pakistan described any interference with treaty-mandated flows as an act of war and pursued the arbitration it had begun in August 2016 under Article IX and Annexure G. The World Bank paused the appointments in December 2016 and lifted that pause only in 2022, when the Court of Arbitration was empanelled. India has never appeared before the Court of Arbitration and treats it as illegally constituted, on the ground that the World Bank empanelled it in breach of the Treaty. The World Bank is not a guarantor of the Treaty but an appointing authority, nominating the Chairman of the Court under Annexure G and the Neutral Expert under Annexure F, a role the Court itself has described as special but essentially ministerial.

In the award of 31 August 2026 the Court found that "abeyance" is a term of neither the Treaty nor international law, and treated India's position as a claim that the Treaty is suspended or terminated. It then held unanimously that no available ground supported it. The Treaty may be modified or terminated only by India and Pakistan acting together. No rule of international law permits unilateral suspension on grounds of sovereignty, and pacta sunt servanda applies. Pakistan's alleged refusal to renegotiate, its objections and its dispute-settlement filings are not a material breach, and even assuming its sponsorship of cross-border terrorism, that would not be a material breach of a treaty that governs only the use of the waters. The changes India cited, namely demography, clean-energy need, dam technology, terrorism and climate change, did not meet the high threshold for a fundamental change of circumstances. No international armed conflict presently exists, and in any event the Treaty is of a type that continues to operate during one. Nor could suspension be justified as a countermeasure. Alongside the award, the Court ordered interim measures on the Ratle plant, prohibiting India from concreting the dam wall and the power intake above specified levels until 90 days after the Neutral Expert's final decision, whose circulation the latest work programme envisages around 16 July 2027.

India rejected each of these pronouncements as it has rejected all the others. The MEA's statement of 27 June 2025 called any award of the body "illegal and per se void"; on 16 May 2026 it said "India's decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance remains in force"; and on 31 August 2026, from Bishkek, it said the Court "has no jurisdiction whatsoever to pronounce on India's sovereign decisions" and that its pronouncements, "now or in the future, will have no effect on India's actions in connection with the projects being undertaken by India".

Treaty Bodies — India's ICERD Review (August 2026)

India's eleventh periodic review under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was held at Geneva on 11–12 August 2026, with an inter-ministerial delegation led by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta. Responding on 26 August 2026 to the Committee's press release, the MEA called it "a routine treaty-body review" in which India had participated "in the spirit of constructive engagement", recalled that India "played a leading role in negotiating and drafting ICERD in the 1960s", said the delegation had rejected "sweeping generalizations, unsubstantiated allegations, or tendency to exceed the Convention's mandate" during the review, and stated that India rejects "any politically motivated highly malicious references in the report". A treaty body is a committee of independent experts issuing concluding observations, not a court delivering binding judgments between parties, and states routinely contest its findings while remaining parties.

International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Structure and Composition

Jurisdiction

India and the ICJ

The Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan) — 2019

For Prelims: The ICJ's judgment in the Jadhav case (2019) was based on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 — not the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. These are two separate treaties.

Advisory Opinions in Practice

Most of the Court's recent output has come through its advisory jurisdiction, and three opinions define its current reach.

Climate change (23 July 2025). The Court delivered its Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change unanimously, the first time it examined the legal framework applicable to climate change. The General Assembly made the request on 29 March 2023 on an initiative led by Vanuatu, and the proceeding was the largest in the Court's history: 91 written statements were filed and 97 states took part in the oral hearings. Judge Dalveer Bhandari appended a separate opinion and, with Judge Cleveland, a joint declaration. India participated in the oral hearings in December 2024, emphasising CBDR and the greater historical responsibility of developed countries.

On 20 May 2026 the General Assembly adopted resolution A/80/L.65 on the opinion by 141 votes to 8, with 28 abstentions; the eight against were Belarus, Iran, Israel, Liberia, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Yemen, and four proposed amendments were rejected. The resolution welcomed the "unanimous" opinion as "an authoritative contribution to the clarification of existing international law", called on all states to comply with the obligations the Court identified, and asked the Secretary-General to report to the 82nd session on ways to advance compliance. Saudi Arabia and the United States argued in the debate that advisory opinions are non-binding and cannot create obligations.

