India's Multilateral Strategy
India participates in all major multilateral forums while maintaining strategic autonomy — engaging simultaneously with Western-aligned (Quad, G7 outreach), non-Western (BRICS, SCO), and universal (UN, G20) institutions.
| Principle | Application |
|---|---|
| Multi-alignment | India is in both BRICS and Quad; attends G7 as partner and SCO as member |
| Strategic autonomy | Refuses to align exclusively with any bloc; maintains independent positions on Russia-Ukraine, China |
| Global South leadership | Used the G20 presidency (2023) and the BRICS chairship (2026, XVIII Summit held in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026) to champion developing-world interests |
| Institution-building | Hosts or leads a growing set of bodies: ISA (Gurugram) and CDRI (New Delhi), the International Big Cat Alliance, the Global Biofuels Alliance secretariat (New Delhi), and the IORA (2025–2027) and IONS (2026–2028) chairs |
United Nations
India and the UN
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Founding member | India was a founding member of the UN (1945), even before independence |
| UNGA contributions | India initiated the resolution on decolonisation; championed disarmament and NIEO |
| UNSC | Non-permanent member 8 times (most recent: 2021-22); permanent seat aspirant |
| Peacekeeping | One of the largest contributors — over 2,75,000 troops deployed in 50+ missions since 1950; 179 Indian peacekeepers killed in service |
| UN Budget | Contributes ~0.37% of regular budget (2025); significantly below its economic and population weight |
UN Security Council Reform
| India's Position | Detail |
|---|---|
| Demand | Permanent membership with veto power in an expanded UNSC |
| Grouping | G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) — joint campaign for reform |
| Support | USA, UK, France support India's candidacy (with conditions); Russia conditionally supportive |
| Opposition | Uniting for Consensus (Coffee Club) — Pakistan, Italy, South Korea, Argentina oppose expansion of permanent seats |
| Key obstacle | China has not explicitly supported India; any expansion requires 2/3 UNGA majority + ratification by all P5 |
For Mains: India's UNSC permanent seat claim rests on: (1) world's most populous country, (2) largest democracy, (3) top-5 economy, (4) top troop contributor to peacekeeping, (5) nuclear power, (6) UNSC reflects 1945 power structure, not 2026 reality. Counter-arguments: India has no veto experience, expanding P5 creates new rigidities, and regional representation is contested (why India and not Indonesia?).
BRICS
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Original | Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (2010 — SA joined; acronym changed from BRIC) |
| Expansion (2024) | Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE formally joined (January 2024) |
| Saudi Arabia | Participated in the 17th BRICS Summit (Rio, July 2025) and is listed on the official BRICS website. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration of 12 September 2026 nowhere enumerates the membership and does not name Saudi Arabia, but it does not name Egypt either, an uncontested full member since January 2024, so nothing can be read into that silence. Treat Saudi Arabia as 10+1 (status unresolved) in answers. |
| Expansion (2025) | Indonesia joined as full member (January 2025); 10 confirmed partner countries (Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam; Algeria declined) |
| Current full members | 10 confirmed (original 5 + Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE, Indonesia); Saudi Arabia's status remains unresolved as of 22 September 2026 |
| Share of global GDP | ~37% (PPP); ~30% (nominal) — in PPP terms the bloc's combined GDP now exceeds the G7's |
| Share of global population | ~48% (~3.9 billion) |
| India's chairship | 2026, theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability". India hosted the XVIII BRICS Summit in New Delhi, 12–13 September 2026, which adopted the BRICS New Delhi Declaration and the Outreach/BRICS Plus Dialogue segment |
| Next chair | China (2027), which will host the XIX BRICS Summit (BRICS New Delhi Declaration, 12 September 2026) |
Key BRICS Institutions
| Institution | Purpose | India's Role |
|---|---|---|
| New Development Bank (NDB) | Development finance alternative to World Bank | Founding member; HQ: Shanghai; India is second-largest borrower |
| Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) | $100 billion currency swap facility (alternative to IMF) | India committed $18 billion |
| BRICS Business Council | Private sector engagement | Active participation |
BRICS Summits — Kazan 2024 and New Delhi 2026
| Summit | Detail |
|---|---|
| 16th — Kazan, Russia, 22–24 October 2024 | Theme "Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security"; adopted the Kazan Declaration; agreed to work on a BRICS Payment System and a BRICS grain exchange; reaffirmed de-dollarisation as a long-term goal. On the margins PM Modi and President Xi held a bilateral summit, their first in five years, directly followed by the India-China LAC patrolling agreement of 21 October 2024 |
| XVIII — New Delhi, 12–13 September 2026 | India's chairship summit, with the Outreach/BRICS Plus Dialogue segment; adopted the BRICS New Delhi Declaration, which commends India's chairship and extends support to China for the 2027 chairship and the XIX Summit. The detail of the declaration belongs to the dedicated BRICS chapter |
For Mains: BRICS is increasingly seen as a counter-balance to Western-dominated institutions (IMF, World Bank, G7). India's challenge: it shares BRICS's demand for reformed global governance BUT has serious bilateral tensions with China (LAC standoff, trade deficit) and a growing strategic partnership with the USA (Quad). India must navigate BRICS without being pulled into a China-Russia axis. This balancing act is a premium Mains topic.
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Founded | 2001 (evolved from Shanghai Five, 1996) |
| Members | China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Belarus (10 members; Belarus became the 10th full member on 4 July 2024 at the Astana Summit) |
| HQ | Beijing |
| India joined | 2017 (along with Pakistan) |
| Focus | Counter-terrorism (RATS — Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure), connectivity, economic cooperation |
India's Interests and Challenges in SCO
| Interest | Challenge |
|---|---|
| Counter-terrorism cooperation | Pakistan's membership creates friction on defining "terrorism" |
| Central Asian energy access | China's BRI dominates Central Asian connectivity |
| Afghanistan stability | Divergent approaches (India opposes Taliban recognition; China, Russia engage) |
| Balancing China-Russia axis | SCO is increasingly China-dominated; India's voice is diluted |
SCO Structure
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Observer states | Afghanistan, Mongolia |
| Dialogue partners (14) | Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey, Sri Lanka, UAE, Kuwait, Maldives, Bahrain, Myanmar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar |
| Key institution | RATS (Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure) — HQ: Tashkent |
India hosted the SCO summit in 2023 (virtual) and has used SCO platforms to push counter-terrorism norms and connectivity projects. However, India has refused to endorse China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) within SCO, as BRI's China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
At the 24th SCO Summit (Astana, 3–4 July 2024) India was represented by EAM S. Jaishankar rather than the Prime Minister. India adopted the Astana Declaration, alongside 25 strategic agreements, and used the platform to press counter-terrorism through the RATS mechanism, INSTC and Chabahar connectivity, and AI governance cooperation. Jaishankar's bilateral with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the summit margins was an important precursor to the October 2024 LAC agreement. The dedicated SCO chapter carries the summit record in full.
Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | India, USA, Japan, Australia |
| Origins | 2004 (tsunami relief coordination); revived 2017; elevated to leaders' level 2021 |
| Focus | Free and open Indo-Pacific; maritime security; technology; vaccines; climate; infrastructure |
| Not a military alliance | India insists Quad is NOT an Asian NATO; no mutual defence treaty |
Quad Working Groups
| Area | Initiatives |
|---|---|
| Vaccines | Quad Vaccine Partnership — India manufactured, Japan financed, USA/Australia distributed (1 billion doses target for Indo-Pacific) |
| Critical technologies | Semiconductor supply chains; 5G/6G; AI standards |
| Maritime security | Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) — satellite-based vessel tracking |
| Climate | Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package |
| Infrastructure | Quad Infrastructure Fellowship; counter to BRI |
| Cybersecurity | Quad Cybersecurity Partnership |
Quad Summits
| Summit | Year | Key Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Leaders' (virtual) | March 2021 | Quad Vaccine Partnership launched |
| Wilmington (6th) | September 2024 | Quad Cancer Moonshot; MAITRI (Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific); Semiconductor Supply Chains Contingency Network MoU |
| India (7th) | 2025 (not held) | India's hosted summit did not occur — India likely to pass chairmanship to Australia (Source: The Print, May 2026) |
| Quad FM Meeting (New Delhi) | 26 May 2026 | Jaishankar, Rubio, Motegi, Wong; maritime security, critical minerals, energy cooperation; Quad Leaders' Summit in 2026 being worked toward (date unconfirmed) |
For Mains: The Quad's strategic value for India is as a China-balancing mechanism without formal military commitment. India benefits from technology access, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic weight. The risk: being perceived as joining a US-led anti-China bloc could compromise India's strategic autonomy, complicate relations with Russia, and provoke Chinese hostility. The key is India's insistence that Quad is "for something (free Indo-Pacific), not against someone (China)."
G20
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | 19 countries + EU + African Union (added 2023) |
| Share of global GDP | ~85% |
| Share of global trade | ~75% |
| India's presidency | December 2022 — November 2023 |
India's G20 Presidency (2023) — Key Outcomes
| Achievement | Detail |
|---|---|
| African Union membership | India championed AU's permanent membership in G20 — made it the 21st member |
| New Delhi Leaders' Declaration | Consensus achieved despite Russia-Ukraine divisions (a diplomatic triumph) |
| Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) | India's IndiaStack model endorsed as global template for digital governance |
| Climate finance | Commitment to tripling renewable energy globally by 2030 |
| Multilateral Development Bank reform | Agreement to reform MDBs for climate and development finance |
| Global Biofuels Alliance | Launched with India as co-lead |
| IMEC | India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor — MoU signed by India, Saudi Arabia, UAE, EU, France, Germany, Italy, and USA |
| IMEC route | Eastern corridor (India to Gulf) + Northern corridor (Gulf to Europe via Israel and Greece); rail, shipping, energy, and data cables; seen as counter to China's BRI |
| Theme | "One Earth, One Family, One Future" (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam) |
For Mains: India's G20 presidency is considered a significant diplomatic success — achieving consensus on a leaders' declaration (which many expected to fail due to Russia-Ukraine language disputes), elevating the AU, mainstreaming DPI, and projecting India as a bridge between Global North and South. For a critical perspective, note that climate finance commitments remained inadequate and no binding outcomes on trade or debt.
G20 Summits Since India's Presidency
Rio de Janeiro, 18–19 November 2024. The 19th G20 Summit launched the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty (148 endorsers — 82 countries, the AU, the EU and 9 international financial institutions), adopted the Rio de Janeiro Declaration with its language on progressive taxation of ultra-high-net-worth individuals, and recognised the potential of the bioeconomy. PM Modi attended and reinforced India's Global South positioning, building on the New Delhi legacy.
Johannesburg, 22–23 November 2025 — the first G20 summit on African soil. South Africa held the presidency from 1 December 2024 to November 2025 under the theme "Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability."
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Summit | 20th G20 Summit |
| Venue | Johannesburg Expo Centre, Johannesburg |
| Dates | 22–23 November 2025 |
| Theme | Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability |
| Chair | South Africa (first African country to chair G20) |
| Next G20 (2026) | USA |
Key outcomes:
- 122-point Johannesburg Declaration — focused on global equity, multilateral reform, and sustainable development.
- Partnership for African Infrastructure launched — a multi-billion dollar initiative for transport, energy, and digital connectivity across Africa.
- Africa Energy Efficiency Facility (AfEEF) — target: improve Africa's energy productivity by 12% by 2030, mobilise $3 billion by 2030.
- Commitments on anti-money laundering, illicit financial flows, an AI initiative for Africa, and a critical minerals framework.
- The USA did not participate; Xi Jinping and Putin sent delegations but did not attend in person.
- India attended; PM Modi reinforced Global South positioning and supported the African Infrastructure Partnership.