Occupied Palestinian Territory (22 October 2025). The Court delivered its opinion on the Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It held that Israel must agree to and facilitate relief schemes provided by the UN and its entities including UNRWA, must respect and protect relief and medical personnel and facilities, must respect the prohibitions on forcible transfer and on starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, and must respect the inviolability of UN premises, property and assets, which continues during armed conflict. By ten votes to one it held that Israel is obliged to cooperate in good faith with the United Nations. The Court was not asked to decide whether Israel had in fact violated those obligations.

The right to strike (21 May 2026). The Court held, by 10 votes to 4, that the right to strike of workers and their organisations is protected under the ILO's Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87). It accepted that the Convention contains no express reference to strikes, but found that strike action can fall within the ordinary meaning of the "activities" of workers' organisations, while expressly declining to define the content, scope or conditions of the right. Judges Tomka, Abraham, Xue and Hmoud dissented; Judge Bhandari appended a declaration. The ILO Governing Body referred the question on 10 November 2023 under article 37(1) of the ILO Constitution, making this the first ILO referral on the interpretation of a labour convention to reach the Court since it was created in 1945, and a reminder that specialised agencies, not only the UNGA and UNSC, can seek advisory opinions.

Contentious Jurisdiction and the Limits of Consent

Sudan instituted proceedings against the United Arab Emirates on 5 March 2025 alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in relation to the Masalit group in Darfur. On 5 May 2025 the Court rejected the request for provisional measures and ordered the case removed from the General List, because the UAE's reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention left no basis of jurisdiction. Judge Bhandari joined a joint partly dissenting opinion with Judges Charlesworth, Gómez Robledo, Cleveland, Tladi and Judge ad hoc Simma. The leading Genocide Convention case continues: merits hearings in The Gambia v. Myanmar were held from 12 to 29 January 2026 with eleven states intervening under Article 63 of the Statute, and no judgment had been delivered as on 22 September 2026.

International Criminal Court (ICC)

Structure and Key Facts

India's Position on the ICC

For Mains: India's non-membership of the ICC does not mean India opposes accountability for international crimes. India has supported ad hoc tribunals (ICTY for Yugoslavia, ICTR for Rwanda) and consistently advocates for rule-based international order. India's objection is to the specific institutional design of the ICC, not to the principle of international criminal justice.

The Court Under Pressure (2025–2026)

The arrest warrants issued in 2024 in the Palestine situation, including for the Israeli Prime Minister, triggered a sustained campaign against the Court. On 6 February 2025 the United States issued Executive Order 14203, "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court", initially designating Prosecutor Karim Khan. Designations widened through the window: four judges in June 2025; two more judges and both Deputy Prosecutors on 20 August 2025; two further judges on 18 December 2025, bringing the total to eleven; and on 18 August 2026 the US Treasury designated the Court's President, Judge Tomoko Akane, together with Senior Trial Lawyer Abdoulaye Seye. The measures carry asset freezes, travel bans and restrictions on services from US firms. In January 2026 a UN human rights expert publicly demanded their withdrawal and the repeal of the executive order.

Membership moved in both directions. Hungary notified withdrawal from the Rome Statute on 2 June 2025, citing the Netanyahu warrants, which would have taken effect on 2 June 2026 under Article 127. After a change of government, its parliament voted on 27 May 2026 to reverse course and the government notified the Secretary-General on 29 May 2026 that it was withdrawing its notification of withdrawal with immediate effect; the ICC welcomed the decision on 1 June 2026. That is a rare worked example of Article 127 and its reversal.