Other Key Forums
SAARC
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | 8 (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan) |
| Founded | 1985 |
| Status | Effectively defunct since 2014 (last summit in Kathmandu); India-Pakistan tensions have paralysed it |
| Alternative | India promotes BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative) as a more functional regional grouping (excludes Pakistan) |
BIMSTEC
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | 7 (India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan) |
| Legal basis | BIMSTEC Charter, in force 20 May 2024 — BIMSTEC is now a treaty-based organisation rather than a loose initiative |
| Secretariat | Dhaka. Secretary General Indra Mani Pandey of India, the fourth holder of the post, for 2024–2026 (with effect from 4 January 2024) |
| Last summit | 6th Summit, Bangkok, 4 April 2025, theme "Prosperous, Resilient and Open BIMSTEC"; the first in-person summit since Kathmandu (2018) |
| Current chair | Bangladesh, which took over from Thailand at the 6th Summit |
| Vision document | BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030, adopted at the 6th Summit and annexed to the Declaration, along with Rules of Procedure for BIMSTEC Mechanisms |
| Key agreement | Agreement on Maritime Transport Cooperation, signed at the 6th Summit |
| Bodies located in India (5) | BIMSTEC Centre for Weather and Climate (Noida); BIMSTEC Energy Centre (Bengaluru); Centres of Excellence in Disaster Management, in Agriculture and in Maritime Transport (6th Summit Declaration, paras 26–28) |
| Bodies located in Thailand | Centres of Excellence on Tropical Medicine and in Public Audit |
| External relations | The 6th Summit welcomed memoranda of understanding with the Indian Ocean Rim Association and with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and noted the Secretariat's move to seek observer status at the United Nations and the UNFCCC — BIMSTEC is acquiring external legal personality |
| Trade agreement | The Trade Negotiating Committee was again directed at the 6th Summit to finalise the constituent agreements of the long-delayed BIMSTEC FTA |
| Focus | Trade, connectivity, counter-terrorism, disaster management, energy; Blue Economy, Mountain Economy and Poverty Alleviation added as sub-sectors in 2025 |
| India's interest | Bay of Bengal connectivity; links South Asia to Southeast Asia; bypasses Pakistan |
ASEAN and East Asia Summit
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| ASEAN members | 11 Southeast Asian nations (Timor-Leste admitted 26 October 2025) |
| India's status | Dialogue partner (1992); Summit-level partner (2002); Strategic partner (2012) |
| Act East Policy | Upgraded from Look East (1991) to Act East (2014) — deeper economic and strategic engagement with ASEAN |
| Last ASEAN-India Summit | 22nd ASEAN-India Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 26 October 2025; PM Modi attended virtually (MEA briefing, 5 February 2026) |
| East Asia Summit | 19 participating countries after Timor-Leste's ASEAN accession: the 11 ASEAN member states plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the USA; the premier leaders-level forum for Indo-Pacific strategic dialogue |
I2U2
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | India, Israel, UAE, USA |
| Launched | 2022 |
| Focus | Food security, water, energy, health, space, technology |
| Key projects | UAE to invest $2 billion in integrated food parks in India; hybrid renewable energy project in Gujarat (wind + solar + battery storage) |
| Significance | West Asia mini-lateral linking strategic partners; India leverages Abraham Accords normalisation |
IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Launched | May 2022 by the USA |
| Members | 14 (USA, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, New Zealand, Fiji, Brunei) |
| Pillars | (I) Trade — India opted out; (II) Supply chains — the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement has been in force since 24 February 2024 and India is Vice-Chair of its Supply Chain Council (GTRI analysis reported by Economic Times, 5 May 2026; not stated on a current official IPEF page); (III) Clean economy; (IV) Fair economy |
| Significance | US-led economic framework for Indo-Pacific; not a traditional FTA — focuses on standards, supply chain resilience, and decarbonisation |
| India's position | Joined Pillars II, III, IV; stayed out of Pillar I (trade) to protect policy space on labour, environment, and digital data |
| Context | India exited RCEP (2019) but joined IPEF selectively — reflects preference for plurilateral frameworks with flexibility over binding mega-FTAs |
Voice of Global South Summit
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Convenor | India, which launched the summit as a platform to carry developing-country priorities into the G20 and other forums |
| Editions | Three, all virtual: 12–13 January 2023, 17 November 2023 and 17 August 2024 (MEA's Voice of Global South Summit page) |
| Status | No fourth edition has been held as of 22 September 2026 |
AI Impact Summit 2026 (New Delhi)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Summit | Hosted by India in New Delhi on 18–19 February 2026, the successor to the Bletchley, Seoul and Paris meetings |
| Outcome | The New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact, endorsed by 92 countries and international organisations and guided by the principle Sarvajan Hitaya, Sarvajan Sukhaya. Secondary reports quoting 86, 88, 89 or 91 endorsers are unreliable; PIB says 92 |
| Seven "Chakras" | Democratising AI resources; economic growth and social good; secure and trusted AI; AI for science; access for social empowerment; human capital development; resilient, efficient and innovative AI systems |
| Deliverables announced | A Charter for the Democratic Diffusion of AI; a Global AI Impact Commons; a Trusted AI Commons; an International Network of AI for Science Institutions; an AI for Social Empowerment Platform; an AI Workforce Development Playbook; Guiding Principles on Resilient and Efficient AI |
| India's framing | New Delhi organised the agenda around access, diffusion and development outcomes rather than risk alone |
Indian Ocean Forums — MAHASAGAR, IORA, IONS, CSC
At Port Louis on 12 March 2025, PM Modi announced that India's vision for the Global South would go "beyond SAGAR" to MAHASAGAR — Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions — built on trade for development, capacity building for sustainable growth and mutual security, delivered through technology sharing, concessional loans and grants. MAHASAGAR builds on the 2015 SAGAR vision (also launched in Mauritius) rather than replacing it, and in the same statement Modi named the Colombo Security Conclave, the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Conference as the forums through which India would extend that cooperation. As of 22 September 2026 India chairs both IORA (2025–2027) and IONS (2026–2028), and holds the Colombo Security Conclave's first Secretary General post.
IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | 23 Member States and 12 Dialogue Partners (IORA's own figure, as of 22 September 2026); France (2020) is the most recent accession |
| Secretariat | Ebene, Mauritius; Secretary General Sanjiv Ranjan of India, appointed 30 December 2024 |
| India's role | Chair for 2025–2027, theme "Innovation, Openness, Resilience & Adaptability in the Indian Ocean Region" (MEA, Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2941, answered 13 August 2026). The chairship is a voluntary two-year position |
| Last Council of Ministers | 24th COM, held virtually on 21 May 2025 under Sri Lanka's chairship, theme "Sustainable Indian Ocean for future Generation"; it adopted the Colombo Communiqué. India was represented by Secretary (East) P. Kumaran |
| Next COM | The 25th COM, to be hosted by India, had not been held as of 22 September 2026; MEA told Parliament in August 2026 that it was expected "later this year" |
| Activity under India's chair | IORA's flagship Track 1.5 Indian Ocean Dialogue, New Delhi, 7–8 May 2026; an in-person Committee of Senior Officials meeting in June 2026, the first in three years |
Two official figures diverge here: MEA's release of 21 May 2025 refers to "all 22 IORA Member States", while IORA's own homepage and member-states listing give 23, which is the figure to carry into an answer. On the chairship, no official document gives a handover date; MEA records only the two-year term, 2025–2027, and the 24th Council of Ministers recorded that India "will assume" the chair.
IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Origin | Founded in 2008 in New Delhi on the Indian Navy's initiative; a biennial forum of navies and maritime security agencies of Indian Ocean littoral states |
| India's role | Chair for 2026–2028, assumed from the Royal Thai Navy on 20 February 2026 at the 9th Conclave of Chiefs in Visakhapatnam — India's return to the helm after 16 years, having held the inaugural 2008–2010 chairmanship |
| 9th Conclave of Chiefs | Visakhapatnam, 20 February 2026; chiefs of navies and heads of maritime security agencies from 33 countries representing IONS members, observers and other littoral states |
Colombo Security Conclave (CSC)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Bangladesh (fifth member since 10 July 2024) and Seychelles, which moved from Observer to full member at the 7th NSA-level meeting on 20 November 2025 — MEA's release records the decision to accede rather than a completed accession (see note below) |
| Institutional basis | Founding Documents signed in Sri Lanka in August 2024; the first Secretary General is appointed by India |
| Five pillars | Maritime safety and security; countering terrorism and radicalisation; combating trafficking and transnational organised crime; cyber security and protection of critical infrastructure and technology; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief |
| Last NSA-level meeting | 7th, New Delhi, 20 November 2025, hosted by NSA Ajit Doval; Malaysia attended as a Guest for the first time. The previous NSA-level meeting was in Mauritius, 7–8 December 2023 |
On Seychelles the two official accounts differ and both are worth knowing. MEA's release of 20 November 2025 records that Seychelles participated as an Observer State and that CSC members "welcomed the decision of Republic of Seychelles to accede to the CSC as a full member", which is a decision rather than a completed accession; the Maldives President's Office release of the same day describes Seychelles as having been inducted as an official member.
IBSA, NAM, Commonwealth and the G77
IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Founded | 2003, by the Brasília Declaration; a trilateral of Global South democracies across three continents |
| Last ministerial | 13th IBSA Trilateral Ministerial Commission, New York, 26 September 2025, on the margins of UNGA80, hosted by Brazil; attended by EAM S. Jaishankar, Brazil's Mauro Vieira and South Africa's Sindisiwe Chikunga |
| Key demand | Comprehensive UN reform, including a review conference under Article 109 of the UN Charter |
| IBSA Fund | The IBSA Fund for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation has supported 51 projects in 40 countries (13th Ministerial, 26 September 2025) |
| Leaders' level | IBSA Leaders' Meeting, Johannesburg, 23 November 2025, on the margins of the G20 summit, hosted by President Ramaphosa with President Lula and PM Modi |
| India's proposals (Nov 2025) | An IBSA Digital Innovation Alliance to share digital public infrastructure (UPI, CoWIN-type health platforms, cybersecurity frameworks, women-led tech initiatives) and an IBSA Fund for Climate Resilient Agriculture |
NAM (Non-Aligned Movement)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Current chair | Uganda, since the 19th NAM Summit (Kampala, January 2024); its chairmanship runs to 2027 |
| Last ministerial | 19th Mid-Term Ministerial Review Meeting, Speke Resort Munyonyo, Kampala, 15–16 October 2025, theme "Deepening Cooperation for Shared Global Affluence", opened by President Museveni |
| India's representation | MoS for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh led the delegation (Uganda visit, 15–17 October 2025); Secretary (West) Sibi George led India at the Senior Officials' Meeting on 13–14 October 2025 |
India's level of representation at NAM meetings is itself a standard answer point: New Delhi stays engaged at ministerial and official level while investing its leaders' time in the groupings it chairs or hosts.
Commonwealth
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | 56 independent member countries |
| Secretary-General | Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey of Ghana, formerly Ghana's Foreign Minister, in office since 1 April 2025; the first woman from Africa to hold the post |
| Last CHOGM | Apia, Samoa, 21–26 October 2024 |
| Next CHOGM | Scheduled for 1–4 November 2026 in St John's, Antigua and Barbuda; not yet held as of 22 September 2026 |
| Recent work | Commonwealth Strategic Plan 2025–2030; the first Commonwealth Business Summit (Namibia, June 2025) |
G77
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Members | 134 countries (G77's own figure, accessed 22 September 2026); the original name was retained for its historic significance |
| Chair | Uruguay for 2026, which took over from Iraq at a handover ceremony at UN Headquarters, New York, on 14 January 2026 |
| India | A founding member (1964, Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries, issued at the first session of UNCTAD) |
| How it works | Negotiates as the "G77 and China" bloc, the standard developing-country formation in climate and development talks |
India-Anchored Global Initiatives
Alongside the forums it joins, India now hosts or co-leads a set of institutions it helped create. This is the strongest evidence for the "India as institution-builder" framing in Mains answers.