Judicially the Court kept working. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was surrendered to it on 12 March 2025 on a warrant issued five days earlier; on 23 April 2026 Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed all three counts of crimes against humanity and committed him to trial, whose opening is scheduled for 30 November 2026. It is the first head-of-state-level surrender from Asia, and a live test of complementarity in respect of a state that had already withdrawn from the Statute. On 8 July 2025 Pre-Trial Chamber II issued arrest warrants for the Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, finding reasonable grounds to believe they committed the crime against humanity of persecution under article 7(1)(h) on gender grounds against girls, women and persons not conforming with the Taliban's gender policy, and on political grounds against persons perceived as allies of girls and women, in Afghanistan since 15 August 2021 and continuing until at least 20 January 2025. These are the first ICC warrants framed on gender persecution.

Separately, the codification project that the Rome Statute left unfinished has begun. By resolution 79/122 of 4 December 2024 the General Assembly decided to convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity for three weeks in early 2028 and three in 2029, to negotiate a binding instrument on the International Law Commission's draft articles. Its Preparatory Committee met for the first time from 19 to 30 January 2026 at UN Headquarters, with governments invited to file amendment proposals by 30 April 2026.

UNCLOS — United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Overview

Maritime Zones Under UNCLOS

India and UNCLOS

India's position under the Convention is more precise than it is often stated. India is a full party to UNCLOS, including Part XI on the deep seabed as modified by the 1994 Implementing Agreement, and holds an ISA exploration contract for polymetallic nodules in the Central Indian Ocean Basin. Part XI is the seabed regime, not a dispute-settlement mechanism. Dispute settlement lives in Part XV, where article 287 lets a state choose its forum and article 298 lets it exclude specified categories of dispute (sea-boundary delimitation, military activities, and matters before the Security Council) from compulsory binding procedures. India has made neither declaration, so it has chosen no forum under article 287 and has excluded no category of dispute under article 298. Other states do use article 298: Cambodia entered an article 298(1)(a) declaration on ratifying on 6 February 2026 and withdrew it on 26 May 2026.

High Seas Treaty (BBNJ Agreement)

The Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement), also called the High Seas Treaty, was adopted in June 2023 as the third implementing instrument under UNCLOS. It crossed the 60-ratification threshold on 19 September 2025 and, under article 68(1), entered into force 120 days later on 17 January 2026. The UN Treaty Collection records 145 signatories and 94 parties as on 22 September 2026. India signed on 25 September 2024 and has not ratified, approved, accepted or acceded; ratification is tied to amendments to the Biological Diversity Act.

The Deep Seabed and Freedom of Navigation (2025–2026)

The sharpest current test of UNCLOS is over the deep seabed. On 24 April 2025 the United States issued an executive order, "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources", and on 29 April 2025 The Metals Company USA filed for commercial recovery of high-seas minerals under the US Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, outside the ISA regime. ISA Secretary-General Leticia Reis de Carvalho responded that no state may claim or exercise sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its minerals, that activities there must be conducted under contract with the Authority, that this prohibition "is binding on all States, including those that have not ratified UNCLOS", and that parties have a duty not to recognise rights over minerals recovered outside Part XI. Article 311(6) makes the common-heritage principle the only unamendable provision of the Convention. The ISA Council is still negotiating the Mining Code; it concluded Part I of its 31st session in Kingston in March 2026, with India's Mayank Joshi presiding as Council President. China, separately, continues to reject the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that found its Nine-Dash Line claims incompatible with UNCLOS, while India treats UNCLOS as the foundational framework for maritime order, with its SAGAR doctrine resting explicitly on UNCLOS norms.

Freedom of navigation acquired a direct Indian stake in 2026. After the conflict that began on 28 February 2026 with Israeli and US strikes on Iran and Iranian attacks on Gulf states, the Security Council adopted resolution 2817 (2026) at its 10119th meeting on 11 March 2026, on a letter from Bahrain on behalf of the GCC states. The resolution affirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense... as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter", condemns Iran's attacks on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan as a breach of international law and a serious threat to international peace and security, calls on Iran to comply with international humanitarian law on the protection of civilians, reaffirms navigational rights and freedoms for merchant vessels, and affirms that any attempt to impede lawful transit passage or freedom of navigation in those waterways is itself a serious threat to international peace and security. It is a rare recent text engaging Article 51, IHL and UNCLOS transit passage together.

India framed its response in Charter terms throughout. Its statement of 28 February 2026 urged restraint and added that "Sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states must be respected", a formula the External Affairs Minister repeated in his suo motu statements to both Houses on 9 March 2026. On 3 March 2026 India recorded that it "is firmly opposed to attacks on merchant shipping" after Indian nationals were killed or went missing; on 8 April 2026 it welcomed the ceasefire and said it expected "that unimpeded freedom of navigation and global flow of commerce would prevail through the Strait of Hormuz"; and on 18 April 2026 the MEA summoned Iran's Ambassador after two Indian-flagged ships were fired on in the Strait, asking Iran to resume facilitating the passage of India-bound ships.

For Prelims: UNCLOS defines six maritime zones. India's EEZ extends to 200 nm and covers approximately 2.37 million sq km. The International Seabed Authority (ISA), headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, regulates deep sea mining in "The Area" beyond national jurisdiction.

Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949

Additional Protocols

Key Principles of IHL

Ratification Status

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are among the most universally ratified treaties in history — 196 states are parties, covering virtually every country in the world. India is a party to all four Geneva Conventions. India has not ratified Additional Protocol I or Additional Protocol II — India's Ministry of External Affairs confirmed in 2019 that no decision has been taken to ratify either Additional Protocol.

For Mains: Common Article 3 is sometimes called a "mini-convention" within the Geneva Conventions because it applies to all armed conflicts, including internal conflicts. It establishes the absolute minimum standards of humanitarian treatment. The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) is the guardian of IHL.

Extradition Law — Principles and India's Practice

Key Principles of Extradition

India's Extradition Framework

High-Profile Extradition Cases

For Mains: India has faced persistent challenges in extraditing economic offenders from the UK. Prison conditions in India, particularly in Tihar Jail, are the recurring obstacle, and the Bhandari judgment of 28 February 2025 has given fugitives a fresh precedent to invoke; press reports in 2025 described a Crown Prosecution Service team inspecting Tihar Jail to assess those conditions. India enacted the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018 to allow confiscation of assets of fugitives who flee India to avoid prosecution.

Space Law

Major Space Law Treaties

Key Principles of the Outer Space Treaty (1967)

Artemis Accords

India's Space Law

India has no dedicated space activities statute. A draft Space Activities Bill was circulated for public consultation in 2017 and was later shelved: IN-SPACe's chairperson said in May 2025 that the 2017 text had been treated as obsolete and a fresh draft finalised, and the Parliamentary Standing Committee's report of March 2026 records the redrafted Bill as being in inter-ministerial consultation, with public consultation and Cabinet approval still to follow. No such Bill had been introduced in Parliament as on 22 September 2026. In the meantime, authorisation and licensing of private space activity is handled administratively by IN-SPACe under the Indian Space Policy 2023. ISRO's commercial arm, NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), handles commercial launches and technology transfer. India's anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2019 ("Mission Shakti") raised questions about space debris and the militarisation of space.

For Prelims: The Outer Space Treaty (1967) has 118 States parties, with 23 further states that have signed but not ratified (UNOOSA status document, as at 1 January 2026). India has signed but not ratified the Moon Agreement (1979). India signed the Artemis Accords on 21 June 2023 (73 signatories as on 21 September 2026; China and Russia have not signed). The treaty explicitly prohibits nuclear weapons in space but does not ban all military activities. India has no space activities Act — private activity is licensed by IN-SPACe under the Indian Space Policy 2023.

Antarctica Treaty System

Antarctic Treaty (1959)

India and Antarctica

Protocol on Environmental Protection (Madrid Protocol, 1991)

The Protocol designates Antarctica as a "natural reserve devoted to peace and science" and bans mining and mineral resource activities (except for scientific research). The mining ban is subject to review after 2048, which has raised concerns about future resource exploitation pressures.

For Prelims: India has two active research stations in Antarctica — Maitri (1989) and Bharati (2012). Dakshin Gangotri (1983) was decommissioned. India became a Consultative Party to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983. A new Maitri II station is planned for completion by 2029.