International Solar Alliance (ISA)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Headquarters | Gurugram, India |
| Membership | 113 Member Countries and 14 Signatory Countries (ISA, as of 22 September 2026) |
| Leadership | India President and France Co-President for 2024–2026, elected at the 7th Session of the Assembly (New Delhi, 4 November 2024). India's Presidency is exercised by the Union Minister of New and Renewable Energy |
| Last Assembly | 8th Session, Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, 27–30 October 2025, with participation from over 120 member and signatory countries; President Droupadi Murmu delivered the keynote at the opening plenary. No presidential election was held at this session |
| Launched at the 8th Assembly | SUNRISE (Solar Upcycling Network for Recycling, Innovation and Stakeholder Engagement); a dedicated OSOWOG (One Sun One World One Grid) programme for regional solar interconnections; an AI-driven ISA Academy e-learning platform; a Global Capability Centre in India; the reports Ease of Doing Solar 2025 and Global Solar Trends and Outlook 2025 |
Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Launched | UN Climate Action Summit, September 2019; headquarters in New Delhi |
| Membership | 72 Members (CDRI website, 22 September 2026). CDRI's headline figure combines member countries and member organisations and does not split the two; the Philippines' membership was announced on 15 September 2026 |
| Delivery | 183 projects and USD 21.84 million disbursed (CDRI, 22 September 2026) |
| ICDRI 2025 | The annual International Conference on Disaster Resilient Infrastructure was held in Nice, France on 6–7 June 2025, days before the UN Ocean Conference (UNOC3, 9–13 June 2025) in the same city; 220 delegates from 52 countries. Its outcome was a Call to Action with ten concrete steps, including the SIDS Global Data Hub 2.0 and modular design codes for island contexts |
International Big Cat Alliance (IBCA)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Status | A full treaty-based intergovernmental organisation and international legal entity from 23 January 2025, when the Framework Agreement entered into force; headquarters in India, with MEA as depositary |
| Founding ratifiers | Nicaragua, Eswatini, India, Somalia and Liberia deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval under Article VIII(1) |
| Participation | 27 countries including India had consented to join (PIB, 3 February 2025) |
| Coverage | Seven big cats: tiger, lion, leopard, snow leopard, cheetah, jaguar and puma |
| Origin | Launched by PM Modi on 9 April 2023 at the 50 Years of Project Tiger event; the Union Cabinet approved its establishment with headquarters in India on 29 February 2024 |
Global Biofuels Alliance (GBA)
| Feature | Detail |
|---|---|
| Launched | G20 New Delhi Summit, 9 September 2023, with India as a co-founder |
| Membership | 34 member countries and 14 international organisations (Global Biofuels Alliance website, accessed 22 September 2026). Older secondary compilations still quote the launch-era "24 countries and 12 organisations" |
| Secretariat | New Delhi, under a Host Country Agreement signed in October 2024 |
India's Multi-Alignment Strategy
| Forum | India's Key Interest | Tension Point |
|---|---|---|
| BRICS | Global South voice; alternative institutions | China dominance; Russia-Ukraine positioning |
| SCO | Central Asia access; counter-terrorism | Pakistan membership; BRI endorsement pressure |
| Quad | Indo-Pacific security; technology access | Perception as anti-China bloc; Russia relations |
| G20 | Economic governance reform; bridge role | Limited enforcement; consensus challenges |
| UN | Permanent seat; multilateral legitimacy | Reform blocked by P5 interests |
For Mains: India's foreign policy is often described as "multi-alignment" rather than non-alignment. Unlike Cold War non-alignment (staying out of blocs), multi-alignment means actively engaging with all blocs simultaneously. This requires diplomatic agility — attending Quad one week and BRICS the next, buying Russian oil while deepening defence ties with the USA, opposing China on the border while cooperating in BRICS. The risk is strategic overstretch; the reward is maximum flexibility.
UPSC Relevance
Prelims Focus Areas
- BRICS — 10 confirmed full members (original 5 + Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE, Indonesia); Saudi Arabia's status unresolved as of 22 September 2026; 10 confirmed partner countries; NDB (HQ Shanghai); CRA (USD 100 billion); XVIII Summit New Delhi 12–13 September 2026; China chairs in 2027
- SCO — 10 members, HQ (Beijing), RATS (Tashkent), India joined 2017, observer states
- Quad — members, working groups, NOT a military alliance, Wilmington summit 2024
- G20 — members (19 + EU + AU), India's presidency outcomes, IMEC corridor
- UNSC — P5 members, India's claim, G4, Coffee Club
- SAARC vs BIMSTEC — members, why SAARC is dormant; BIMSTEC Charter in force 20 May 2024, 6th Summit Bangkok 4 April 2025, Bangkok Vision 2030, chair Bangladesh, Secretary General Indra Mani Pandey, Secretariat Dhaka, five BIMSTEC bodies in India
- ASEAN and East Asia Summit — ASEAN 11 members (Timor-Leste, 26 October 2025); EAS 19 participating countries; 22nd ASEAN-India Summit Kuala Lumpur, 26 October 2025
- I2U2 — members and focus areas
- IPEF — 14 members, 4 pillars, India opted out of trade pillar; Supply Chain Agreement in force 24 February 2024 and India Vice-Chair of the Supply Chain Council (per GTRI analysis, May 2026)
- Indian Ocean cluster — MAHASAGAR (12 March 2025); IORA (23 members, 12 dialogue partners, India chair 2025–2027, secretariat Ebene, Secretary General Sanjiv Ranjan); IONS (founded 2008, India chair 2026–2028); Colombo Security Conclave (five pillars, Founding Documents August 2024)
- IBSA — founded 2003, IBSA Fund (51 projects in 40 countries), Johannesburg Leaders' Meeting 23 November 2025, Article 109 review conference
- NAM (chair Uganda 2024–2027, mid-term ministerial Kampala October 2025); Commonwealth (56 members, SG Botchwey from 1 April 2025, CHOGM 2026 Antigua and Barbuda); G77 (134 members, chair Uruguay 2026)
- India-anchored bodies — ISA (HQ Gurugram, 113 members + 14 signatories, 8th Assembly New Delhi October 2025); CDRI (HQ New Delhi, launched 2019, 72 members); IBCA (treaty in force 23 January 2025, HQ India, seven big cats); Global Biofuels Alliance (34 countries + 14 organisations, secretariat New Delhi)
- AI Impact Summit 2026 — New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact, 92 endorsers, seven Chakras
Mains Focus Areas
- India's multi-alignment strategy — benefits and risks
- UNSC reform — India's case and obstacles
- BRICS expansion — what it means for global governance; Saudi Arabia's hedging as a case study
- Quad and Indo-Pacific security architecture; evolution from tsunami relief to strategic grouping
- India's G20 presidency — achievements (AU inclusion, NDLD consensus, DPI, IMEC) and limitations
- SCO — navigating China-Russia dominance while pursuing Central Asian connectivity
- SAARC's decline and alternatives (BIMSTEC)
- India as bridge between Global North and South; the Voice of Global South Summit has not met since August 2024, and the pitch has moved to platforms India chairs or hosts
- IPEF vs RCEP — India's trade framework choices in the Indo-Pacific
- BIMSTEC's institutionalisation (Charter, Vision 2030, MoUs with IORA and UNODC) as India's working substitute for SAARC
- India's Indian Ocean leadership — chairing IORA and IONS simultaneously, and whether MAHASAGAR delivers more than SAGAR did
- India as institution-builder — ISA, CDRI, IBCA and the Global Biofuels Alliance as instruments of norm-setting rather than membership-seeking
Cross-paper relevance
- GS2 (primary) — G20, G7, BRICS, SCO, NAM, Commonwealth; India's role in each; Kazan Summit 2024; BRICS expansion; India as Voice of Global South
- GS3 — Economic agenda of G20 (digital economy, climate finance, debt relief); IMEC; Sustainable Development Goals
- GS4 (Ethics) — Multilateralism vs. bilateralism: what serves global justice better?; India's ethical responsibilities as emerging power
- Essay — "The G20 and the future of global governance"; "BRICS: challenge to Western hegemony or talking shop?"