Refugee Law and India's Position

International Framework

India's Position

Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), 2019

For Mains: India's approach to refugees is characterised by pragmatism rather than a legal framework. The absence of a domestic refugee law gives the government flexibility but also leaves refugees vulnerable to arbitrary decisions. The National Human Rights Commission has recommended that India enact a comprehensive national refugee law.

Diplomatic Immunity — Vienna Conventions

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961)

Levels of Diplomatic Immunity

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963)

Inviolability Beyond the Vienna Conventions — UN Premises and Personnel

The same principle of inviolability protects the United Nations and its staff under the Charter and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and it has been tested repeatedly in the current window. In its advisory opinion of 22 October 2025 on Israel's obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ held that the inviolability of UN premises, property and assets continues to apply in armed conflict, and that Israel must facilitate relief schemes run by the UN and its entities, including UNRWA. India took the same line after an attack on French peacekeepers serving with UNIFIL on 18 April 2026, in which one peacekeeper was killed and three injured: recalling that it had piloted UN Security Council Resolution 2589 on accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, India urged an investigation and "reiterate[d] the importance of respecting the sanctity and inviolability of UN premises and personnel".

For Prelims: The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) are two separate treaties. Diplomatic immunity is broader (full personal immunity) while consular immunity is narrower (functional immunity only). Article 36 of the Consular Convention — the right of consular access — was central to the ICJ's Jadhav case judgment.

Key Terms for Quick Revision

Cross-paper relevance

• GS2 (primary) — UNCLOS; Vienna Convention on Treaties; ICJ; sovereign immunity; India's treaty obligations; EEZ disputes
• GS3 — Blue economy; deep seabed mining; maritime security and international law
• GS4 (Ethics) — Rule of law vs. power politics in international relations; justice and fairness in treaty interpretation
• Essay — "International law in an era of great-power competition"; "UNCLOS: the constitution of the oceans under stress"

What Changed in 2025–26

Advisory Opinions Became the Court's Main Instrument

The ICJ's unanimous climate opinion of 23 July 2025 mattered less for what it found than for what happened next. A formally non-binding opinion was converted into political and legal pressure by the very organ that had requested it, through the General Assembly resolution of 20 May 2026, which welcomed the opinion as an authoritative clarification of existing law and asked the Secretary-General to report on ways to advance compliance. Saudi Arabia and the United States argued in that debate that advisory opinions cannot create obligations, which is formally correct and practically beside the point. For India the reasoning was favourable, resting as it did on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities, the position India had argued at the hearings in December 2024.

The opinions that followed showed how many doors into the Court are now open. The Occupied Palestinian Territory opinion of 22 October 2025 arrived through the General Assembly; the right-to-strike opinion of 21 May 2026 arrived through the ILO Governing Body under the ILO's own constitution, the first such referral to reach the Court since it was created. Against them, the removal of Sudan v. United Arab Emirates from the General List on 5 May 2025 is the reminder that contentious jurisdiction still rests entirely on consent, and that a reservation to a compromissory clause defeats it outright.

UPSC angle: Three jurisdictional routes in a single window: a General Assembly request, a specialised-agency request under that agency's own constitution, and a compromissory clause defeated by a reservation. That contrast is the answer-worthy point, not the individual case facts, and the advisory-opinion-to-resolution sequence links international law (GS-II) to climate diplomacy (GS-III).

The Indus Waters Treaty Became India's Live Treaty-Law Problem

India's decision of 23 April 2025 to hold the Treaty in abeyance has grown into the most fully argued treaty-law dispute involving India in living memory, and the Court of Arbitration's award of 31 August 2026 rejected every ground India had advanced, in a forum India does not recognise. Two consequences follow. Doctrinally, the award is now the most detailed modern application of material breach, rebus sic stantibus, countermeasures and the continuity of treaties in armed conflict to a single dispute; an aspirant who can set the Court's reasoning against India's jurisdictional objection is better placed than one who picks a side. Practically, the interim measures tie construction at Ratle to the Neutral Expert's timetable rather than to the arbitration, so the two parallel tracks under Annexure G and Annexure F, a classic Prelims trap, now bear on each other. What to watch is the Neutral Expert's final decision, and whether India's conduct on the projects shifts while its statements do not.