What Changed in 2024–2026
Two years of summitry left India's multi-alignment intact and considerably busier. India attended the BRICS summit at Kazan in October 2024 without loosening its Western ties, and the Modi-Xi bilateral held there, followed within days by the LAC patrolling agreement, showed what the non-Western forums are actually worth to New Delhi: they supply the room in which a frozen bilateral can be restarted. The pattern had already repeated on the SCO's margins at Astana that July, where the Jaishankar-Wang Yi meeting preceded the same breakthrough. For Mains, the point is that India's multilateral memberships often earn their keep bilaterally rather than multilaterally.
The G20 moved on from India's presidency through two Global South hosts, Brazil at Rio in November 2024 and South Africa at Johannesburg in November 2025, before passing to the United States for 2026. Each declaration carried more of the development agenda India had pushed in 2023, and the Johannesburg meeting also exposed the format's fragility: the incoming host stayed away altogether, and two other major members sent delegations rather than leaders. What to watch is whether an American presidency keeps the African and Global South workstreams alive or quietly lets them lapse.
India's BRICS chairship is now a completed record rather than a forthcoming event. The New Delhi summit of September 2026 closed India's year and the chair passes to Beijing for 2027, a year in which India will be balancing BRICS commitments against its Quad and Indo-Pacific engagements, with the Quad summit India was to host still unheld.
The Global South pitch has changed address. The Voice of Global South Summit has not met since August 2024, while IBSA, long written off as moribund, met at ministerial level in New York in September 2025 and at leaders' level in Johannesburg that November, and India used the AI Impact Summit of February 2026 to set an agenda in its own terms rather than joining one set elsewhere. India now spends its leaders' time on platforms where it holds the chair or the host's pen and sends ministers where it does not, which is also the explanation for its level of representation at NAM's Kampala meetings in October 2025.
The most consequential shift is regional rather than global. BIMSTEC stopped being a loose initiative: the Charter came into force in May 2024, the Bangkok summit of April 2025 adopted a vision document and a maritime transport agreement, and the grouping began acquiring external legal personality through memoranda with other organisations and a bid for UN observer status. That, rather than any revival of SAARC, is the working answer to what replaces SAARC. In the Indian Ocean, PM Modi's MAHASAGAR framing at Port Louis in March 2025 was followed by India taking the IORA chair, the Indian Navy assuming the IONS chairmanship at Visakhapatnam in February 2026 after sixteen years away, and the Colombo Security Conclave acquiring founding documents, a Secretary General appointed by India and a widened membership. A chaired IORA, a chaired IONS and an institutionalised CSC give India the convening role it has long claimed; the test of the coming year is delivery, and the IORA Council of Ministers that India is to host had still not been held as of 22 September 2026.
Three bodies India helped create crossed thresholds in the same window: the International Big Cat Alliance became a treaty-based intergovernmental organisation in January 2025, the ISA Assembly met at Bharat Mandapam in October 2025, and the CDRI took its annual conference to Nice in June 2025 with a small-island agenda and a fresh Call to Action. Read together with the Commonwealth's change of Secretary-General in April 2025 and the CHOGM due at Antigua and Barbuda in November 2026, the trajectory is clear enough for an answer: India is investing less in seeking seats at old institutions and more in chairing, hosting or founding new ones — and the questions worth carrying into the exam hall are whether that convening power converts into outcomes, and what happens to the Global South agenda once the G20 gavel leaves the developing world.
Vocabulary
Bloc
- Pronunciation: /blɒk/ (RP), /blɑːk/ (GA)
- Definition: A group of countries or political parties that have formed an alliance to act together in pursuit of shared strategic, economic, or ideological interests.
- Root: French bloc = group/block, from Old Dutch via Frankish; entered English 1903 in political-alliance context
- Origin: Borrowed from French bloc ("group, block"), of Old Dutch origin via Frankish; first used in English in 1903 in the context of Continental European political alliances.
- Part of Speech: noun
- Word Family: bloc (n), blocs (n pl), bloc-level (adj compound), trading bloc (n compound)
- Usage: As the post-Cold-War order fragments into competing trade and security blocs, India's strategic autonomy lies in engaging each grouping on its own terms rather than being permanently absorbed into any single one.
- Synonyms: alliance, coalition, axis, grouping, federation, league
- Antonyms: faction, splinter, individual, isolate
- Mnemonic: A "bloc" is a solid block of nations or voters wedged together by common interest - just drop the "k" and you have a political "block".
- UPSC: A group of states acting together, and the types should be kept apart because they behave differently. A military bloc rests on a defence commitment, as NATO does. A trading bloc rests on preferential market access, as the European Union and ASEAN do. A negotiating bloc coordinates positions within a wider forum without any commitment outside it, which is what the G77 and the Like-Minded Developing Countries do in climate negotiations and the Africa Group does at the WTO. The third kind matters most for India, whose leverage in multilateral negotiation has rested on aggregating the bargaining power of developing countries rather than on any alliance. The analytical caution worth stating is that bloc politics presupposes stable and mutually exclusive alignments, which the present system does not exhibit, since states now belong simultaneously to groupings with divergent purposes, and that is what multi-alignment describes.
- Nuance: A bloc is a group acting together, and the kind matters, since a military bloc rests on defence commitments, a trading bloc on preferential access and a negotiating bloc only on coordinated positions within a forum. An alliance implies mutual defence and is therefore narrower than a bloc. A coalition is usually temporary and issue-specific. Non-alignment was the refusal to join a bloc, while multi-alignment is the contemporary practice of belonging to several groupings with different purposes at once.
- Hindi: गुट (gut); व्यापारिक गुट for a trading bloc and गुटनिरपेक्षता for non-alignment.
- FAQ: What kinds of bloc are there? || Military blocs resting on defence commitments, trading blocs resting on preferential market access, and negotiating blocs that merely coordinate positions within a wider forum.
- FAQ: Why is bloc politics a poor description of the current order? || Because it assumes stable and mutually exclusive alignments, whereas states now participate simultaneously in groupings with divergent purposes.
Summit
- Pronunciation: /ˈsʌmɪt/
- Definition: A high-level meeting of heads of state or government convened to discuss and negotiate issues of international significance.