The ICC Absorbed an Assault From a Permanent Member and Kept Working

The Palestine warrants of 2024 set off a campaign that has run through the whole window: an executive order in February 2025, designations widening from the Prosecutor to judges and Deputy Prosecutors through 2025, and reaching the Court's President in August 2026. A permanent member of the Security Council sanctioning the judges of a standing international criminal court is without precedent, and it hardens the case India has made since 1998 about political selectivity and inadequate safeguards. Yet the Court did not stop. Hungary's withdrawal notification of June 2025 was itself withdrawn in May 2026 after a change of government, Article 127 running in reverse, while the notifications filed by Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Venezuela and Chad between June and July 2026 point membership the other way once their one-year clocks expire. Judicially the Court confirmed charges against Rodrigo Duterte in April 2026 for a trial opening in November 2026, and issued its first warrants framed on gender persecution against the Taliban leadership in July 2025. Its gravest wound was self-inflicted: the Assembly of States Parties removed its own Prosecutor for serious misconduct in July 2026, and the office is being run by the Deputy Prosecutors pending an election.

UPSC angle: India's non-membership is a standing Prelims fact. For Mains the richer contrast is India's engagement with the ICJ set against its distance from the ICC, and the 2025–26 record supplies evidence for both sides of that argument: a court sanctioned by a permanent member, a State Party lost and regained, and a Prosecutor dismissed by the states that appointed him.

UNCLOS Is Being Tested From Outside the Convention

The strain on the law of the sea in this window came not from a rival interpretation but from states acting outside the Convention altogether. The United States moved in April 2025 to license high-seas mineral recovery under its own domestic statute rather than through the International Seabed Authority, and the Authority's reply, that the common-heritage prohibition binds even states that have not ratified UNCLOS, is the sharpest available statement of a treaty regime claiming to bind the world. India sits on the other side of that line as a full Part XI party holding an exploration contract, and presided over the Council negotiating the Mining Code through 2026, so the question is not academic for it.

Freedom of navigation, usually taught through the South China Sea, acquired a direct Indian stake the same year. The Gulf conflict that began in February 2026 produced a Security Council resolution in March that engaged Article 51 self-defence, international humanitarian law and UNCLOS transit passage in one text, and India's own response moved from a general call for restraint to summoning Iran's Ambassador in April 2026 after Indian-flagged ships were fired on in the Strait of Hormuz. The line worth carrying into an answer is that freedom of navigation is an Indian commercial interest in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf, not only a position on the South China Sea, and that India remains a full party to the Convention while deliberately keeping its Part XV options open.

Treaty-Based Governance Is Producing Texts It Cannot Bring Into Force

Read together, the treaty events of this window describe a system still capable of producing instruments but struggling to bring them into force or to hold its membership. One instrument entered into force, one opened for signature, one cannot open at all until a subsidiary annex is agreed, one negotiation collapsed in August 2025 and has not resumed substantive work since, and a permanent member completed its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in January 2026 and then directed its departments to begin leaving dozens of other bodies. India's practice moved the other way on trade, with the EFTA agreement entering into force in October 2025 carrying the first investment-linked commitment in any Indian trade agreement, while its absence from the Cybercrime Convention, alongside its distance from the Rome Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention, remains the clearest recent evidence of how selective that practice is.

UPSC angle: Group these rather than memorising them singly. Adoption, signature, ratification and entry into force are four separate events, and this window offers a live example stuck at each gate. That is the shape of a Mains answer on the strain in treaty-based governance.

Both Nuclear Regimes Stalled, and India Answered to a Treaty Body

India's standing preference for the NPT process over the TPNW now has to be defended against the state of that process: the eleventh Review Conference ended in May 2026 without a consensus outcome document, in the same year in which the TPNW holds its first Review Conference. The sharper question for an answer is no longer which regime India prefers, but whether either is producing outcomes.

India's ICERD review at Geneva in August 2026 illustrated a different mechanism working exactly as designed. India appeared, engaged, and then publicly rejected parts of the Committee's findings while remaining a party, which is the normal practice of most states. The distinction worth carrying into an answer is between a treaty body issuing concluding observations and a court delivering binding judgments between parties, and India's position combines full participation with selective acceptance.

Exam Strategy

For Mains Answer Writing: International law questions often appear in GS-II Paper 2 as part of "bilateral, regional and global groupings." When writing answers, always cite specific treaty provisions (e.g., "Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations" rather than just "Vienna Convention"). Use the Jadhav case, UNCLOS disputes, and ICC debates as contemporary examples. Structure answers around India's principled positions — sovereignty, non-interference, and multilateral frameworks through the UN.

For Prelims: Focus on numerical facts — maritime zone distances (12 nm territorial sea, 24 nm contiguous zone, 200 nm EEZ), ICC States Parties (125 as on 22 September 2026, with five withdrawals due to take effect in 2027), UNCLOS parties (172), ICJ Optional Clause declarations in force (75) and Antarctic Treaty parties (58), all as on 22 September 2026, number of Geneva Conventions (4 + 3 Additional Protocols), and India's ratification status for major treaties. The distinction between the two Vienna Conventions (1961 for diplomatic relations, 1963 for consular relations) is frequently tested.

Key Terms

Jus Cogens

• Definition: Jus cogens (Latin for "compelling law") refers to peremptory norms of general international law that are accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as norms from which no derogation is permitted, and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of the same character. Any treaty conflicting with a jus cogens norm is void.
• Context: The concept was codified in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), adopted on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980. It marks a shift in international law from a purely consent-based "law of coexistence" to a value-based "law of community" — recognising that certain norms protect interests so fundamental that no State or pair of States may contract out of them. The International Law Commission (ILC) adopted detailed Draft Conclusions on the identification and legal consequences of peremptory norms in 2022, providing the most authoritative modern treatment of the doctrine.
• UPSC Relevance: Jus cogens is a foundational GS2 International Relations concept that underpins UPSC questions on international law, the UN system, sources of international law, and human-rights enforcement. In Mains, it is useful for answers on the binding nature of international law, treaty law, and obligations erga omnes (e.g., genocide, aggression). In Prelims, candidates should distinguish it from related concepts such as erga omnes obligations and customary international law. No direct PYQ exists for this exact term, but it is a building-block concept for the broader international-law topic family.

Sources & Verification

Documents behind the facts and corrections on this page, verified on 22 September 2026.

International Court of Justice

• UN News — ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (23 Jul 2025)
• UN Meetings Coverage — General Assembly adopts resolution A/80/L.65 on the ICJ climate advisory opinion, 141-8-28 (20 May 2026)
• ICJ — Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion (22 Oct 2025)
• ICJ — Right to Strike under ILO Convention No. 87, case file and Advisory Opinion (21 May 2026)
• UN News — ICJ rules the right to strike is protected under ILO Convention No. 87 (21 May 2026)
• ICJ — Sudan v. United Arab Emirates, Order removing the case from the General List (5 May 2025)
• ICJ — The Gambia v. Myanmar, merits hearings (12-29 Jan 2026)
• ICJ — Current Members of the Court (as on 22 Sep 2026)
• ICJ — Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory: 75 States (as on 22 Sep 2026)

Indus Waters Treaty arbitration

• Permanent Court of Arbitration — Award on the Status of the Indus Waters Treaty and Order on Interim Measures, press release (31 Aug 2026)
• Permanent Court of Arbitration — Award on Issues of General Interpretation, press release (11 Aug 2025)
• MEA — Matters pertaining to the illegally-constituted so-called Court of Arbitration (27 Jun 2025)
• MEA — Response on the so-called award concerning maximum pondage (16 May 2026)
• MEA — India's statement rejecting the award of the so-called Court of Arbitration, Bishkek (31 Aug 2026)