- Root: Old French somete = top (diminutive of som); Latin summum = the highest; summus = topmost
- Origin: From Old French somete ("top"), diminutive of som ("highest part"), from Latin summum ("the highest"); its diplomatic sense of a leaders-level conference emerged in the mid-20th century.
- Part of Speech: noun; also verb (intransitive)
- Word Family: summit (n/v), summiteer (n), summitry (n), summits (n pl), summiting (v pres.p)
- Usage: The much-anticipated climate summit in Glasgow exposed the chasm between the developed world's pledges and the developing world's demand for equitable finance, reminding us that diplomacy at the summit is only as durable as the political will that underwrites it.
- Synonyms: apex, peak, pinnacle, zenith, acme, crest
- Antonyms: base, foot, nadir, bottom
- Mnemonic: Think of the "sum" in summit as the total, topmost SUMming-up point — the highest figure you reach when everything is added up, like standing at the very top of a mountain.
- UPSC: A meeting at the level of heads of state or government, and its function is best understood through what only leaders can do: break deadlocks that officials cannot resolve because the remaining questions are political rather than technical, and commit their states in a way subordinates cannot. That explains both the value and the risk. Summits impose deadlines that force bureaucracies to converge, and they attach the leader's personal authority to the outcome. But a visible summit failure does far more damage than a failed officials' meeting, which is why most outcome documents are negotiated in advance by sherpas and the leaders' meeting largely ratifies what has already been settled. Distinguish institutionalised summits with fixed membership and rotating chairs, such as the G20 and BRICS, from ad hoc summits convened for a single purpose. Summit diplomacy has expanded because leaders can now travel and communicate easily, so it is a modern development rather than a permanent feature of statecraft.
- Nuance: A summit is a meeting of heads of state or government, while a ministerial meeting sits one level below and a senior officials meeting below that, so the level signals how much authority the outcome carries. A sherpa is the leader's personal representative who negotiates the outcome document beforehand, which is why summit texts are usually settled before the leaders arrive. A bilateral on the margins is a separate meeting between two leaders during a larger gathering. Trilateral and plurilateral describe the number of parties rather than the level of representation.
- Hindi: शिखर सम्मेलन (shikhar sammelan); शेरपा retained as it stands.
- FAQ: Why are summit outcomes negotiated in advance? || Because a visible failure at leaders' level is costly, so sherpas settle the outcome document beforehand and the summit largely ratifies what has already been agreed.
- FAQ: What does a sherpa do? || Acts as the leader's personal representative, negotiating the substance and wording of summit outcomes with counterparts in the months before the meeting.
Communiqué
- Pronunciation: /kəˈmjuːnɪˌkeɪ/
- Definition: An official statement or press release issued after a diplomatic meeting, conference, or summit, summarising the agreed positions and decisions of the participants.
- Root: French communiqué = something communicated; past participle of communiquer = to communicate; from Latin communis = common
- Origin: Borrowed from French communiqué ("something communicated"), past participle of communiquer ("to communicate"); first used in English in the 1850s.
- Part of Speech: noun
- Word Family: communiqué (n), communiqués (n pl), communicate (v), communication (n), communicative (adj)
- Usage: The joint communiqué issued after the bilateral summit reaffirmed both nations' commitment to a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, yet its carefully hedged language betrayed the persisting divergence on contentious border questions.
- Synonyms: bulletin, statement, dispatch, announcement, declaration, report
- Antonyms: silence, concealment, suppression
- Mnemonic: Hear "communicate" inside communiqué — it is the French for "communicated": an official message communicated to the world after a meeting.
- UPSC: The official statement issued after a diplomatic meeting, and reading one is a skill because the document is negotiated word by word and its language is coded. The first thing to check is what kind of document it is: a joint communique agreed and issued by all participants signals that consensus was reached, whereas a chair's statement or chair's summary is issued on the chair's own responsibility precisely when it was not, so the form reveals more than the content. Within the text the vocabulary is graded, since welcomed indicates approval, noted indicates awareness without endorsement, and expressed concern is markedly stronger than regret. Omissions carry as much weight as inclusions, so the absence of a country's name from a paragraph on a conflict is itself a negotiated outcome. The effort India has invested in particular formulations at G20 and BRICS meetings illustrates how much diplomacy a single clause can absorb.
- Nuance: A joint communiqué is agreed and issued by all participants, whereas a chair's statement or summary is issued on the chair's own responsibility when consensus failed, which is why the form of the document is itself information. A declaration is more formal and usually more substantive. A memorandum of understanding records intended cooperation without creating binding legal obligations, while a treaty does bind. A readout is a brief account of a meeting issued by one participant alone and reflects only that side's characterisation.
- Hindi: विज्ञप्ति (vigyapti); संयुक्त विज्ञप्ति for a joint communiqué.
- FAQ: What is the difference between a joint communiqué and a chair's statement? || A joint communiqué is agreed by all participants and signals consensus, while a chair's statement is issued on the chair's own responsibility when consensus could not be reached.
- FAQ: Why does the wording of a communiqué matter? || Because the vocabulary is graded, with welcomed, noted and expressed concern carrying different weight, and because omissions are themselves negotiated outcomes.
Key Terms
Group of Seven (G7)
- Definition: The Group of Seven (G7) is an informal intergovernmental forum of seven major advanced industrial democracies — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the European Union as a "non-enumerated" participant — that coordinates positions on global economic, political and security issues. It has no founding treaty, permanent secretariat or budget.
- Context: The grouping began as the G6 in 1975, when France, West Germany, the USA, Japan, the UK and Italy met at Rambouillet, France, to respond to the oil shock and global recession; Canada joined in 1976 to form the G7. Russia was added in 1998 to create the G8, but was suspended in 2014 after its annexation of Crimea, returning the forum to the G7. The presidency rotates annually among members, with the host country setting the agenda and convening the leaders' summit.
- UPSC Relevance: This is a foundational GS2 (International Relations) institution that UPSC tests through static and current-affairs angles — its membership, origin year, the G8-to-G7 transition over Crimea, and its informal (non-treaty) character. It is best studied comparatively with the G20, BRICS and OECD, and through India's recurring role as an "outreach"/guest invitee (every summit since 2019, including Kananaskis 2025). Mains relevance lies in debates over the G7's declining share of world output and the rise of plurilateral groupings — foundational concept that underpins questions on global economic governance and India's multi-alignment.