Law of the sea

• UN Treaty Collection — UNCLOS status: 157 signatories, 172 parties, and India's declaration (as on 22 Sep 2026)
• UN Treaty Collection — BBNJ Agreement status: entry into force 17 Jan 2026, 145 signatories, 94 parties (as on 22 Sep 2026)
• UN DOALOS — India's partial submission to the CLCS and the amended submission of 3 April 2025
• Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways — circular revising India's coastline to 11,098.81 km (29 Apr 2025)
• PIB — Rajya Sabha reply on the re-assessed length of India's coastline (4 Dec 2025)
• PIB — Parliament passes the Merchant Shipping Bill, 2025 (11 Aug 2025)
• International Seabed Authority — Statement on the US Executive Order "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources" (30 Apr 2025)
• UN Security Council — resolution 2817 (2026), adopted at the 10119th meeting (11 Mar 2026)
• MEA — India's statement on the situation in West Asia (28 Feb 2026)
• MEA — EAM's suo motu statement in Parliament on West Asia (9 Mar 2026)
• MEA — India welcomes the ceasefire and the Strait of Hormuz (8 Apr 2026)
• MEA — India condemns the attack on UNIFIL peacekeepers (18 Apr 2026)

International Criminal Court and international criminal law

• Assembly of States Parties — 125 States Parties to the Rome Statute, with regional breakdown (as on 22 Sep 2026)
• ICC — Court welcomes Hungary's decision to remain a State Party (1 Jun 2026)
• UN News — States Parties dismiss ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan (24 Jul 2026)
• OHCHR — UN expert demands withdrawal of sanctions against ICC judges and prosecutors (Jan 2026)
• ICC — Pre-Trial Chamber I confirms all charges against Rodrigo Roa Duterte (23 Apr 2026)
• ICC — Arrest warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani (8 Jul 2025)
• UN Office of Legal Affairs — Diplomatic Conference on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity

Treaty-making, withdrawals and the nuclear regimes

• UN Treaty Collection — UN Convention against Cybercrime status: 84 signatories, 3 parties, India not a participant (as on 22 Sep 2026)
• WHO — Member States agree to extend negotiations on the PABS annex to the Pandemic Agreement (1 May 2026)
• UNEP — Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on plastic pollution: INC-5.2 and INC-5.3 (2025-2026)
• UN Depositary Notification C.N.71.2025.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d — US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, effective 27 Jan 2026
• UN News — US presidential memorandum on withdrawal from 31 UN entities and treaties (8 Jan 2026)
• United Nations — Eleventh NPT Review Conference, 27 Apr to 22 May 2026
• UNODA — Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: third Meeting of States Parties and first Review Conference
• EFTA — India-EFTA Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement enters into force (1 Oct 2025)

Extradition

• US Department of Justice — United States extradites Tahawwur Rana to India (10 Apr 2025)
• Sanjay Bhandari v Government of India, EWHC 449 (Admin), judgment (28 Feb 2025)
• All India Radio News — UK High Court rejects Nirav Modi's plea to reopen the extradition case (26 Mar 2026)
• All India Radio News — Belgian court clears Mehul Choksi's extradition to India (22 Oct 2025, reporting the Antwerp Chamber of Indictment's decision of 17 Oct 2025)
• MEA — India-Belgium Joint Statement, including the CBI-Federal Police MoU (3 Sep 2026)

Space law and Antarctica

• NASA — Albania becomes the 73rd Artemis Accords signatory (21 Sep 2026)
• UNOOSA — Status of International Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2026, A/AC.105/C.2/2026/CRP.9/Rev.1, 17 Apr 2026: Outer Space Treaty 118 ratifications/accessions, 23 signature-only
• Department of Space — Draft Space Activities Bill, 2017, circulated for public consultation (text hosted by PRS Legislative Research)
• Antarctic Treaty Secretariat — Parties to the Antarctic Treaty: 58 (as on 22 Sep 2026)
• ATCM 47 — Final Report, Milan, 23 Jun to 3 Jul 2025

Human rights treaty bodies

• MEA — Response to media queries on the CERD Committee's concluding observations (26 Aug 2026)