BRICS
- Pronunciation: /brɪks/
- Definition: An intergovernmental grouping of major emerging economies — originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — now expanded to ten full members (with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE joining in January 2024, and Indonesia in January 2025), representing approximately 48% of the world's population and ~37% of global GDP (PPP). BRICS coordinates on economic cooperation, development finance through the New Development Bank (NDB, HQ Shanghai), the USD 100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) as an alternative to IMF lending, and reform of global governance institutions.
- Context: The acronym BRIC was coined by British economist Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs in his November 2001 paper Building Better Global Economic BRICs, projecting that these four economies would challenge the dominant G7. The first BRIC summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009. South Africa joined in 2010, adding the "S." At the October 2024 Kazan Summit (Russia), ten partner countries were added (Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam). Saudi Arabia participated in the 17th BRICS Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 6–7 July 2025) and is listed on the official BRICS website. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration of 12 September 2026 nowhere enumerates the membership and does not name Saudi Arabia, but it does not name Egypt either, an uncontested full member since January 2024, so nothing can be read into that silence; the membership count is best stated as 10 confirmed full members with Saudi Arabia's status unresolved as of 22 September 2026. India held the BRICS chairship in 2026 under the theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability" and hosted the XVIII BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026, which adopted the BRICS New Delhi Declaration; China chairs BRICS in 2027 and will host the XIX Summit.
- UPSC Relevance: GS2 International Relations — Prelims tests current 10 full members (including the 2024-25 expansion), NDB (HQ Shanghai), CRA (USD 100 billion), partner countries, India's 2026 chairship and the New Delhi Summit (12–13 September 2026). Mains asks "Is BRICS a credible alternative to the G7-led order?" and "How does India navigate BRICS while deepening Quad ties?" India's strategic challenge within BRICS — sharing the platform with China despite LAC tensions and a USD 85 billion+ trade deficit — is a premium Mains topic for multi-alignment strategy questions.
G20
- Pronunciation: /ˌdʒiː ˈtwɛnti/
- Definition: An international forum of 19 countries, the European Union, and the African Union (admitted as a permanent member in 2023), representing approximately 85% of global GDP and 75% of global trade, which coordinates macroeconomic policy, financial regulation, sustainable development, and climate action. Unlike the UN, G20 decisions are not legally binding but carry significant political weight due to members' collective economic heft.
- Context: Founded on 26 September 1999 at the G7 Finance Ministers' meeting in response to the late-1990s financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin America; elevated from a finance ministers' forum to a leaders-level summit in 2008 during the global financial crisis, and designated the "premier forum for international economic cooperation" in 2009. India held the G20 presidency from 1 December 2022 to 30 November 2023, under the theme "One Earth, One Family, One Future" (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam). Key achievements included championing the African Union's admission as the 21st permanent member (the first expansion since 1999), achieving consensus on the New Delhi Leaders' Declaration despite Russia-Ukraine divisions, mainstreaming Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), launching the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and co-founding the Global Biofuels Alliance.
- UPSC Relevance: GS2 International Relations — Prelims tests members (19 countries + EU + AU = 21 members), India's presidency outcomes (2023), theme (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam), and key initiatives (IMEC, DPI, AU membership, Global Biofuels Alliance). Mains asks about India's G20 presidency achievements, India's bridge role between Global North and Global South, and G20 vs G7 in reshaping global governance. For a critical perspective in Mains, note that climate finance commitments remained inadequate and no binding outcomes were achieved on trade or debt restructuring.
Sources & Verification
BIMSTEC
BRICS
Indian Ocean forums
- MEA — Press Statement by PM during the India-Mauritius Joint Press Statement, announcing MAHASAGAR (12 March 2025)
- MEA — 24th IORA Meeting of the Council of Ministers (21 May 2025)
- MEA — Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2941, Chairmanship of IORA (13 August 2026)
- IORA — Council of Ministers (accessed 22 September 2026)
- IORA — Member States, 23 members and 12 dialogue partners (accessed 22 September 2026)
- Indian Navy — India assumes chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (20 February 2026)
- PIB — India assumes chairmanship of IONS, 9th Conclave of Chiefs, Visakhapatnam (20 February 2026)
- IONS — Conclave of Chiefs listing (accessed 22 September 2026)
- MEA — 7th NSA-Level Meeting of the Colombo Security Conclave (20 November 2025)
- President's Office, Maldives — 7th NSA-Level Meeting of the Colombo Security Conclave (20 November 2025)
IBSA, NAM, Commonwealth, G77
- MEA — Media Statement of the 13th IBSA Trilateral Ministerial Commission Meeting, New York (26 September 2025)
- MEA — Prime Minister participates in IBSA Leaders' Meeting, Johannesburg (23 November 2025)
- NAM Uganda Chairmanship — President Museveni opens the XIX NAM Mid-Term Ministerial Review, Kampala (15 October 2025)
- The Commonwealth — CHOGM: Apia 2024 and Antigua and Barbuda 2026 (accessed 22 September 2026)
- The Commonwealth — Secretary-General Shirley Botchwey marks one year in office (1 April 2026)
- The Commonwealth — Secretary-General Shirley Botchwey (accessed 22 September 2026)
- G77 — About the Group of 77 and current chairmanship (accessed 22 September 2026)
- UN President of the General Assembly — Remarks at the handover of the G77 chairmanship to Uruguay (14 January 2026)
India-anchored initiatives
- PIB — Eighth Session of the ISA Assembly, Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi (28 October 2025)
- ISA — Assembly sessions and membership (accessed 22 September 2026)
- CDRI — ICDRI 2025 outcomes, recommendations and next steps, Nice (7 June 2025)
- CDRI — Membership and delivery figures; Philippines membership announcement (15 September 2026, accessed 22 September 2026)
- PIB — International Big Cat Alliance becomes a treaty-based intergovernmental organisation (3 February 2025)
- Global Biofuels Alliance — About us, membership (accessed 22 September 2026)
ASEAN, EAS and IPEF
- ASEAN — East Asia Summit participating countries (accessed 22 September 2026)
- MEA — Special Briefing by Secretary (East) on the PM's visit to Malaysia, recording the 22nd ASEAN-India Summit (5 February 2026)
- GTRI analysis reported by Economic Times / Rediff Money — IPEF status, Supply Chain Agreement in force since 24 February 2024, India as Vice-Chair of the Supply Chain Council (5 May 2026)
AI Impact Summit and Global South
BharatNotes